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
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49.1741.



AN OUTLINE OF THE NECESSARY
LAWS OF THOUGHT;
A TREATISE ON PURE AND
APPLIED LOGIC.

BY WILLIAM THOMSON, M. A.

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE OXFORD.

SECOND EDITION MUCH ENLARGED.




LONDON: WILLIAM PICKERING.
OXFORD: W. GRAHAM.
1849.

Καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὄρμη, ἣν ὀρμᾶς ἐπὶ
τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ
τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρηστοῦ εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολ-
λῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται
ἡ ἀλήθεια.

ΠΛΑΤΟ.

TO
SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.
PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,
ETC. ETC.
THIS ESSAY
IS BY HIS PERMISSION INSCRIBED.

49.1741.



and reserve. They have denied to the rules of the syllogism that prominent place once assigned to them, yet at the same time they have refrained from rejecting as cumbrous and unnecessary an instrument which did not subserve any practical end in their systems.

The present work is an attempt to enlarge the science of Pure Logic, so that it may be adequate to the analysis of any act of reasoning. How far it has attained its object ought to be decided by the application of its principles to many miscellaneous examples from different sciences; and whilst I have rigorously and frequently applied this test to it for eight years, I cannot hope that the partiality of an author will be a sufficient guarantee of its pretensions, and therefore commend the same line of examination to any one who believes, with me, that a sedulous practice of logical analysis will richly reward the understanding with accessions of strength and clearightedness. If the result should be the detection of many errors and omissions on the author's part, enough of matter may perhaps be left unshaken, to prove that Pure Logic is not the mere *officina veteramentaria*—the warehouse of useless relics—it is too often taken for,

but a practical system—an important branch of mental culture.

In this edition, besides many other alterations, very valuable help has been derived from the communications of Sir William Hamilton, of Edinburgh, of whose assistance, so fully and freely afforded, yet greater use would have been made, but for the hope that the valuable matter placed at my disposal will soon be accessible to the student as part of his forthcoming work. In the publication of his *New Analytic*, logicians will have to recognize the commencement of a new era for their science. Specific obligations to this great authority have been from time to time acknowledged in the following pages; but they are far from representing the extent of assistance received.

But the doctrine of the syllogism here explained is substantially the same as that of the former edition; and it may perhaps be permitted me, without being suspected of courting a comparison between this little essay and a far superior work, to point out that the twelve affirmative modes in each figure which replace the much more limited number of the old system, are precisely those which Sir William Hamilton has found it necessary, on his own principles, to employ

in his New Analytic. This will be an evidence to the reader that the alteration in question is not rash and arbitrary.

To Professor De Morgan, the author of a very ingenious work undertaken with a similar object, under the title of *A Treatise on Formal Logic*, my best acknowledgments are due for his kind and patient explanations of certain parts of his system.

In Dr. Whewell's two works on the Inductive Sciences, Sir J. F. W. Herschel's *Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy*, and Mr. J. S. Mill's *Logic*, abundant materials will be found for the application of the rules of Pure Logic. In directing the reader to those works, I must add that a collection of *Logical Examples* fairly drawn from different sciences, and arranged in an ascending scale of difficulty, is still much needed, for the use of those who have not time to pursue the subject through several extensive and elaborate works.

W. T.

QUEEN'S COLLEGE,
OXFORD. Feb. 12, 1849.



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OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

INTRODUCTION.

**Εἰπωμεν οὖν διὰ βραχέων τίς ἡ πρόθεσις καὶ τίς ὁ
σκοπὸς πάσης τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης.*

ALEXANDER APHROD.



OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

INTRODUCTION.

EVERY process has laws, known or unknown, according to which it must take place. A consciousness of them is so far from being necessary to the process, that we cannot discover what they are, except by analysing the results it has left us. Poems must have been written before Horace could compose an "Art of Poetry," which required the analysis and judicious criticism of works already in existence. Men poured out burning speeches and kindled their own emotions in the hearer's breast, before an Art of Rhetoric could be constructed.

They tilled the ground, crossed the river or the sea, healed their sicknesses with medicinal plants, before agriculture, chemistry, navigation, and medicine, had become sciences. And wherever our knowledge of the laws of any process has become more complete and accurate; as in astronomy, by the substitution of the Copernican for the Ptolemaic system; in history, by a wiser estimate than our fathers had the means of forming, of modern civilization and its tendencies; in chemistry, by such discoveries as the atomic theory and the wonders of electro-magnetism; our progress has been made, not by mere poring in the closet over the rules already known, to revise and correct them by their own light, but by coming back again and again to the process as it went on in nature, to apply our rules to facts, and see how far they contradicted or fell short of explaining them. Astronomers turned to the stars, where the laws they sought for were day and night fulfilling themselves before their eyes; historians collected facts from the records of different countries, watched men of many races, of

various climates, differently helped or hindered, for there, they knew, the true principles of history were to be read ; and chemists, in the laboratory, untwisted the very fibres of matter, and watched its every pulse and change, to come at the laws which underlaid them. " Even geometry," says the great chemist, Justus Liebig, " had its foundation laid in experiments and observations ; most of its theorems had been seen in practical examples, before the science was established by abstract reasoning. Thus, that the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides, was an experimental discovery, or why did the discoverer sacrifice a hecatomb when he made out its proof ?"*

The same applies to Logic, or *the science of the laws of thought*. The process of thought commenced long before the rules to which it adheres with unfailing strictness, had been drawn out. And though they do not *depend* on experience—*i. e.* their truth may be

* Chemical Letters, Second Series, p. 6.

tried and made manifest without recurring to examples—still without experience, without the power of watching our own thoughts and those of others, there could never have been a science of Logic, which had its origin when some reflective mind, that had for years performed the various acts of thought spontaneously, began to lay down the laws on which they take place, or to give rules for repeating them at pleasure. The clearest reasoner cannot with propriety be called a logician, so long as he disputes spontaneously and without rule; whilst the man of the humblest reasoning powers may lay claim to the title, in so far as he reasons according to laws, ascertained by reflection upon the process of thinking.* If we call Zeno of Elea the inventor of Dialectic or Logic in Greece,† it is not in virtue of his marvel-

* See *Cousin*, *Nouveaux Fragments*, p. 1, seq.

† It is uncertain whether the Hindu work of Gotama, called *Nyaya*, is anterior to the Greek logical system. An account of it is given in *Colebrooke's Essays*, vol. ii. In another place I hope to be able to compare it with

lous ingenuity in arguing against the possibility of motion, because this might have been the result of natural acuteness; but because his arguments, all constructed upon one type, that of forcing his antagonists into an absurd position, by reasonings drawn from their own views, seem to indicate the possession of a logical rule, the same which now

the logic of Greece, to which it bears a strong resemblance. Here a short account of the logical argument, as described in it, may be inserted. "A regular argument or complete syllogism (*Nyaya*) consists of five members or component parts; 1st, the proposition; 2nd, the reason, 3rd, the instance; 4th, the application; 5th, the conclusion. Ex.

1. This hill is fiery,
2. For it smokes.
3. What smokes is fiery; as a culinary hearth.
4. Accordingly, the hill is smoking;
5. Therefore it is fiery.

Some [commentators] confine the syllogism (*Nyaya*) to three members, either the three first, or the three last. In this latter form it is quite regular. The recital joined with the instance is the major; the application is the minor; the conclusion follows." *Colebrooke*, vol. ii. p. 292. Also *Cousin, Histoire*, Leçon vi. and *St. Hilaire, Logique d' Aristote*, ii. 330.

has the name of *reductio ad absurdum*. He had reflected upon those modes of argument which his position led him to adopt spontaneously, and had formed a general rule or plan which assisted him in forming like arguments in future. Logic then, like Philosophy, of which it is a part, arises from the reflection of the mind upon its own processes; a logician is not one who thinks, but one who can declare how he thinks. This important distinction, which has been too often neglected, must govern all researches into the history of the science.

§ 2. Logic has been defined to be *the science of the necessary laws of thought*. But this definition, the correctness of which shall presently be examined more particularly, requires a few words of general explanation. Our thoughts are formed indeed by laws; and when we conceive, abstract, define, judge, and deduce, we put in practice so many ascertainable principles. But does Logic simply explain these laws *in themselves*, or contemplate them *in their uses*, as assisting and regulating our efforts in searching after know-

ledge? This distinction is analogous to that which is drawn between Anatomy and Physiology, the former of which simply examines what are the parts of the human frame, and the latter, the Science of Life, dwells upon the uses and developments of the parts: the one declares that I have a brain, and the other determines that it is the principal seat of passion, sensation, and reason; and that it is weak in childhood, strong and constant in mature life, and subject to a gradual decay in age. It is competent to us unquestionably to consider the principles of thought under this twofold aspect of their nature and their employment. Thus, if we take a judgment; say, "The happiness of the human family will increase in proportion to the increase of mutual love," and consider it in its own nature, we shall decide that it is a judgment correct in form, that certain other judgments may be gathered from it, that it has some qualities which may belong to a judgment, and wants others; and so far we are only looking at the judgment *in itself*, by what we know of the laws of judgment. But if

we consider this example in connection with truth and knowledge, we are led to examine further, whether it is false or true, whether in forming it we fulfilled those conditions, of observation and reasoning, without which we have no right to expect a true result, to what region of thought it belongs, and what is the method, be it testimony, deduction from principles, or observation of facts, by which judgments are to be obtained in that region? In the former case we only put in requisition what may be called *pure Logic*, which is defined to be *the science of the necessary laws of thought in their own nature*; whilst the questions in the latter case belong to *applied Logic*, or *the science of the necessary laws of thought as employed in attaining truth*. It remains to ascertain, whether the distinction is worth preserving in our exposition of the science. Many logicians, believing that they must undertake to teach men "the art of reasoning," do not attach any value to the laws of thinking, except in so far as the employment of them may help men to think, and so to enlarge their stock

of truth ; that is, they do not regard pure Logic as a distinct branch of their subject. But there is one grand reason for the opposite course. Truth is a wide word, and denotes all that we can ever know of ourselves, the universe, and the Creator. The science which explains how the mind deals with truth, must be loose and indefinite, as its object matter is of infinite extent ; so that applied Logic can never attain perfect completeness and precision, because it can never affirm that it has shown how the mind deals with every part of truth and knowledge. But the laws of thought themselves are few in number, and lie, in examples of perpetual occurrence, under every thinking man's observation ; and therefore it may be declared with tolerable correctness when a full and accurate view of pure Logic has been taken. To secure that which we have completely mastered, it is desirable to keep it separate from that in which perfect completeness is hopeless ; and therefore we purpose to consider Logic under two distinct lights, first as a science of laws, and next as a science of

laws applied to practice. But here a caution is necessary (which we shall have to repeat in connection with the tripartite division of pure Logic itself) that as the distinction is in a measure arbitrary, for the laws of thought are always put in force with a view to the attainment or communication of knowledge, it will be impossible to maintain it with perfect consistency throughout our labours. Occasions constantly arise when the line of demarcation becomes blurred and confused ; when the bare laws of thought cannot be explained without the mention of that truth, in the search for which they are always employed : thus, in treating of Definition, which is one form of judgment, we imply the existence of a person *for* whom it is necessary to define a given notion that he may possess the true meaning of it, and be able to identify the things for which it stands. All that can be expected from us is, that, even if we find it necessary to repeat the same truths in the two divisions, we do not desert our point of view, but explain the laws of thought, first, mainly for themselves, and then mainly in

relation to truth, which is the object of all thought and enquiry.

Pure Logic (which is later in the order of discovery than applied, inasmuch as it is formed by abstracting from that more general science,) takes no account of the modes in which we collect the *materials* of thought, such as, Perception, Belief, Memory, Suggestion, Association of Ideas; although these are all in one sense laws of thought.* Pre-

* “ Now universal Logic is either pure or applied Logic. In the first we make abstraction of all empirical conditions, under which our understanding is exercised; for example, of the influence of the senses—the play of the imagination—the laws of memory—the power of habit, of inclination, &c. ; consequently also of the sources of prejudices, nay, in fact, in general, of all causes out of which certain cognitions arise to us or are pretended to do so, since they merely concern the understanding under certain circumstances of its application, and in order to know them, experience is requisite.”—*Kant's Critique*, p. 58, English Transl. The ground here taken is different from that in the text. I do not say they are *contingent*, for memory, for example, enters into every act of thought; but, that they are *subsidiary*; thought is not complete without them, but at the same time thought is never complete with them alone.

supposing the possession of the materials, it only refers them to their proper head or principle, as conceptions, as subjects or predicates, as judgments, or as arguments. It enounces the laws we must observe in thinking, but does not explain the subsidiary processes, some or all of which must take place to allow us to think. Metaphysics is the science in which these find place ; but they also belong to *applied* Logic, because they are so many conditions under which the human mind acquires knowledge. Again, in pure Logic, the different processes of the mind are regarded in their perfect and complete state ; whilst in applied, the imperfect faculties of man, the limited opportunities of observation, the necessity of deciding upon a question when the materials of a judgment are still insufficient, impose many limitations on the perfection of our knowledge. Thus, whilst pure Logic only treats of arguments that are certain and irrefutable, applied Logic is compelled to admit, and to gauge the value of, such an argument as this—"All men seek revenge, and therefore Theophilus will

avenge himself," where the premiss, not being true of all men without exception,* will taint the conclusion with its own uncertainty. Indeed, the most important duty of applied Logic is to determine under what conditions imperfect arguments, such as the Example, the Imperfect Induction, the Deduction from a proposition that is not truly universal, and some of the Rhetorical Enthymenes can be fairly employed, and to show, that though these weaker forms are so many deviations from a perfect demonstrative argument, they are so far from superseding the perfect forms, that in reality each of them appeals to, and attests the cogency of, some perfect form, to which it strives, as it were, to conform itself. As we are anticipating, a very easy example must suffice to illustrate our meaning. Every one is perfectly certain of the truth of the proposition that *men grow infirm and die* ; of which we have been convinced partly by our own experience of men, and partly by the experience

* It is the *εἰκὸς* of Aristotle.

of others, delivered to us from all quarters, in the sober pages of the moralist as well as in the reckless lyrics of the reveller. Nor does our conviction of this truth permit itself to be disturbed by the consideration, which is likewise undeniable, that the whole aggregate of this experience does not in itself warrant any statement having *all* mankind for its subject: that even supposing the decadence and death of every man in times past had been observed, which is utterly inconceivable, at any rate there are many now living upon whom the common doom has not passed, and whose cases therefore cannot enter into the sum of our experience. In a word, we have concluded from an experience that *many* men have become infirm and died, the much wider truth that *all* men do so; and this is warrantable in the given case, and we are right in rejecting upon the faith of it an assertion, unless supported by evidence that transcends experience, that one man has not died, such as we have in the fable of the Wandering Jew, or a proposal to obviate death in future, such as was involved in the

search of the alchemist for an Elixir of Life. But that this mode of argument from a particular to a universal, from *some* to *all* is not valid in itself, is evident from applying it to another case, in which it is absurdly false; *some men are tall, therefore all men are tall*: and the only form perfectly indisputable in itself would be, "the men whom we have observed have all died, and these men are all men, that is, the only men, therefore all men die," which from the nature of this case cannot be employed. But applied Logic first shows that this perfect argument is the measure of the validity of the other; that our conclusion is only true if we can say, not indeed "these men are all men," which is impossible, but the equally *general* proposition "These men are (*as good as*) all men;" thus, conforming really to the perfectly conclusive argument; and next, how and under what circumstances we can conform the incomplete to the complete enumeration, how *some* can ever be said to be as good as *all* for purposes of argumentation.

But it is time to proceed to examine the

different parts of the definition of pure Logic, by shewing that Logic is a science, rather than an art—that it is a science of the necessary laws or forms of thought—that it has thought rather than language for its adequate object-matter.

§ 3. *Logic is a science, rather than an art.* The distinction between science and art is, that a science is a body of principles and deductions, to explain the nature of some object-matter: an art is a body of precepts, with practical skill, for the completion of some work. A science teaches us to know, and an art to do; the former declares that something exists, with the laws and causes which belong to its existence, the latter teaches how something must be produced.* An art will of course admit into its limits every thing which can conduce to the per-

* Περὶ γένεσιν τέχνη, περὶ τὸ ὄν ἐπιστήμη. *Aristotle. An. Post.* II. xix. 4. By science in the text is meant the *speculative* science of *Plato* and *Aristotle*; by Art the *practical* science. *Plato* seems to use τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη as interchangeable terms (*Theæt.* 146, c.). Again (*Politicus*, 258, D, E.) he divides ἐπιστήμῃαι into

formance of its proper work; it can recognize no other principle of selection. The painter may fail of perfect success from employing improper colouring materials, or a muddy and perishable varnish, as well as from incorrect drawing or ill-managed light and shade; the lower defect and the higher are fatal to that perfect picture which he wishes to produce. So that an art may contain precepts of a very dissimilar character; the painter must be taught Expression, Anatomy, and mixing of Colours; the Rhetorician must learn to manage his thoughts, his hearers, and his hands, with equal dexterity. The science, on the other hand, having the object-matter for its touchstone, admits nothing except what relates directly to it; and so a far greater unity and simplicity naturally belongs to it. Geometry treats of no-

πρακτικά) and γνωστικά); the latter he would subdivide (260, B.) into *critical*, which end in judging merely, and *epistactical*, which lead us to some practical result. See also *Theæt.* 202, D. For *Aristotle's* view of Science, consult, among other places, *An. Post.* i, ii. Top. vi. viii. 1, *Eth. Nic.* vi. iii.

thing but the properties of space, because it is a pure science, whilst the arts founded upon it, such as Land-surveying, must bring in such topics as inequalities of surface, use of instruments, and the like. The science of Musical Counterpoint teaches the theory of harmonic progressions, and nothing else; but the musician's *art*, in which it is employed, must add the knowledge of instruments and their compass, of the human voice, even sometimes of the powers of a particular finger. Now in the popular meaning of the word Logic, no doubt the notion of an *art* is more prominent; to be able to reason better, and to expose errors in the reasoning of others, is supposed to be the object of this study.* But those writers who have followed out this view have been compelled to go over too wide a field for any one system. Logic must be the widest of all arts or sci-

* Upon the historical question, whether Logic is an Art or a Science, most valuable remarks will be found in a paper by *Sir William Hamilton*. *Edinburgh Review*, 115, p. 202, seq.

ences ; because thinking, which is its object-matter, belongs to all the rest ; it is *ars artium*, the art which comprehends all others, because its rules apply to every subject on which the human mind can be engaged. If then it is to be taught as an Art, it should contain specific rules for reasoning or thinking in every region of thought ; it must propose to itself nothing less than to enable men of the most various capacities to apply a set of principles to effect the work of thinking correctly, under all circumstances. And the consequences are, an enormous expansion in the first instance, from the huge mass of heterogeneous materials ; and a consciousness of incompleteness in the second, since it is impossible to suppose that so vast a work has ever been completely achieved. Works in which the attempt has been made, often contain a chapter on Scriptural Interpretation, and perhaps another on Forming a Judgment on Books :—can it be supposed that the precepts under either of these heads can be complete ? The one is an epitome of all Theology, and the other, it might be

said, of all wisdom. Now Logic may be unquestionably an Art or a Science; but it seems that all we can do is to lay down the principles of the science and leave each student to form for himself his own art, to teach himself how to employ these principles in practice. In this way we may attain something like completeness in a moderate compass, and may escape those incessant shiftings of the boundaries of the art, which are inevitable where men have to select a finite number of precepts out of infinite knowledge.

Those who represent Logic as both art and science are accustomed to assume that all arts, possessing the principles of correspondent sciences, teach their application to practice, so that art is but science turned to account. In the case of Logic this is not very far from the truth; but as a general statement it is false, for it overlooks that notion of *unconsciousness* which is commonly involved in Art. Shakespeare is admitted to be a consummate artist, but no one means by this that his plays were composed only to de-

velope a certain exprefs theory of Dramatic Poetry, fuch as Coleridge, Horn, or Ulrici have fince founded upon them. No: the man of fcience poffeffes principles, but the artift, not the lefs nobly gifted on that account, is poffeffed and carried away by them. "The principles which Art *involves*, fcience alone *evolves*. The truths on which the fucces of Art depends, lurk in the artift's mind in an undeveloped ftate; guiding his hand, ftimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of enunciated propofitions."* And becaufe the artift cannot always communicate his own principles, men fpeak of his "*happy art*," as if it were almoft by chance or *hap* that his works were accomplifhed;† and it was the fafhion of the laft century to fpeak of Shakefpeare himfelf as a wild, untutored child of genius, not even to be named as an artift, becaufe in truth his plays wanted dra-

* *Whewell's* Philofophy of Ind. Sciences, II. p. 111.

† So we have the line of *Agatbo*, Τέχνη τύχην
ἔστειλε, καὶ τύχῃ τέχνην.

matic *science* and were not obedient to the law of the dramatic unities. So that the praise of being a good logician, or of having a logical mind, is sometimes awarded where there is little or no acquaintance with the science of logic. An understanding naturally clear, and a certain power of imitation, will enable the thinker or speaker to pour forth arguments which might serve for examples of all the logical rules, not one of which he has learnt; and without some share of these talents, no precepts would avail to make a reasoner. But when we write upon Logic, the unconsciousness of the artist must be left out of the account, because it cannot be communicated by rules. By the art of Logic we mean so much of the art of thinking as is teachable, and no more. The whole of every *science* can be made the subject of teaching.*

In treating of Logic as a science, we shall not forget that the ultimate object of the

* Διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι. *Aristotle's Eth. Nic.* vi. iii.

study is strictly practical, and shall labour to state the principles in such a way as to facilitate to the student their application as an art. If we would redeem Logic from the charge usually brought against it, that it is a system of rules which the initiated never employ, and the uninitiated never miss, it must be by giving it a far more extensive verification in practice than it usually receives. The inconsistency of teaching a science, where we mean that an art should be ultimately learnt, is only apparent, not real ; and at any rate is less injurious than that of those who teach an “instrumental art” which is never reduced to practice, and of which the very attempt would at once demonstrate the insufficiency.

§ 4. *Pure Logic is a science of the necessary laws of thought.* After the remarks already made,* this subject will need less illustration. Logic only gives us those principles which constitute thought ; and presupposes the operation of those principles by

* P. 11, seq.

which we gain the materials for thinking. Thus I have a conception of *house* which sums up and comprises all buildings in which men live; how did I obtain it? Logic answers that it was generalized from different single houses which I had seen, by noticing what points they had in common, and by gathering up these common features into a new notion. It tells us further that this conception has various powers, that it may be defined, by declaring what I understand by it, that it may be divided, as into "houses of the rich" and "houses of the poor," that by comparing it with other general notions, as church, quay, monumental pillar, I may form a more general conception, in which all these may be comprehended, that of building. In all this Logic is to a certain extent my guide, because *conception* is one great function of thought; but with considerable reservations. It only tells me what is true of *all* conceptions, and leaves me to apply the principles to this particular one; for about *houses* Logic of course knows nothing, and to know what is a house and what not,

I must go to Architecture or to common sense. Logic only tells me what principles I *must* put in practice in forming any general notion whatever ; but to her all general notions are alike. She makes no account of the great diversity of the classes of things they represent ; king, animal, acid, mammal are all alike to her, and ranked together as conceptions, though the sets of objects they severally stand for, have little resemblance. Logic then takes no account of the *contents* of a conception, of the things from which it is generalized ; these are contingent *to her*—if any given class from which a conception is now formed were annihilated, there would still be conceptions. The function of conception is essential to thought ; its laws are accordingly laid down, but their particular use must be determined by the particular sciences. Logic teaches me what Generalization, or the forming of common notions from many things, is ; but Botany teaches me to generalize upon plants, Political Economy upon the facts of social prosperity, and Geometry upon the properties of space.

In another direction also Logic seems to stop short, and to leave to another science what it was incumbent upon it to explain. Our conceptions are formed from single objects ; how do we come to know these ? The logician replies, that it is not his business to shew how, but that for the most part they are derived from the senses, by means of which we are put in communication with the external world. But many farther questions arise out of this answer. What are the senses ? How much of every notion conveyed by them is new, how much is the result of the experience of past impressions ? Does my *sight* tell me that yonder steeple is about three miles off, or is it my understanding co-operating with my sight ? Is there no doubt that the senses report truly ? Are we even certain that there *is* an external world ? To these and many like questions the logician has one answer ;—" I presuppose a man able to perceive, to receive impressions from the surrounding world, and then merely explain the principles on which he *must* proceed, in combining his impressions and

drawing inferences from them. The speculations you suggest are highly interesting, and all who would understand the mind of man must enter upon them ; but the science of Metaphysics, or of the Human Mind has already taken them up, and, closely connected as Logic is with this science, it is *expedient* that they should divide the ground. Logic therefore presupposes a mind capable of, and actually receiving, impressions ; though, perhaps, if there were no such science as Metaphysics, it would be necessary even in a logical work to give a preliminary account of the origin of all knowledge."

§ 5. *Pure Logic is a science of the form, or the formal laws of thinking*, and not of the *matter*. Though we may doubt the policy of preserving an expression like *form*, the meaning of which, originating in a loose and vague metaphor, is difficult to catch and retain, it is so generally used in connexion with Logic that some attempt to explain it seems demanded by our present purpose.

A statue may be considered as consisting

of two parts, the marble out of which it is hewn, which is its *matter* or *stuff*, and the *form* which the artist communicates. The latter is essential to the statue, but not the former, since the work might be the same, though the material were different; but if the form were wanting we could not even call the work a statue. This notion, of a *material* susceptible of a certain *form*, the accession of which shall give it a new nature and name, may be analogically transferred to other natures. Space may be regarded as *matter*, and geometrical figures as the *form* impressed in it. The voice is the *matter* of speech, and articulation the *form*. But as it is the form which proximately and obviously makes the thing what it is (although there can be no form without matter), the word form came to be interchanged with *essence* and with *nature*. Already we have left the original sense at some distance.

With thinkers to whom the metaphorical sense was not so prominent, the word is used in three distinct but cognate senses. It is, first, a law or an idea, which are the same

thing seen from opposite points. "That which, contemplated *objectively* (that is, as existing externally to the mind) we call a law; the same contemplated *subjectively* (that is, as existing in a subject or mind) is an Idea. Hence Plato often names Ideas, Laws; and Lord Bacon, the British Plato, describes the laws of the material universe as ideas in nature. *Quod in naturâ naturatâ lex, in naturâ naturante idea dicitur.*"* Lava, heated metal, boiling water, the rays of the sun, all rank under one common form (that is, law) of *heat*, namely: by which is meant that they, all and each, contain whatever is essential to heat. Lead, gold, vermilion, stones, and (in a greater or less degree) all bodies, possess weight; the law of weight then is their form—the law under which they all come, the condition with which they all comply. By virtue of this form they are, not bodies indeed, but *heavy* bodies: in other words, if we suppose that form or law to be expunged from the tables of the uni-

* Coleridge's Church and State, p. 12.

verse, their existence as to that nature or property would terminate; or if the *idea* of weight were removed from the mind, we could no longer know them as heavy bodies.

Now how does every one of the given instances come under the forms, heat and gravitation? By something contained within itself—by its embodying the law or definition: that which comes under the form of *weight*, must possess weight, must have in it all that the definition of weight demands. And here we may trace the second meaning of the word form: it is *that part of any object through which it ranks under a given law*. Every new object represented to the mind is referred to different laws, called forms, by virtue of various qualities in itself, each of which is termed metonymically, and with respect to the law under which it is the means of ranking the representation, its form. When we observe (say) a stone, the mind proceeds to class the representation of it, afforded by the senses, under the various forms of *colour, figure, size, weight, temperature, &c.*; and with reference to the *form* (law)

of weight, the weight of the object would be its form (essential part), with reference to the form of colour, the colour of the object would be its form. So that that, which in the object, when viewed in relation to one law or form, is its form (essential part), is not its form when it is viewed in relation to another. Now the *matter* of any representation is that part of it which with reference to any given law is non-formal.* Thus in our stone, the weight, size, temperature are parts of the matter, as far as the law of colour is concerned, for they are all non-formal, and the colour of the stone alone is formal. The matter is that which, when added to the form (essential part), gives it extra-neity — *outness* — objective existence. Without something more than the mere form, there can be no *instance* of a law, an instance being the presence of the law in an object capable of containing it, and thus pre-

* Hence the same thing is alternately form and matter. See *Ritter's History*, III. p. 121, (Eng. Transf.) for this point in Aristotle's doctrine.

supposing two things, the law and the capable object, whereof we term one the form and the other the matter. *Ex. gr. triangle* may be conceived by means of its own *form* or definition alone, but it must have a material part, it must become *a* triangle of stone, or wood, or ink on paper, as the condition of its external existence. When no separation, according to some law or other, of a representation into its formal and material part takes place, that is, where it is referred to no law or conception already in the mind, there must be total ignorance of the object represented: the representation must remain obscure, and can never amount to a cognition. The absolutely material part of a cognition would be that which remains unknown after it has been brought under as many forms as the mind can reduce it to; that which never becomes the condition of its ranking under a law. Forms have a triple mode of existence; they exist in the Divine Mind as ideas, and are the archetypes of creation; they exist as embodied in "instances" or examples, in which mode they

are laws; they exist lastly in the human mind as ideas: thus they precede creation, they are in it, they succeed it.

Writers of this school give yet a third sense to the word form; as it denotes the law, so by an easy transition it stands for the class of cases brought together and united by the law. Thus to speak of the form of animal might mean, first, the law or definition of animal in general; second, the part of any given animal by which it comes under the law, and is what it is; and last, the class of animals in general formed by the law.

The sense attached at the present day to the words form and matter is somewhat different from, though closely related to these. The form is what the mind impresses upon its perceptions of objects, which are the matter; form therefore means *mode of viewing* objects that are presented to the mind. When the attention is directed to any object, we do not see the object itself, but contemplate it in the light of our own prior conceptions. A rich man, for example, is regarded by the poor and ignorant under

the form of a very fortunate person, able to purchase luxuries which are above their own reach; by the religious mind, under the form of a person with more than ordinary temptations to contend with; by the political economist, under that of an example of the unequal distribution of wealth; by the tradesman, under that of one whose patronage is valuable. Now the object is really the same to all these observers; the same "rich man" has been represented under all these different forms. And the reason that the observers are able so to find many in one, is that they connect him severally with their own prior conceptions. The form then in this view is mode of knowing; and the matter is the perception, or object we have to know.* Hence, when we call Lo-

* A few passages to illustrate these various meanings, may be added here. *Plato* uses form in all the three senses, of law, distinctive or essential part, and species (which last word means *form*); as these places will show.

"Remember then, that I directed you not to teach me some one or two holy acts out of many, but that

gic a science of the formal laws, or the form, of thinking, we mean that the science is only concerned with that which is essential

very form by which all holy acts are holy
 Teach me then, the nature of that form itself, that looking to it and using it for our example, I may declare any of the actions of yourself or any other, which partake of this nature, to be holy, and any not so partaking, not to be holy."—*Plat. Euthyp.* 6, D. E. "And of the just, the unjust, the good, the evil, of all the forms in short, the same holds true, that each is one and simple, but because every where appearing by incorporation with actions, or matter, or other things, that each appears many."—*Resp.* 476, A. "For we have been accustomed to lay down one form for many particular cases, on which we impose the same name."—*Resp.* 596, A. "And according to the same form of justice, a just man will nowise differ from a just city, but will be like it."—*Resp.* 435, B. See also *Symp.* 205, D.; *Resp.* 581, E.; *Polit.* 258, E. Lord Bacon says, "The form of any nature is such that where it has place the given nature is also, as an infallible consequence. Therefore it is ever present where the given nature is so, it attests that nature's presence, and is in it all. The same form is such that upon its removal the given nature infallibly vanishes. Therefore it is invariably absent where that nature is so, it in those cases disavows that nature's presence, and is in it alone."—*Nov. Org.* II. 4. "The examination of forms proceeds thus. Concern-

to, and distinctive of, the thinking process. Every act of thought, is a thought *about* something; it has *matter* as well as *form*. Every common noun is a sign of the act of conception; thus crystal is a conception formed from comparing together many inorganic bodies which have spontaneously assumed certain regular forms; animal, a conception from comparing many live crea-

ing the given nature we must first bring together before the intellect all the known instances, agreeing in that nature, though manifesting it in vehicles [*i. e.* in matter] the most dissimilar."—*Nov. Org.* II. 11. Again, "When we speak of forms, we understand nothing else than those laws and manifestations of the pure act, which order and constitute any simple nature, as heat, light, weight, in any sort of matter and subject that can contain them. Therefore, the form of heat or form of light, and the law of heat or light is the same thing, nor do we ever abstract our thoughts from actualities and active manifestations."—*Nov. Org.* II. 17. Again, "For since the form of a thing is the very thing itself (*ipsissima res*), and the thing no otherwise differs from the form, than as the apparent differs from the existent, the outward from the inward, or that which is considered in relation to man from that which is considered in relation to the universe [*or* universal mind], it follows clearly that no

tures. Here the form is the same, for both are conceptions, and it is this quality which constitutes them thoughts; but the matter is different, for one is about certain inorganic solids, and the other about living creatures. Logic, not being concerned with the things that thoughts are formed from,* ranks the two together: it is for Mineralogy and Zoology to distinguish between them, Logic

nature can be taken for the true form, unless it ever decreases when the nature itself decreases, and in like manner is always increased, when the nature is increased."—*Nov. Org.* II. 13.

Rutter in his History shews the analogy between form and difference, matter and genus respectively, in the writings of *Aristotle*; *Plotinus* indeed asserts their absolute identity.—*Ennead.* II. iv. 4. For a collection of passages to illustrate *Aristotle's* doctrine, see *Waitz's Organon.* comm. on 94. a. 20. To our own great writers the philosophical senses of the word *form* were well known. *Taylor, Andrewes, Hooker, Berkeley, Butler, Sir Thomas Brown, Coleridge*—supply instances which are now before us. But the subject has already occupied our attention long enough. *Keckermann's* Logic affords materials for understanding the views of the old logicians.

* See p. 24. *seq.*

only knows them for their formal or logical value. Are they conceptions? are they judgments, syllogisms, definitions, or genera? Occupied only with the bare laws of thinking, Logic must leave to other sciences the consideration of the various matters upon which these laws operate. In these thoughts —“ life is short” —“ Mirabeau was said to have been poisoned” —“ the radii of a circle are equal,” we have only one form or law of thinking, namely Judgment, exhibited in connexion with various things or matter.

The philosophic value of the terms matter and form is greatly reduced by the confusion which seems invariably to follow their extensive use. Whilst one writer explains form as “ the mode of knowing” an object, another puts it for “ distinctive part,” which has to do with the being or nature of the thing rather than with our knowledge of it; where it means “ shape” in one place, which is often a mere accident, in another it means “ essence;” so that it may be brought to stand for nearly opposite things. I will add, that probably there is no idea which

these terms represent that cannot be conveniently expressed by others, less open to confusion.

§ 6. Logic is said, in the language of the old writers, to be concerned only with second notions or intentions. The distinction between first and second intentions is connected with that which has been drawn between matter and form. Notions are of two kinds; they either have regard to *things as they are*, as horse, ship, tree, and are called first notions; or to things as they are *understood*, as notions of genus, species, attribute, subject, and in this respect are called second notions, which however are based upon the first, and cannot be conceived without them. Now Logic is not so much employed upon first notions of things, as upon second; that is, as we have said, it is not occupied so much with things as they exist in nature, but with the way in which the mind conceives them. A logician has nothing to do with ascertaining whether a horse or a ship, or a tree exists, but whether one of these things can be regarded as a genus or species, whether it can

be called a subject or an attribute, whether from the conjunction of many second notions a proposition, a definition, or a syllogism can be formed. The first intention of every word is its real meaning; the second intention, its logical value, according to the function of thought to which it belongs.*

* See *Bule* (*Aristotle* i. p. 432) whose words I have followed. See also *Crackanthorp*, (*Logic. Proem.*) and *Sir W. Hamilton* (of Edinburgh) in the *Edinburgh Review*, No. 115, p. 210. There is no authority whatever for *Aldrich's* view, which makes second intention mean apparently "a term defined for scientific use;" though with the tenacious vitality of error it still lingers in some quarters, after wounds that should have been mortal.



OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

LANGUAGE.

“Nomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerum.”

“Ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
παθημάτων σύμβολα.”—*Arist. de Int.*

§ 7.

HITHERTO we have assumed that the adequate object matter of Logic is *thought*, rather than language; that having explained the laws of thinking, it is not bound to examine under what conditions these manifest themselves in speech. But logicians do not invariably follow this course; those who regard it as an act of reasoning, seeing that reasoning is not conducted

but by language, and that many of the chief impediments to the correct performance of the process, lie in the defects of expression, make speech and not thought the matter with which they are primarily concerned. The name of Logic itself would not be inconsistent with this view; since *logos* may mean the outer or the inner word—the *sermo internus* or the *sermo externus*—the articulate expression or the thought itself. Here then the relation between thought and language must be ascertained.

Language is not only the vehicle of thought, but it is a great and efficient instrument in thinking. By observing the properties common to several things, we are able to divide them into groups or classes, and to speak of and reason about the classes, instead of tediously recurring to each individual at every stage of our progress. Wanting this power we should be utterly unable to cultivate science in any the lowest degree, because science is but the grouping of single cases under laws. Nay, we could not form one rule or maxim upon the subjects of com-

mon experience, for rules and maxims too are general, and founded upon many particular cases. Let any one endeavour to think or speak upon a subject without employing general terms, and he will not only find his powers crippled by being precluded from all truths of this kind, but also that he cannot even give his accustomed names to the single objects which meet his senses ; since he has long been in the habit of making general serve instead of proper names, to save a needless multiplication of the latter. The star which the astronomer knows as Sirius he calls “ that star ;” the mountain which is Cader Idris in the map is “ that mountain ;” thus, remembering the general characters of similar objects, he applies them to a new special case, without taking the trouble to ascertain its distinctive features and to mark them by a proper name. Now the comparison of several objects and the formation from them of a general notion is a prerogative of thought alone ; but the preservation of the notion for future use belongs to language. In the higher truths of science,

names are conspicuously useful for fixing and, as it were, making portable the results of complicated trains of thought. The word *isomorphism* is familiar to chemical students, and appears in their manuals. It means "power of assuming the same forms;" and it recalls to them the discovery of Gay Lussac and Mitscherlich, which could not be explained without many words, that some elements either crystallize in the same form, or may be substituted for each other in compounds, the proportions remaining the same, without change in the form which the compounds assume. The reasonings that arise from this law, which throw light upon the nature of the ultimate elements of matter, are greatly simplified by our power of carrying it with us as one word; and it is probable that if no attempt had been made to *name* the property, its discovery would have been forgotten from the mere difficulty of recalling it to the mind and explaining it to others. The words inertia, affinity, polarization, are so many examples of a law conveyed in a name. On the other hand,

our eminent anatomist, Mr. Owen, complains of the embarrassments produced in his science, by having to use a *description* where a name would serve; for instance, a particular bone is called by Soemmering “pars occipitalis strictè sic dicta partis occipitalis offis spheno-occipitalis,”* a description so clumsy that we may be certain the bone will not be mentioned more frequently than absolute need requires. In many cases, the privilege of giving the name which all the world shall employ, is conceded to the man or the nation who first clearly perceives the attributes, sees that they make one notion, and determines how it shall be designated. We are indebted to the finer observation of the French for the names *ennui*, *naïveté*, and *fineffe*, for which we have given our own *comfortable* in exchange: and an Englishman may notice with a smile of satisfaction that *das gentlemanlike* makes its appearance in a German author.

* See Owen on the vertebrate skeleton in Report of British Association for 1846.

§ 8. But it is not only in the higher laws of science, or the more subtle qualities which social refinement develops in men and in society, that the power of naming is the power of fixing the fleeting colours of thought. So long as we are content with the bare reception of visual impressions, we can in a measure dispense with words, because our remembrance of the image of each object will serve instead of its name to ourselves, and a picture of it may represent it, though by a cumbrous and difficult process, to the minds of others. But thought never stops with the mere inspection of objects. In the simplest case, we proceed to *decompose* the sensitive impression into its parts. The tree which our eyes behold is found upon reflection to be tall or stunted, blooming or withered, old or young, straight or gnarled, waving in the wind or still; and these properties have no independent existence, but are parts of the visible object; they are *entia rationis*, and exist separately in the mind alone. Whence then is our power of recalling them with such marvellous precision

and facility? How is it that we can keep them safely apart in the mind, instead of being obliged to look for them mingled and confused, in the objects from which we first disentangled them by reflection? By virtue of the name which we have attached to each of them; which, like the labels upon the chemist's jars or the gardener's flowerpots, enable us at once to identify and secure the property we seek. Names then are the means of fixing and recording the result of trains of thought, which without them must be repeated frequently, with all the pain of the first effort.*

Leibniz was the first, so far as I know, to call attention to the fact that words are sometimes more than signs of thought; that they may become thoughts. His distinction between *symbolical* and *intuitive* [*notative*] conceptions† contains a very important law of

* Upon this, consult *Damiron* Logique, p. 200, seq. and *Duval-Jouve*. Logique, p. 199. seq. *Mill* on the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 86.

† *Erdmann's* Ed. p. 79. *Acta Erudit.* an. 1684.

thinking. Where our notion of any object or objects consists of a clear insight into all its attributes, or at least the essential ones, he would call it intuitive. But where the notion is complex, and its properties numerous, we do not commonly realize all that it conveys; the powers of thinking would be needlessly retarded by such a review. We think more compendiously, by putting a symbol in the place of all the properties of our notion, and this naturally is the term by which we are accustomed to convey the notion to others. A name then, employed in thought is called a *symbolical cognition*; and the names we employ in speech are not always symbols to another of what is explicitly understood by us, but quite as often are symbols both to speaker and hearer, the full and exact meaning of which neither of them stop to unfold, any more than they regularly reflect that every sovereign which passes through their hands is equivalent to 240 pence. Such words as the state, happiness, liberty, creation, are too pregnant with meaning for us to suppose that we

realize their full sense every time we read or pronounce them. If we attend to the working of our minds we shall find that each word may be used, and in its proper place and sense, though perhaps few or none of its attributes are present to us at the moment. A very simple notion is always intuitive ; we cannot make our notion of brown or red simpler than it is, by any symbol. On the other hand a highly complex notion, like those named above, is seldom fully realized—seldom other than symbolical. Here then is a second use of names ; they serve to abbreviate the process of thought, as we have seen that they are useful in recording its results. And it may be noticed here that this distinction of cognitions throws a new light on the nature of definitions, or explanatory propositions, which are not, as they are often regarded, mere explanations to others of a meaning which we ourselves duly apprehend, but are real acts of thought, which by unfolding before us some marks of our conception, partially or wholly unseen by us,

have all the power of new truths even for ourselves.

§ 9. Passing over, as sufficiently obvious, the value of language as a means of communication, let us remark that the power of naming is not its only, and scarcely perhaps its greatest, use. Besides objects and their qualities, we can reproduce in speech the mutual relations of objects, the relations of our thoughts to objects; and lastly, the order and relation of our thoughts themselves; for which we must employ, in addition to names or nouns, the other parts of speech. Now as the mind never receives impressions from without passively, but reflects upon them, decomposes them into their elements, and compares them with notions already stored up, language, the close-fitting dress of our thoughts, is always analytical,—it does not body forth a mere picture of facts, but displays the working of the mind upon the facts submitted to it, with the order in which it regards them. This analysis has place even in the simplest descriptions. “The bird is flying” is an ac-

count of one object which we behold, and its present condition. But our object was one thing, whilst our description mentions two—"bird" and "flying,"—and it is plain that this difference is the result of an analysis which the mind has performed, separating, in thought, the bird from its present action of flying, and then mentioning them together.* If painting and sculpture are considered languages,† we have in them language that does not employ analysis; and a picture or statue would be called by some a *synthetic*, or compositive, sign, from the notion that in it all the elements and qualities of the object which would have been mentioned separately in a description, are *thrown*

* See Mr. *Smart's* Sematology, ch. 1, § 3.

† Language is thus divided by M. *Duval-Jouve*, *Logique*, p. 201,

Languages are	{	Natural	{ Absolute— <i>Cries and Gestures.</i>
			{ Conventional— <i>Speech.</i>
	{	Artificial	{ Absolute— <i>Painting and Sculpture.</i>
			{ Conventional— <i>Emblems, Telegraphic Signs, Hieroglyphics, Writing.</i>

together and represented at one view. The statue of the Dying Gladiator gives at one glance all the principal qualities so finely analysed by the following description, which however includes also the poet's reflections upon and inferences from the qualities he observes; the *objective* impression is described, but with a development of the *subjective** condition into which it throws the narrator.

"I see before me the Gladiator lie:
He leans upon his hand—his manly brow
Consents to death but conquers agony,
And his drooped head sinks gradually low—

* Not to understand these words is a disqualification for the study of modern philosophy. The *subject* is the person who receives impressions; the *object* is the external thing which gives them. When I see a mountain, I am the subject, and the mountain the object. Subjective therefore would mean "relating to the mind that thinks;" objective, "relating to the thing thought of." This use of the words, though now universally followed, is of modern origin; formerly that in which any qualities inhered was called the "subject" of them—a very different use of the word. See *Trendelenburg*, *Excerpta*, p. 52. Ed. iii. To the passages there quoted add *Clauberg*, *Logic*. p. 63.

And through his side the last drops, ebbing flow
 From the red gash, fall heavy, one by one,
 Like the first of a thunder-shower ; and now
 The arena swims around him—he is gone,
 Ere ceased the inhuman shout which hailed the wretch
 who won.

“ He heard it, but he heeded not—his eyes
 Were with his heart, and that was far away ;
 He recked not of the life he lost, nor prize,
 But where his rude hut by the Danube lay,
 There were his young barbarians all at play,
 There was their Dacian mother—he, their fire,
 Butchered to make a Roman holiday !
 All this rushed with his blood—shall he expire
 And unavenged ? Arise ! ye Goths, and glut your ire ! ” *

Here the analysis of the impression is carried to its farthest ; and in the second stanza the *object* becomes quite subordinate to the inferences and fancies of the subject. But it is all the more striking as an illustration of our law, that language is the analysis, as painting and sculpture are the imitations, of a sensible impression.

§ 10. But different languages are more or less analytic, and the same language be-

* *Byron's* Childe Harold, Canto iv.

comes more analytic as literature and refinement increase.* This property indicates, as we should expect, corresponding changes in the state of thinking in different nations or in the same at different times. With increasing cultivation, finer distinctions are seen between the relations of objects, and corresponding expressions are sought for, to denote them. Where the powers of a particular case of a substantive were once sufficient to express a whole class of relations, we find afterwards several prepositions brought in to shadow forth the minute differences between them. Again, where the termination of the verb was once sufficient to denote the person whose action the verb described, whilst the pronoun was only used as an additional mark when great emphasis was required, more modern habits, exalting the notion of personality, always assign a distinct word to the person. Thus the Greeks were able to express "I have a pain in my head" by three words, Ἀλγῶ τὴν κεφαλὴν: they needed

* See *Donaldson*, *New Cratylus*, B. I. ch. 3; *Duval-Jouve*, *Logique*, p. 203; *Damiron*, *Logique*, p. 207.

no word to distinguish the person, and merely qualified the verb by "the head" to express the seat of the pain. Our expression analyses the verb into three notions, "I," the person, "pain," the thing I suffer, and "have," the relation; and marks more precisely by the preposition "in" that the head is the seat of the pain; so that our analysis is much more complete than that of the Greek. As a language acquires more of this character, and multiplies pronouns, prepositions and conjunctions, it begins to forget its inflections, because it can express all their powers by circumlocution with these new expletives. As syntax becomes more complex, inflections grow simpler. Our own language has almost lost the terminations of cases and persons; and French writers attribute part of the clearness of their own tongue to the same feature, and the consequent necessity of determining the relations of words clearly by proper connectives. The Greek language has preserved its inflections, although it has also acquired a full and complicated syntax; which is owing probably to the fact that the

Homeric poems moulded and set the former before the necessity for the latter had arisen. Perhaps the Greek of Homer shows more than its original share of syntax from the touch of later editorial hands, like that of Peisistratus. Here then is a further use of language, and a proof of its intimate adaptation to thought. As the distinctions between the relations of objects grow more numerous, involved and subtle, it becomes more analytic, to be able to express them: and, inversely, those who are born to be the heirs of a highly analytic language must needs learn to *think up* to it, to observe and distinguish all the relations of objects, for which they find the expressions already formed, so that we have an instructor for the thinking powers in that speech which we are apt to deem no more than their handmaid and minister.

§ 11. The superiority of spoken language over the language of painting and sculpture, has been the frequent subject of remark. One reason for it is that whilst the artist can only effect with certainty an impression upon

the eye, and must depend upon the sensibility, often imperfect, of the spectators for the reproduction in their minds of the emotions that suggested his subject and guided his hand, the poet by his description can himself call up the appropriate feelings. Upon the forehead of the Dying Gladiator what chisel could inscribe plainly that which the poet bids us read there ?

— “ his manly brow
Consents to death but conquers agony.”

In the picture of the Crucifixion at Antwerp, by Rubens, one of the most powerful specimens of “ the brute-force of his genius,” the action and purpose of more than one of the figures have been variously understood, and therefore by one party or another misunderstood. It is a disputed question whether the mounted soldier is looking with reverence at the chief Figure, or with cruel calmness at the agonies of one of the thieves ; and whether the soldier on the ladder has broken the legs of the thief, or is preparing to do so. Art finds few to understand its sweet inarti-

culate language ; but the plainer and fuller utterances of poetry cannot be misunderstood. Another reason of its superiority may be found in the greater power of words to *suggest associations* that knit up our present impression with others gained from the past, or, better still, bring our emotions and moral feelings into connexion with our present impression. What painting of a house can ever convey so much to a feeling heart as the short description—" This is the home in which I spent my childhood ? " The sculptor raises a tomb, and covers it with the ensigns of piety and death, but his art tells us less after all than the brief inscription, " He died for his country," or, " he looks for immortality."* The painter cannot dip his pencil in the hues of the spirit ; the sculptor's drill and chisel cannot fix in matter the shapes which the mind assumes. The artist's thought remains unexplained, or depends upon the casual advent of congenial interpreters. In

* Compare *Cousin*, Philosophie du Vrai, &c. Leçon 27 ; and *Burke*, on the Sublime, § vii. 5.

the comments upon our famous pictures and statues I read so many acknowledgments of the inferiority of the language of art to that of speech. Art would need no commentators, if it were thoroughly competent to tell its own story.

§ 12. But great as are the services which language performs for thought, it must not be supposed that an examination of the rules of language would answer every purpose of a logical system. As we are now constituted, our thoughts are invariably clothed in speech; we use words even if we do not utter them. But if articulate speech were withdrawn from man, it cannot be supposed that thought would for ever cease. On the contrary, wherever personal defects or external circumstances deprive the mind of this means of communication, it succeeds in providing an efficient substitute, and attains by practice much the same facility in the use of it as we enjoy in the exercise of the powers of speaking. Those among the deaf-and-dumb who have been taught by the pains of an enlightened humanity to converse and to think,

must use, instead of the remembered words which we employ, the remembered images of hands, in the various combinations of finger-speech, as the symbols of their thoughts. The deaf-and-blind, taught the names of objects from raised letters, must think, not by associations of sound but of touch. The telegraph, and the signals on railroads, are new modes of speech; and though an inexperienced practitioner may have at first to translate such signs into common language, the skill which comes from practice soon prompts him to omit this needless intermediate step. The engine driver shuts off the steam at the warning sign without thinking of the words to which it is equivalent; a particular signal becomes associated with a particular act, and the interposition of words becomes superfluous. Dr. Hooke, the inventor of the telegraph, called it "a method of discoursing at a distance, not by sound but by sight;" and it is conceivable that we might learn to think by the telegraphic signals, so that "red flag over blue," seen with the eye or recalled by the memory, might be our *word*

for happiness. Leibniz* suggests the possibility of employing various tones instead of articulate words to convey our notions; and mentions that the Chinese, having a slender vocabulary, use the aid of tone and accent to vary and augment it. The *Ranz-des-vaches* that rends asunder the heart of the Swiss exile, to him is but a *word* for "country and home;" and the signet of the king sent to his servant, or the broken *astragalus*, by which the "guest-friend" reminded his fellow of his plighted hospitality, are signs which plainly and certainly suggest thoughts, and therefore they are words also. Without thought, language would cease; but we can conceive the language we use might be denied to us, and yet thought still proceed with the assistance of some other class of signs. And it is scarcely philosophical to found an analysis of the reasoning powers upon that which, however useful to the reason, may be conceived to be universally, as it is now in isolated cases, separated from it, without de-

* Nouv. Ess. iii. 1.

stroying its action. Granting that the processes of thought may be traced to a great extent in the signs which it employs, they are still but signs, and if the process beneath them can be examined in itself—as we need not fear to maintain that it can—then to view it only in the instruments it uses is to leave our survey shallow and incomplete. Logic should expound the laws of thinking, and universal Grammar the laws of speech, apart from their special modifications in any given language. These two sciences would mutually illustrate each other; whilst a clear separation between them would probably have the effect of elevating the latter into an importance not hitherto assigned it. No confusion can result from introducing principles of language into Logic, as has been often done, so long as thinking is made the adequate object matter of the science, and language comes in only as the minister of thought; indeed as the general principles of Grammar are very seldom laid down, they must either be picked up from logical works or learnt imperfectly by natural acuteness.

The question we have just considered—whether thinking could proceed without articulate words as its signs—must be distinguished from the more difficult one—whether thinking could dispense with *all* signs. The latter we do not pretend to answer here; but it may be hinted that thinking and science are not identical, that even if trains of systematic reasoning are quite beyond the reach of any but a speaking, “word-dividing” being, the simpler acts of thought may perhaps be within his reach. Without language, all the mighty triumphs of man over nature which science has achieved would have been impossible. But this does not prove that man might not, without speech, observe objects, gather them into groups in his mind, judge of their properties, and even deduce something from his judgment. Weak and incomplete the process of thought would be; but we dare hardly say that one could not think at all.

§ 13. But in no subject is it more necessary to distinguish between the actual, and the

merely conceivable. Language and thought have never been put asunder, but in a few exceptional cases. With some nations they have the same name; with all, the rules of the one are readily applied to the other.

There are two opposite views of the origin of language, which seem equally erroneous, as supposing that thought has actually been separated from speech.* The one asserts that man could not have *invented* speech, because it obeys the laws of reasoning, and reflects them in examples; but reasoning cannot be developed and perfected without language, therefore language must have been previously given: and indeed it would seem impossible that men should agree to invent language without *having* language in which to communicate to each other the agreement. Language therefore was an original gift of the Creator, and the development of thought followed the possession of it.

But we must either suppose that at the

* *Rauch's Psychology*, p. 229. New York. 1840. 8vo.

time of the gift the mere word had power to convey a conception to the mind, whereas all experience testifies that a new and strange word conveys absolutely nothing: or else that the words were taught before there were any conceptions to fit them, as the mother makes clothes for her unborn son, and that thoughts were adapted to them by degrees. Either alternative is so startling that men are apt to fly to a contrary opinion, and to maintain that the different families of men invented for themselves arbitrarily, by the power they possess of imitating natural sounds, such words as they required to represent their notions; in proof of which, appeal is made to the great diversity of languages. But this opinion, pushed to its fullest extent, presents a difficulty not more easily disposed of than the other. It assumes that men had notions and conceptions before they found names for them, as the view we have just left supposed names for which correspondent notions were yet to be found; and we have seen already that the mind needs the aid of language in forming and preserving

its conceptions.* Surely the marriage of thought and speech need not be thus nullified. A more reasonable account, and one which sacred history fully warrants, is that the gift of reason, once conveyed to man, is the common root from which both thought and speech flow, like the pith and the rind of a tree, to be developed in inseparable union. He who created Adam gave him this power, and then brought all the beasts of the field to him "to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof."† In the fullest sense, language is a divine gift; but the power and not the results of its ex-

* Compare pp. 42 seq.

† Gen. ii. 19. On this Section see *Rauch's* Psychology, pp. 227—233. The historical grounds of the question we do not examine. Comp. *M. Duval-Jouve*, *Logique*, §§ 189, seq. According to *M. Cousin* language began when some cry or gesture, produced instinctively at first in consequence of some inward feeling or impression, was produced *voluntarily* upon the recurrence of the same feeling, with a view to express it. This is the element of all that is conventional in language. See *Frag. Philosoph. ii.* on *Maine de Brian*.

ercise, the germ and not the tree, was imparted. A man can teach names to another man, but he cannot plant in another's mind that far higher gift—the power of naming, which demands nothing less than a divine power. From the first we have reason to believe that these two functions went together. A conception received a name; a name recalled a conception; and every accession to knowledge of things expanded the treasures of expression. And we are entangled in absurdities by any theory which assumes that either element existed in a separate state, antecedently to the other.



OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

INTRODUCTION CONCLUDED.

§ 14.

LOGIC has been called an *a priori science*. The distinction between truths *a priori* and truths *a posteriori*, as observed universally by modern writers, may be drawn as follows. If there are any truths which the mind possesses, whether consciously or unconsciously, before and independent of experience, they may be called *a priori* truths, as belonging to it *prior* to all that it acquires from the world around. On the other hand, truths which are acquired by observation and experience, are called *a posteriori* truths, because they come

to the mind *after* it has become acquainted with external facts. How far *a priori* truths or ideas are possible, is the great *campus philosophorum*, the great controverted question of mental philosophy. In entering into it, and that only so far as our present purpose requires, we must remove from it one great cause of misunderstanding. No one at present maintains that the mind can know any thing at a point of time before its observation of external things began; a mind in that condition would be full of thick darkness. However independent of experience any process may appear to be now, as for instance, that by which geometrical truths are proved, we may be sure that we made much use of observation before we deduced the very laws which place it in our minds far above all need of confirmatory evidence from observation.* A mind which never observed, would not be a mind. But the question is whether even the facts which we observe do not furnish evidence that something has been

* See p. 3.

in the mind before it was directed to the facts; just as we know by looking at something that we have eyes, and must have had them before we looked, although without putting them to their proper use we could never have known that we had them at all.* Now without going into the dispute as to how much of our knowledge is *a priori*, we may be able to show that at least the conditions of all knowledge are so,—that the mind does not simply reflect the images of things without, but impresses characters of her own upon them,—that our knowledge of things is not the exact counterpart of the things, but of the things and the mind operating together. When we see our image in a mirror, (to use Bacon's similitude) we know that our shape is the cause of it on the one side and the power of reflection in the mirror on the other; if we were to see it multiplied, or increased, or diminished, or changed in hue, we should infer that the

* Coleridge. Lit. Rem. i. 326; and Friend, i. 307, note.

mirror had several angular faces, or was concave, or convex, or made of tinted glass. Each of these properties would be inherent in the mirror *prior* to our presenting ourselves before it; they are its *a priori* laws; although we could only ascertain them *a posteriori*, by a trial. When an image is received upon the mirror of the mind, we see that the latter also has its laws and properties. Our remark upon one object of common occurrence is "the bird is flying against the wind." Have we here no more than the single object which the eye presents? There are three distinct notions, of a bird, of its being in the act of flying, of the direction of its flight; so that the mind has decomposed the one object into three impressions; and there is besides an act of deciding upon the agreement of these impressions, expressed by the word "is." And as the object does not resolve *itself* into three parts, but is to all intents and purposes one, and as there can be nothing in the object to correspond to the act of judging expressed by the word "is," we conclude that the

power of analysis of the simple impression into three, together with that of judging upon it, belong to the mind itself. Further, as we have no reason to think that this object created the two powers, or did more than call them into action, we conclude that they were present *a priori*, that is, prior to the impression from without. And again, for the same reason that they are not found in this object of sense,—that is, because they decompose it into many parts and judge upon its parts, which no object can do for itself—we conclude that they were not learnt from any object we may have seen before; and therefore they are absolutely *a priori*, they are independent of all experience.*

* The various modes of expressing the antithesis between thoughts and things are here exhibited in a tabular form.

Man,	.	as opposed to Nature
Thoughts,	„ „	Things
Theories,	„ „	Facts
Reflection,	„ „	Sensation
Subject,	„ „	Object
Form,	„ „	Matter.

Whewell's Phil. of Ind. Sci. vol. I. B. i.

Hence we may understand the importance which attaches to Leibniz's well known comment on the maxim of the school of Locke;* to the *nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu*, he adds—*nisi intellectus ipse*. The mind does not simply receive the impressions of the senses, like the passive surface of a mirror; it groups them, judges about them, separates their qualities from each other, and draws inferences about the qualities which like objects, hitherto unknown, may be expected to have. But qualities, classes, inferences, are not objects of sense, however they may reside in or be drawn from those objects. They have no separate existence out of the mind; whilst, within it, they are perfectly distinct. This transmutation of objects of sense into their elements must therefore be the work of the mind alone. It is a law of the intellect it-

* *Leibniz*. Nouveaux Essais. ii. 1. p. 223. Erdmann's Ed. *Locke* himself admits "ideas of reflection," gained by observing the mind's own actions, besides "ideas of sensation." On Hum. Under. ii. vi. 1.

self, and never was nor can have been in the sensuous impressions we have received.

Pure Logic treats only of these laws or conditions to which objects of sense are subjected in the mind ; and hence it is called an *a priori* science. It unfolds the laws of the *intellectus ipse*, and gives no account of the impressions of the senses.* It will enumerate, for instance, all the different kinds of judgments which can be formed, but will not pretend to decide upon the truth of any one judgment respecting something which is now before the eyes. As the laws of the understanding are few and invariable, whilst the phenomena in the world around us appear, from our imperfect knowledge of their complicated laws, very uncertain, Logic is far less liable to error than those sciences which have to do with external facts. Thus the truth that " if A is B and B is C, then A must be C," cannot be denied, whatever we suppose these letters to represent. The formula is universal and necessary ; it was so

* Compare p. 26.

in the days of Aristotle, and will be as long as there remains upon the face of the world one mind to think. But an *a posteriori* science—a science of external facts—like Astronomy, though using demonstration, depends upon observation, and the accuracy of its calculations is in a direct ratio to her opportunities of observing all the circumstances which may affect them. It can never be a necessary truth that after each interval of two hundred and twenty-three lunations the sun will be eclipsed; grounded only upon facts, whenever some convulsion shall be prepared by the Creator to disturb them, its prediction will fail. Calculations of the period of the return of comets have sometimes failed, because of our defective means of observation; thus the return of the comet of 1770 was promised in five years and a half; it falsified the prediction, and never returned at all.

This view of Logic as an *a priori* science, it is hoped, will meet with a general assent; and we purposely abstain from touching the great question of Metaphysics—how much of our knowledge is from the mind itself

and how much from experience. The conflicting opinions upon this matter will never be reconciled, and perhaps the best service which philosophy could receive would be rendered by marking out the region which must be mutually ceded by the opposite schools.*

§ 15. *Uses and Pretensions of Logic.* The acts of the mind are so quick, so numerous, so complex, that they are not easy to note and describe, although we daily perform

* Before leaving the subject, it must be noticed that the term *a priori* has undergone important changes of meaning. In *Aristotle's* philosophy the general truth is "naturally prior" (πρότερον τῇ φύσει) to the particular, and the cause to the effect; but since *we* know the particular before the universal, and the effect before we seek the cause, the particular and the effect are each "prior in respect to us" (πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς). Anal. Post. i. ii. Top. vi. iv. Metaphys. v. (Δ) xi. p. 1018. Ed. Berol. Following this, the Schoolmen call the argument which proceeds from cause to effect, *a priori* demonstration. But with *Hume* (Sceptical Doubts) *a priori* has the sense given in the text, which *Kant* has fixed in the language of philosophy. See *Trendelenburg's* *Excerpta*, p. 81, Ed. iii. *Sir W. Hamilton's Reid*, p. 762.

them, and that without serious mistake. Logicians have generally erred on the side of underrating the number both of the mental processes themselves, and of the particular acts which go to the attainment of any judgment or conception. As the act of standing erect, so simple apparently, calls into operation a very numerous array of muscles, by means of which the body perpetually sways and adjusts itself, without the mind's being conscious of any effort, so we may believe that the mind goes through acts, which from long practice scarcely awaken her own attention, much less the sense of pain and effort, yet which involve a great number of subordinate acts, depending on distinct principles. And as it takes the physiologist many pages of explanation, to analyse a posture which a three years' child assumes and retains without difficulty, so the logician seems to spend too many words upon the rules of thinking, since all men, from the statesman to the clown, are able to think, whether they have learnt rules or not. To show that the complexity we speak of really belongs to thoughts

apparently very simple, it may be necessary to examine an example. When Captain Head was travelling across the Pampas of South America, "his guide one day suddenly stopped him, and, pointing high into the air, cried out 'A lion!' Surprised at such an exclamation, accompanied with such an act, he turned up his eyes, and with difficulty perceived, at an immeasurable height, a flight of condors soaring in circles in a particular spot. Beneath this spot, far out of sight of himself or guide, lay the carcass of a horse, and over that carcass stood, as the guide well knew, a lion, whom the condors were eyeing with envy from their airy height. The signal of the birds was to him what the sight of the lion alone would have been to the traveller, a full assurance of its existence."* Here was an act of thought which cost the thinker no trouble, which was as easy to him as to cast his eyes upward, yet which from us, unaccustomed to the subject, would require many steps and some labour.

* *Sir J. Herschel's Prelim. Discourse.* p. 84.

The sight of the condors convinced him that there was some carcass or other ; but as they kept wheeling far above it instead of swooping down to their feast, he guessed that some beast had anticipated them. Was it a dog or a jackal ? No ; the condors would not fear to drive away, or share with, either ; it must be some large beast, and as lions abounded, or had been seen in the neighbourhood, he concluded that one was here. These steps of thought at least, and probably many more, rushed through his mind with the proverbial swiftness of thought, but they were summed up in the words " A lion." Daily and hourly we run through similar or more complicated trains of thinking, with no more consciousness of the several links than the organ-player has of each note he strikes in a rapid passage of full harmony. As the logician professes to give an account of the thinking process, he must try to follow all these out, and show the laws on which they severally depend. He may incur the charge of tediousness in showing (for instance) that our notion of " house"

in general, is formed by the successive steps of Comparison, Reflection, Abstraction and Generalization, for every one has been forming such general notions all his life without knowing one of these hard names; or that “he will come, for he said he would” contains three terms and three propositions, joined together by a sign of inference, which should appear in a certain order; for we can all manage our inferences without these formalities. But still he must not shorten his explanation at the expense of truth; these are laws of thought, and it is his business to ascertain them, just as the physiologist thinks himself bound to examine all the rules of the bodily motions and positions so unconsciously assumed. But is there any gain to mankind from this analysis? Would not natural logic suffice, without a number of technical rules, uninviting to learn, hard to remember, and seldom applied? What is the *use* of Logic?—I answer, that knowledge itself is a use, and that all legitimate enquiry rewards itself with its own pleasures. The appetite for finding out laws from facts, causes

from effects, necessary truth from fleeting occurrences of the day, puts in its claim to gratification, which is as legitimate, if less imperious, as that of the animal nature for food and sleep. The studies which enwrap the soul of Archimedes in the siege, of Aquinas at the royal feast, of Joseph Scaliger during the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's, must have been a source of pleasure, pure and high, from which they had a right to draw. If the question, What "fruit" does it bring?—which the Baconian philosophy puts so often, be understood, as it certainly ought not, to refer only to the *material* wants and comforts of humanity, it is a base, sordid and stupid question, against which every better mind indignantly protests. Science was never brought to its present height by hopes of wealth, plenty and comfort alone, but chiefly by those *mirabiles amores* with which she can inspire her followers. He who loves to see the processes of his mind reduced to their laws and causes, to him are logical studies a pleasure—to him they bring fruit.

But whilst even the coldest followers of Bacon* admit that the value of science must not be estimated by what she can actually perform, no doubt it must be granted that even the highest sciences do condescend to help our lowest wants. Astronomy, Chemistry, Geology and Mechanics not only furnish delightful contemplations to the student, but they put food into the mouths of the vulgar; they clothe them, and fill their purses, they put houses over their heads, and adorn them with objects of beauty and convenience. Logic has its use also in improving the condition of men; it teaches, or perhaps I may only say, may be made to teach, them to think. This is often denied, and partly on account of the extravagant claims put forward by logicians, who assume that the acquisition of a few logical rules will enable men to think correctly, just as the possession of a watch enables them to ascer-

* See *M. Comte*, *Philosophie*, iii. p. 280, as against the brilliant but (I think) mistaken view of Bacon and the old philosophers, in *Macaulay's Misc. Essays*. "Bacon."

tain the hour. No science can make such pretensions. The active intellect has two parts, one of which originates our thoughts, and may be called the suggestive, whilst the other checks and judges thoughts as they arise, and may be called the critical, power. Thoughts are continually suggested without the consent of the will. One would think indeed, were it not for the obvious similarity these spontaneous visitors bear to the matter of former study, that they were in no sense our own, that an independent being, over whom one had absolutely no control, was whispering within us. In the poetical temperament, where the power of suggestion strongly predominates, the thoughts which arise are less like any thing one remembers, than in ordinary minds; and hence poets have maintained, perhaps in full sincerity, that an unseen spiritual power, higher than themselves, used them as the channel of its teaching,—that they were inspired.* The

* *Plato* again and again mentions this claim of poets. See *Ion*, 533, *D. Apol. Soc.* 22, *B. C. Legg.* 719, C.

suggestive power may be educated as certainly as, though more gradually than, the critical. The discovery which we call a flash of genius, a happy thought, really depends as much upon previous acquirements, as the power of stating a case or applying a rule does. These bright suggestions never occur to the ignorant;* they have the facts before them, but their imaginations are not trained to leap to the proper inference from them. All discipline of the suggestive must proceed from the critical power; it is by a long, careful, patient analysis of the reasonings by which others have attained their results, that we learn to think more correctly ourselves.

Meno. 99, B. C. Phædrus, 245, A. Stallbaum (Preface to Ion) does not think that *Plato* would deny to the poet a modifying power over the dictating principle. But the truth is, *Plato* still allows them all they claim, in order that the absence of voluntary action (*αὐτονομία*) in all they do, may be seen and despised. Compare *Ovid.* (Fasti. vi. 5) *Cicero* (de Div. i. 37). *Morgenstern* (de Rep. p. 296). Dictation and inspiration are distinguished, *Coleridge's* Table Talk, ii. 30.

* See this beautifully illustrated in *Whewell*, Phil. Ind. Sci. B. xi. § 5.

He who reads over a work upon Logic probably thinks no better when he rises up than when he sat down ; but if any of the principles there unfolded cleave to his memory, and he afterwards, perhaps unconsciously, shapes and corrects his thoughts by them, no doubt his whole powers of reasoning gradually receive benefit. Perhaps the principal advantage which science has received from Bacon's great work, has arisen from his denouncement of hasty generalization,* which being easily remembered, and applicable to all subjects, has much influenced the practice of all scientific students who have become acquainted with it. In a word, every art, from Reasoning down to Riding and Rowing, is learnt by assiduous practice, and if principles do any good, it is proportioned to the readiness with which they can be converted into rules, and the patient constancy

* Nov. Organ. i. 19. 20. 22. Not that *Bacon* first discovered this abuse of the law of Anticipation. *Plato* knew it well enough. *Philebus*. 16. Ε. οἱ δὲ γῶν κ.τ.λ. and has stated it almost in the same way.

with which they are applied in all our attempts towards excellence.

No one will pretend to say that Logic has been fairly treated in this respect. Our view of the elements of Logic has indeed been very imperfect, and would be quite insufficient for scientific analysis; but no attempt has been made to widen and improve it, because we have not tried to put it to use, and so shewn its inadequacy. In some popular treatises, of latest date, both English and French, the rules of syllogism are passed lightly over, as rusty weapons that have no place in the armoury of science—"You will find them somewhere—in Aristotle, in the Schoolmen, or in Manuals—we admit their existence, but to teach them is beside our purpose—we present you only with a small specimen or two for curiosity's sake." This course is to us unintelligible. The rules in question claim to be those which regulate the act of reasoning; if a system professes to teach reasoning, it should either give us the rules complete, or prove that they are false or defective. A large book on Logic that refers

us to another book for the rules of the great logical act, does not fulfil its duty ; and suggests a suspicion that these rules have not been made use of as the instrument of scientific research—that proper trouble has not been taken to ascertain how far they are really applicable to such a purpose, and how far absurd and useless. I believe that if a set of rules, as free from technicalities of form and expression as is consistent with complete accuracy, be sedulously applied to the examination of the books we read, more especially to the history and theory of some particular science, the mind will receive great and signal benefit, and the creative powers will be increased as well as the judgment strengthened. In past days it was worth while to learn the scholastic terminology, because it ran through all scientific practice ; the theology and metaphysics of Aquinas and Occam vindicate their right to spend time upon the barbarisms of their Logic. Let us get by degrees a logic which is to our philosophy, what that of the Schoolmen was to theirs, and no one will complain that

some of its expressions are technical and its rules hard to understand. Technicalities are only wearisome, where we have no hope of their after-fruits to lure us through them.

On these grounds, we try to make the analysis of thinking as complete as possible, and beg the student to master a few new names, expecting that the trouble so bestowed will not be grudged as a preparation for that habitual examination of thoughts and arguments which is the great means of teaching us to reason. For, the rules of Logic, those of syllogism for example, do not teach a new trick of argument, nor furnish an instrument by the possession of which we are at once enabled to speak or dispute. There is neither trick nor magic in them; they are principles which we call into use every hour of our lives. They do not impart any new faculty, but lay bare before us the nature of that reasoning which has been from childhood our delight and our prerogative. Who shall say that this is a frivolous or unworthy study?

§ 16. But it is thought advisable that

young men who are not inclined to examine with habitual patience their own thoughts or the procedure in any of the real sciences, should acquire some slight knowledge of Logic. In this case, we cannot expect the same diligence in learning technical terms and rules, as they will not be required hereafter. The difficulties of mode and figure will be reluctantly mastered, because in popular language no one mentions them. But what is the course adopted? We attenuate the science, where we ought to simplify it; we reduce the size of our manuals in the vain hope of lessening their difficulty: and there remains little more than a catalogue of hard terms with harder explanations—little else than a reliquary of the dry bones of that system of knowledge which five hundred years ago was alive and breathing. No wonder that untrained minds are repelled. Instead of explanation and illustration of common things, they find the plainest and simplest veiled behind the terms of a forgotten metaphysical system; they are commanded to master all the rules required for

an extensive practice of logic, though they never mean to enter upon such a course, and are not encouraged to do so now, except by the most puerile examples. Surely it is not worth their while to learn the language of a region of philosophy in which they are never to travel. Surely it would be possible to give them some sound and accurate instruction in the nature of their thoughts and minds, making use only of the language of common life. Every art and science has the right to form its own terms; but necessity can alone justify the exercise of it. New facts and laws require new words, but he who hides a well-known thing by a strange name, makes truth ridiculous by the robe of mock dignity he clothes her with. Only in the hope that the nomenclature of logic which the following pages contain may become familiar by a steady course of logical practice, do I invite my reader to master it. But where there is to be *no* practical application of the rules, it would be advisable to study some popular work, in which the

leading principles only of mental or physical science are familiarly expounded. A book like Sir J. Herschel's Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy carefully read will do more to expand the mind than years of toilsome study of the technical rules of thought pursued without that practice of logical analysis which is its natural complement.

§ 17. In the division of the subject, I see no cause to deviate materially from the ordinary distribution into three parts, the first treating of Conception, or the power of forming general notions, the second of Judgment, or the power of deciding whether two notions agree or not ; and the third of Syllogism, or the power of drawing one judgment from another. To these a fourth part, in which Method, or the power of using the other three functions in the discovery of truth, is explained, has been added ; which answers to the applied Logic of the present work. But it is proper to notice one or two objections to this division.

In beginning with conceptions, we are charged with putting the last, first.* Men cannot get a clear conception without passing a judgment about it; nor can they always pass a judgment without certain reasonings, or syllogisms; so that we go to the third part of Logic to establish what belongs to the second, in order that from that we may more clearly understand something which relates to the first. Why not *begin* then with the third?

Whilst this regressive order is certainly natural, and whilst a Logic might be written which set out from the sentence or the syllogism, and analysed it into judgments, and then again into conceptions; the contrary procedure from the simplest element of reasoning, the conception, to the syllogism which is its complete act, will be found in our opinion easier to follow. The analysis has long since been performed, and we find it convenient to proceed by synthesis, in this as

* *Kant* throws out this objection; but it applies to his own treatise on Logic, if to any.

in many other sciences. But the objection is valuable, as bringing out the contrast between the natural course of reasoning and its technical explanation. Why do we reason? To find whether some judgment, which has suggested itself to our minds, be true or not. Why do we seek to make this judgment? To add something to the clearness of the notion that is its subject. Copernicus reasoned to prove that the globe revolved round the sun; and he established this judgment that when men thought of "the globe" in future they might know it as "the revolving globe." All the reasonings in Aristotle's Ethics are to give a more adequate notion of happiness;—of Plato's Republic, to improve our notion of justice;—of Bacon's Organon, to afford a more accurate conception of Method.

§ 18. Another objection against the division is that it distinguishes parts which are really confused;* that, for example, when we divide such a conception as that of "gases"

* *Damiron*, Logique, p. 4.

into inflammable and non-inflammable, we really pass a judgment, though we explain division in the first part of Logic, which treats of Conception.

The answer to this may be suggested by that to the preceding one. We do not deny that the processes of the mind run into one another, that a man judges when he forms conceptions, and so on; we only ask for leave to *describe* each process separately. Our arrangement is confessedly artificial.

Some logicians indeed argue that properly speaking Judgment is no distinct act of thought, but rather a part and condition of every act. Every notion seems to imply a judgment; when I think of the Queen, gravitation, or virtue, I mean that the Queen—gravitation—virtue *exists*; so that we have one common attribute which we affirm of every thing, that of existence. But it is one thing to say that a judgment *may* be, and another that it *is*, made. The distinction between a complex notion and a judgment is that whilst in the one several attributes have been brought together already, in the

other we formally bring a subject and its attribute together. My notion of freedom implies that it is the state of being able to do as I will, having respect however to the rights of others, and that this is a state possible for men ; but I do not formally *affirm* either that it contains these attributes or that it is possible, and therefore my mentioning freedom involves no judgment, although I may if I please form judgments about it. We must carefully distinguish between a possible and an actual judgment—between a notion which is and one which may be the subject of a judgment.

§ 19. Method, which is usually described as the fourth part of Logic, is rather a complete practical Logic. Whilst the other three parts describe each a distinct and complete product of thought, the Conception, the Judgment, and the Syllogism, no such whole is treated of in the doctrine of Method ; which may be used for making a whole science, or a whole speech, a system or a sentence. Method is rather a power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that

it does, than its tangible product.* Hence we put in the place of rules for Method as a *part* of Logic an Applied Logic, which shows under what conditions in the several regions of enquiry the three acts of thought may be safely performed ; and how far rules can avail to direct the mind in the use of them to profitable or beautiful results.

The attempt to apply the rules of Logic will both raise and lower the opinion which obtains concerning the worth of the science. Those who condemn it altogether, as wholly arbitrary and artificial, as a set of rules for arguing, put together in an age when truth was less the object of desire than argument, may find to their surprise that it is only a searching and systematic account of processes which they daily perform, whether in thought, or in argument, in the pursuit of a science or in the transactions of the street and market. Those on the other hand who expect that Logic will be to them a golden key to un-

* See the fragment on Method in *Coleridge's Friend*, vol. iii.

lock the treasure house of the knowledge of the universe, will find that it neither gives them nor pretends to give, any new power; that it only refines and strengthens powers they already possess; that out of a dunce it never yet made a philosopher. Whilst its rules apply to every science, and it may therefore lay some claim to its ancient titles—the Art of Arts, the Instrument of Instruments—it only assists us in the study of the sciences, not stands in their stead. We must fight our own way over every inch of ground in the field; but Logic will often prevent our throwing away our blows. She can do no more. Sophists of Greece may offer to teach us “a trick worth a hundred minæ,” which is to be the secret of all wisdom; or Lully and Bruno may pretend so to arrange in tables the results of human research that a child may know where to put his hand on the most recondite secrets, and employ them at pleasure. But these are wild dreams of the infants of science, which thinkers in their sober, waking moments hardly mention but

with a smile. We only affirm that when men think, these are the rules according to which their thoughts run, that the knowledge of laws and principles, independent of ulterior profit, is always gratifying to active minds, and that inasmuch as the clear understanding of what is right, is always useful for the avoidance of what is wrong, Logic is an useful instrument in thinking. But it gives us the forms of knowledge, not the matter. It will not lay bare the hidden springs of moral action; nor explain the mystery of life, of sleep, of fancy, of memory; nor display the future destination of man and the world. Still less will it be to us instead of eyes, if, turning away from this ball of earth on which we stand, we try to look off to the Infinite—the Absolute—the Eternal, whose nature will not take the mould of our intellectual forms, who comprehends us, when we vainly think that we comprehend Him.

OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

PART I.

CONCEPTIONS.

“ Non obstant hæ disciplinæ per eas euntibus, sed
circa illas hærentibus.”

QUINTILIAN.





CONCEPTIONS.

§ 20. *Cognitions in General.*



THE want of any manual of Metaphysics to which we might conveniently refer, compels us to explain here the names of the simplest mental impressions, in as far as Logic presupposes the possession of them.

The impression which any object makes upon the mind may be called a Presentation. Some Presentations are admitted into the mind without being noticed, as is the case with the words spoken to a dreamy or absent man, or with a house or tree which, forming part of a great landscape, escapes the special notice of the beholder. The mind is unconscious of them ; it sees or hears, but does not know that it sees or hears, so that the

impression is not clear. And yet it is a real impression, because when attention is directed to it, we know that it must have been there before. A man stares his friend in the face without recognizing him; his friend awakens his attention, and that instant he becomes conscious of what is before him. But he knows that it is not the impression upon his eye which begins at that point of time, but his attention to the impression. Presentations then are divided into Clear and Obscure, and the former, with which alone Logic is concerned, may be called Notions or Cognitions.

Clear Presentations, or Cognitions, are subdivided into confused and distinct. Where the marks or attributes which make up the Presentation cannot be distinguished, it is confused; where they can be distinguished and enumerated, it is distinct. For example, we have a clear notion of the colour red; but we cannot tell by what marks we identify this colour—we could not describe it intelligibly to another, and hence our cognition of it is confused; again, we have a clear

notion of house, but we can declare its various marks, namely, that it is an enclosed and covered building, fit for habitation; and therefore our notion is distinct.

We subdivide the class of distinct notions twice, according to two principles of division; and first, into adequate and inadequate notions. Adequate notions are those in which, besides enumerating the marks, we can explain them; that is, can enumerate the marks of the marks of the distinct notion, and again the marks of those marks. As this kind of analysis is almost interminable, we call a notion adequate, not when the enumeration of subordinate marks has been carried to the farthest, but when they have been enumerated sufficiently for our present purpose, in whatever subject we are employed. Our notion of happiness, for instance, (according to Aristotle) is adequate, when we not only know that it is "an energy of the soul according to the best virtue, in a perfect life;" but can explain what we mean by an energy of the soul, the best virtue, and a perfect life. So we have an adequate notion

of what Hobbs means by Right, when we not only know that it is "unresistible might in a state of nature," but can explain what unresistible might and state of nature are. The same two notions would be inadequate, if we had the respective definitions of them, but could not explain them.

The other division of distinct notions is into symbolical and notative; it has been already explained.*

* P. 47. seq. Throughout this section we have followed *Leibniz*, with some slight alterations. See *Erdmann's Leibniz*, p. 79. *Acta Erudit.* an. 1684. Some useful distinctions in the various names of notions, are given by *S. T. Coleridge*. Why are we still expecting the fragment on Logic from his pen, so long promised?

"The most general term (*genus sumum*) belonging to the speculative intellect, as distinguished from acts of the will, is Representation, or (still better) Presentation.

"A conscious Presentation, if it refers exclusively to the subject, as a modification of his own state of being, is = Sensation.

"The same if it refers to an object, is = Perception.

"A Perception immediate and individual is = an Intuition.

"The same Mediate, and by means of a character or mark common to several things is = a Conception.

TABLE OF NOTIONS.

Pren- tations	{ Clear (=Cognitions) Obscure.	{ Confused. Distinct	{ Adequate Inadequate Symbolical Notative.

§ 21. *Intuitions and Conceptions.*

The notions which the mind forms from things offered to it are either of single objects, as of "this pain, that man, Westminster Abbey;" or of many objects taken together, as "pain, man, abbey." Notions of single objects are called Intuitions, as being such as the mind receives when it simply attends to or inspects (*intuetur*) the object. Notions formed from several objects are called Conceptions, as being formed by the power which the mind has of taking things together (*concupere* i. e. *capere hoc cum illo*).

"A Conception, extrinsic and sensuous, is = a Fact or a Cognition.

"The same purely mental and abstracted from the forms of the understanding itself is = a Notion." *Church and State*, p. 301.

§ 22. *Formation of Conceptions.*

On inspecting two or more objects of the same kind, we begin to compare them with one another, and with those which are already repositied in our memory; and we discover that they have some points of resemblance. All the houses, for example, which come in our way, however they may differ in height, length, position, convenience, decoration, have some common points;—they are all covered buildings, and fit for the habitation of men. By attending to these points only, and abstracting them from all the rest, we arrive at a general notion of house, that it is a covered building, fit for human habitation; and to this notion we attach a particular name, house, to remind us of the process we have gone through, and to record its results for use.* The general notion so formed we call a Conception; the common points we observed in the various objects are called Marks or Notes; and the process of observ-

* See p. 42. seq.

ing them and forming one entire notion from them is termed Abstraction.

Abstraction, as we have described it, would include three separate acts; first, an act of Comparison, which brings several intuitions together; next, one of Reflection, which seeks for some marks which they all possess, and by which they may be combined into one group; and last, one of Generalization, which forms the new general notion or conception. Kant however confines the name of Abstraction to the last act of the three; others apply it to the second. It is not of much consequence whether we enlarge or narrow the meaning of the word, so long as we see the various steps of the process. The word means a *drawing-away* of the common marks from all the distinctive marks which the single objects have.

§ 23. *On the nature of general Notions.*

There is a pretty general agreement at present as to the mode of the existence of general notions. Formed in the mind, they are not entirely dependent upon its mere

arbitrary decision; because in most cases there are properties in the objects around us which compel us to generalize in a particular way. Every nation, for example, would without any express convention put men into one class and horses into another, because the common properties of men are so marked and striking, that they seem as it were to cry aloud to be classed together. No one would be absurd enough to neglect such similarities; and to put some men and some horses invariably into one class, because they were white, and some other men and some other horses into one class because they were black! General notions are widely accepted in proportion as they are founded upon realities, and formed from important common properties in the objects. The botanical system of Linnæus has been found defective, from its classes being based chiefly upon accidental and less important properties, the number and position, namely, of the stamina and pistils of plants; since a consistent adoption of it would sever many classes of plants which are obviously and naturally

related, and throw together others which in form, size, and all the more obvious characters, differ widely. Its inventor himself is often compelled to deviate from his own principle, to obey a more natural rule of classification. General notions exist in the mind alone; but they are founded on common properties which exist without the mind, not in a separate state, but as inherent in the objects of intuition. Further, these common properties were given to the various objects by design. For example, when the same vertebral column is found in a hundred species of animals, sometimes joined to large and powerful limbs, sometimes to small, rudimental ones, now to wings, now to fins, and now to arms, sometimes carried vertically, sometimes horizontally; and when, amidst all the specific variations, many of them modifying its own structure, the vertebral column is easily recognized as fundamentally unchanged, it is natural to infer that the possession of this part of the frame was pre-ordained to be the link of connection of these species, and that in forming a

class of "Vertebrate Animals" we are seeking after a form or idea which was in the Divine Mind when animals were created. So that general notions exist without the mind of man, in as far as they are in another mind. The divine Mind stamps them on material things; the human reads them there.

Such is our account of that question which caused centuries of acrimonious dispute—Do genera and species really exist? To understand the positions of the Nominalist and Realist, the controversy must be studied historically; we must try to put ourselves in the same point of view as each disputant occupied; otherwise we shall be inclined to cast aside as mere trifling a dispute on which the deepest truths of religion were felt at the time to depend.

Have genera and species a real, independent existence, or are they only to be found in the mind? The Realist answers that they exist independently; that besides the individual objects and the general notion from them in the mind, there exist certain "ideas," the

patterns after which the single objects are fashioned ; and that the general notion in our mind is the counterpart of the idea without it. A good action, for example, is good, because it partakes of the idea of goodness, and we understand good actions in as far as we have the idea of goodness copied in our own intellect ; even a table or chair is formed according to the “very table,” or the “*table-ness*” (if we may imitate the jargon of the Schoolmen)—the pre-existent idea of a table, of which the artificer’s design was but an imperfect counterpart. Such is the Platonic Realism. As we leave the history of the doctrine for another place, we need not shew under what modifications it appeared in the scholastic philosophy. But its difficulties must not be passed over. Where are these ideas repositied ? In the Divine Mind ? or is there, as it were, some general atmosphere of reason, in which they float, and which both the creating and the created minds inhale ? If the latter, how do you connect the ideas with the things which belong to them ? Many however think that Plato adopted the

former opinion. What general notions are to our minds, ideas are to the supreme reason (νοῦς βασιλεύς); they are the eternal *thoughts* of the Divine Intellect, and we attain truth when our thoughts conform with His—when our general notions are in conformity with the ideas.* Interpreted in this way, perhaps our readers will find little to object to in the Platonic Realism.

The ultra Nominalist declared that nothing existed except things and names of things; and that universals had no existence except as names.† But it must be admitted that general names are inseparably attached to general qualities; unless indeed they are purely arbitrary. Between the individual objects and general names, we must insert the notions for which the names stand; between Socrates and the name “man” there is our notion of the properties which make

* See *Stallbaum*. Proleg. to *Plat. Parm.* p. 269, seq.

† For the Nominalism of *Roscelin*, who is regarded as the founder of the doctrine, see *Cousin*. *Introd.* to *Abelard*, p. 86. seq. For earlier Nominalist theories, see *Renouvier*, *Histoire*, II. 210. 213. 215.

a man. Moderate Nominalists cannot have overlooked this, and with them, names would always imply certain properties.*

But if some of them avoided the absurdity of supposing that general names need not signify general notions, Roscelin, who maintained that "things have no parts," may very well have held, as Abelard interprets him, that names imply no properties; and at any rate, the title of Nominalist is likely to lead to the mistake. Accordingly, the Conceptualists, with Abelard at their head, assigned to universals an existence, independent of single objects, but dependent upon the mind of the thinking subject, in which they were notions or conceptions. This, we apprehend, is only moderate Nominalism under an apter title.†

Making allowance for much confusion of statement in the scholastic writers, and for extreme assertions which, there is reason to

* Thus *Occam* founded his Nominalism upon the position, "*Nullum universale est aliqua substantia extra animam existens.*" *Logica* I. 15.; which has little to do with mere names.

† *Cousin*. Ouv. d'Abel: Introd. page 180.

think, their authors understood in a modified sense, we have two views of the nature of general notions; that of the Realist, who maintained that they exist in the mind and also without it—in the Divine Mind; and that of the moderate Nominalist,* who held that they exist only in the mind as notions, and that we use names to fix and recall them. Now I venture to think that the interminable contest between Platonist and Aristotelian, Realist and Nominalist, is, at bottom, not so much a question of what universals are, as of how they shall be treated; not so much a question of Metaphysics, as of Method. Upon the *nature* of general notions there is a large amount of agreement between the parties: the Realist believes, with the Nominalist, that they are in the human mind, whilst, if the Nominalist believes at all that the world was created by design, he can scarcely escape from recognizing the Realist

* Like *Occham*. Of the earlier speculations of *Roce-
lin*, reputed an extreme Nominalist, who held that
universals were only *flatus vocis*, we have but scanty
and doubtful accounts.

position, that such ideas as animal, right, motion, must have had their existence from the beginning in the creative mind. Whence then the controversy? The burden of Aristotle's objections to the Platonic scheme of ideas is, that it teaches what cannot be known, and gives out as certain truth what lies far beyond the reach of our powers of investigation. "Instead of being content" he would say to the Platonist, "with classifying particular objects so as to form general notions, which we could always compare with the objects, as being inseparable from them, you jump to certain ideas, separate from the objects, though they cause and determine the manner of their existence, fixed whilst these are changeable, eternal whilst these pass away. Be it so; you offer these transcendent ideas to our understanding—you must remove the difficulties which the understanding meets in receiving them. How do you know that they exist? For we must not, in order to

* So *Ockham*—"Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem."

explain the world which we see, devise another world, of ideas, which no eye has seen.* Again, how are they connected with the things to which they belong? The man, for instance, with the idea of humanity? to say that things 'participate' in, or 'are copies' of, the ideas, is to avoid the difficulty by vague metaphorical language. Must there be an idea for every sensible object? If so, before Socrates could be born, there must have been an eternal idea of Socrates; which would lead us to a multiplication of ideas too great even for the imagination. In a word, you cannot explain the properties of these ideas without vagueness and self-contradiction; and therefore, should not assume them to exist and found a system upon them."*

If this view be correct, Aristotle does not so much intend to deny the existence of ideas,

* Compare, *Metaphys.* XIII. (M). 4, p. 1078, b. Ed. Berol. Ibid. 5, p. 1079, b. 36. Ibid. I. (A) 6, p. 987. Ibid. 9, p. 990, b. *Ravaisson*, *Metaphysique d'Aristote*, III. ii. 2. *Renouvier*, *Histoire*, II. p. 42. To avoid misunderstanding, let me remark that the resemblance between Aristotle and the Nominalist lies only

as to maintain that the evidence for them is insufficient, and that no system can stand secure upon so weak a foundation. And looking to the paradoxical and seemingly inconsistent statements of Plato on the one hand* and the evident misapprehensions of Aristotle upon the other, I can conceive it possible that a sage mediation might have reconciled these two great spirits; and Aristotle might have owned that the universal notions in his mind might answer to certain ideas in the Divine, whilst his illustrious master might have confessed that, putting revelation out of the question, there is no way to the absolute—to knowledge of the ideas—except

in his denying a *separate* existence to universals. His doctrine of Form and Matter, and his distinct definitions for the thing (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) and the notion of it (τὸ τί ἴσται), prove that he knew that universal *properties existed without the mind*.

* For he speaks of the ideas, now as if they were merely mental conceptions, now as independent existences. *Stalbaum's* Parmenides: Prol. p. 273. And he does not clearly explain *where* the ideas exist, and whether they depend on the Divine Mind or It upon them. *Ibid.* p. 272.

a careful observation of, and reasoning from, the facts before our eyes. As we said in the outset—the question chiefly concerns Method, and does not turn so much upon a belief in the existence of ideas, as upon the right to assume them as the ground of teaching.

When at a later period the battle was fought about religion, as it had been about science, the Schoolmen seem to have been partly influenced by the same views. When Occham maintained that general notions only existed in the human mind, he did not push this doctrine to its apparent consequences, and assert that there was no Divine Mind; because he was thinking rather of the place which they were to hold in teaching, than of the possible modes of their existence. The spirit of his objections to Realism is—"The attempt to explain universals as independent natures involves us in logical difficulties and contradictions."* Nor is it clear that even Roscelin held the heretical opinions which were deduced from his logical principle,

* Logica. I. xv.

that words and individual things were the only realities. Perhaps it was some zealous adversary who inferred that he applied to the blessed Trinity what he only meant for a logical rule in treating of earthly things, and who left him the unwelcome choice between Sabellianism and Tritheism, according as he regarded the Eternal Persons as words or independent beings. At all events he himself repudiated the charge of Tritheism, actually brought against him.*

If the controversy is thus resolved into the question, whether we are to be content with things as known by the senses—and our observations on them, or are to interpret them by certain higher existences, which we call ideas, it assumes a high degree of importance. The Nominalist is not a strange monster, standing alone in time, and speaking a senseless jargon. In Bacon and Comte we behold his descendants, though in the latter the family features are growing exaggerated. So the

* *Errorum suum abjuraverat. Anselm.* Was it ever *suum*?

Realist may know his offspring in many a mystical and "transcendental" thinker. The problem of reconciling the two views, by combining what is good in each, is worthy of the most philosophic intellect, even at this very day.*

§ 24. *Questions about Conceptions.*

When a conception is recalled to the mind, under what form does it appear? Under that of a bare word, or of all the marks which we abstracted to form it, or of some single object used as the representative of all the others of the same class?† We have seen already‡ that the word or the array of marks

* Upon the history of Nominalism and Realism may be consulted—*Brucker*, vols. iii. and vi. *Tennemann's* Manual. The brilliant Preface by *Cousin* to "Ouvrages inedités d'Abelard." Paris, 1836. Also *Cousin*, *Leçons*. 1829, *Lecq.* 9. In *Degerando*, *Histoire*, I. p. 235, there is a good account of the shades of opinion in the two parties. *Sir W. Hamilton's Reid*, p. 405. *Dugald Stewart*, *Phil. of Human Mind*, vol. I. ch. 4, §. 2. *Brown's Lectures*. Bishop *Hampden's* Bampton Lectures: Lecture II. and Notes.

† *Bp. Berkeley*. Principles, &c. §§. xi. xii.

‡ See p. 47, seq.

may be employed to recall the conception. In any proposition which conveys a definition, we have examples of both forms. In such a sentence as "honesty is uprightness in all dealings which respect property," the former of the two conceptions is used as a counter* to represent the marks, which the latter explicitly conveys; in the phraseology adopted above,† "honesty" is a symbolical, and "uprightness in dealings which respect property" a notative conception. As to the third opinion, the understanding, which for convenience' sake puts symbols for true conceptions, does on the same account put examples of a conception instead of the conception itself, the singular instead of the general. For the notion animal, I think of a particular horse or cow; for honesty, of some honest man; for justice, of some Brutus or Aristides; for city, of London or Paris; but always with a conscious reservation that there are many points about this particular

* *Notionis teffera. Bacon.*

† P. 47.

case which are not general, and do not belong to the conception. But it will hardly be questioned by any, that the understanding can, by a somewhat severer self-control, throw aside the particular case, and retain only the common marks which belong to the whole conception. For we must admit the power of abstracting some marks from the rest, as the *having life* which is the mark of *animal* is abstracted from the thousand different circumstances of size, shape, colour, food, temper, which distinguish animals from each other; else how are conceptions formed? And if we can abstract the marks from the accidents, surely we can retain them in our grasp when abstracted.

ii. Are representations of the imagination—the notion we have of a landscape from some poetical description, for example—to be considered as intuitions or conceptions? If the description could be so complete, and the reader's apprehension so accurate, that every portion of the landscape were distinctly seen, and we could distinguish that scene from every other, even from one that resembled

it most closely, then it would be in accordance with the definition we have given (§ 21) to call it an intuition. But this, I suppose, is never the case. The poet can describe a lake-scene with distinctness enough to prevent our having an impression from it of any other *kind* of landscape, as a plain with a distant city, or the cliffs of the sea shore. But still the description must be far too obscure to prevent our mistaking this lake-scene from one closely resembling it, or even our putting some lake we remember, to supply the deficiencies of his delineation, although we know that we are adopting one scene, whilst he drew another. He can limit our general notion of landscape to some particular species, but not to this individual landscape—can reduce our “all” to “some,” but not to “this.” Therefore, such an image is a conception, used *particularly*, i. e. only some *part* of it is called up. It is a representation of some landscapes, but not of *one* landscape, to the exclusion of the possibility of confounding it with others.

iii. Can there be abstraction without gene-

ralization, as Archbishop Whately maintains? "Suppose we are speaking of the present King of France," says he; "he must actually be either at Paris or elsewhere; fitting, standing, or in some other posture; and in such and such a dress, &c. Yet many of these circumstances (which are *separable* accidents, and consequently) which are regarded as *non-essential to the individual*, are quite disregarded by us; and we abstract from them what we consider as essential; thus forming an *abstract* notion of the Individual. Yet there is here no generalization." A great error lies hid in this passage—that of not perceiving that the power of separating circumstances called essential to the individual from those which are not so, results from former generalizations. How do we know that "fitting" or "standing" is not essential to a king? How do we know that a crown and a robe of state are separable from the King of France? By prior generalization; by the help of the conception we have formed of a king already. If we had never known of other kings, or the same king at other times,

we should have looked on the accidents and essentials of the King of France, as alike essential. We know that "fitting" is not essential, from hearing that kings sometimes do not fit. There is no abstraction without generalization ; and in the case before us, we abstract, to refer to a former general notion or conception.

§ 25. *Higher and Lower Conceptions.*

The functions of Abstraction do not cease as soon as we have compared several intuitions, to form one conception. We may proceed to form a larger conception from several narrower ones ; and this too is done by Abstraction. By observing John, Thomas, and Peter, and abstracting from their accidents the essential marks, we get the notion of man ; but again, by comparing the conception man with other conceptions, cow, sheep, wolf, whale, and observing the mark common to all, that they suckle their young, we form the wider conception Mammalia,—wider, because it includes man and many other conceptions. We may carry the pro-

cess farther still ; and, with writers on Natural History, compare the Mammalia, with Aves, Amphibia, Pisces, Insectæ, and Vermes, when we shall discover that all these, however different, agree in having life and sensation, from which marks we gain the new conception animal, wider than any of the former, as including them all,—higher, as requiring a second step in the abstractive process to reach it.

It is convenient to figure wider and narrower conceptions by concentric circles. Here let three such circles be supposed ; then the outmost will represent Animal, the middle Mammalia, and the inmost Man.

§ 26. *Co-ordinate Conceptions.*

Two conceptions, neither of which contains the other and which are both contained under a higher one, are called co-ordinate. Thus Mammalia and Insectæ, being contained in Animal, are co-ordinate conceptions.

The co-ordinate species of a genus are not always upon the same level, and equal in dignity to each other. If animal be defined

“substance having life and sensation,” the two species, man and polyp, are in a very different position with respect to this definition, since man has many marks not mentioned in it, polyp scarcely any; and the definition of the genus would almost describe completely this meanest species in it.

§ 27. *Genus and Species.*

Genus and species are relative terms; a conception is called, in relation to its superior, species—to its inferior, genus.

The *summum genus* of logicians is the last result of the abstracting process, the genus which can never be in turn a species. The *infima species* is the species which cannot become a genus;—which can only contain individuals, and not other species.* But there can only be one absolute *summum genus*, whether we call it “thing,” “substance,” or “essence.” And we can scarcely ever ascertain the *infima species*, because even in a handful of individuals we cannot say with

* *Porphy.* *Isag.* ii. Pacian division.

certainty that there are no distinctions on which a further subdivision into smaller classes might be founded.

§ 28. *Extension and Intension.*

When we compare a vague and general conception with a narrower and more definite one, we find that the former contains far more objects in it than the latter. Comparing plant with geranium, for example, we see that plant includes ten thousand times more objects, since the oak, and fir, and lichen, and rose, and countless others, including geranium itself, are implied in it. This capacity of a conception we call its extension. The extension of *plant* is greater than that of *geranium*, because it includes more objects.*

But conceptions have another capacity. Whilst plant has more objects under it than geranium, it has fewer marks in it. I can

* Mr. *Mill*, Logic i. vii. 1, thinks it only "accidental" that "general names" should be the names of classes. But his own language contradicts him; if they are *general* they belong to *genera*; it cannot be accidental that a class-name should be the name of a class.

Scheme of CONCEPTIONS in the two poles of EXTENSION and INTENSION.

		Name.	
		A. Intension, i. e. the <i>marks</i> which com- pose the Conception.	B. Extension, i. e. the <i>objects</i> which the Con- ception stands for.
Genus	Summum	• <i>Body</i> .	• Body . . . Stone, Plant, Brute, Man, &c.
	Subalternum.	<i>Living body</i> .	Body with life . . . Plant, Brute, Man. ∞
	Subalternum.	<i>Animal</i> .	Body with life and sensation . . . Brute, Man.
Species	Infima	• <i>Man</i> .	• Body with life, sensation and reason. . Man.

In the Summum Genus the Intension is least, the Extension greatest. In the Infima Species the Intension is greatest, the Extension least.

describe the leaves, petals, stamina, and pistils of geranium; but of plant no such description is possible. I cannot say that every plant has a stem, for there are the lichens to contradict me; nor a flower, for ferns have none, and so on. I can say little more about plant, than that all plants have growth and vegetable life. The logical expression of this defect is, that its intension is very limited.

The greater the extension, the less the intension; the more objects a conception embraces, the more slender the knowledge which it conveys of any of those objects; and *vice versa*.*

* The various modes of expressing the double capacity of conceptions, which has been called by *Sir William Hamilton* "the cardinal point of Logic," are as follows.

A conception viewed as a	
Logical whole	Metaphysical whole
has	has
Extension	Intension or Comprehension
Breadth	Depth
Sphere	Matter
Objects	Marks
Power to denote.	Power to connote.

With the help of the important distinction between extension and intension, or as others express it, the sphere and matter of the conception, *magnitudo et vis conceptus*, we can understand the meaning of the saying—that the subject of a judgment is in the predicate, and the predicate in the subject. “Man is an animal ;” this conveys two notions, that man is contained in animal, as a species in a genus; and that whatever makes up our notion of animal—all the marks of animal—are contained in (ὁπάρχῃ*) man. So they are mutually contained.

§ 29. *Determination.*

The reverse of the abstractive process, that of descending from higher conceptions to lower, by resuming the marks laid aside, is called determination. Thus from the broad class of diseases, we determine or mark out the class of fevers, by the peculiar symptoms

* *Aristotle* (Anal. Pri. I. i. and many other places) adopts in preference this mode of putting the proposition. Instead of “Man is an animal,” he has “Animal inheres in man.”

of heat, rapid pulse, &c., which are their marks; and from fevers we descend further to intermittent fevers, by bringing in the fresh mark of time.

As abstraction augments the extension by diminishing the marks, so determination augments the intension by increasing them. Notions of individuals, and they only, are said to be fully determined, because to them there are no more marks to add. The use of the word determination in its logical sense is already sanctioned by our older writers.

§ 30. *Privative Conceptions.*

Besides conceptions which are formed from marks, there are others formed from the privation or absence of marks. Our notion of kindness arises from some marks which a kind person always exhibits; but whence our notion of its opposite unkindness? From the want of the marks, whatever they may be, of kindness. So too, in marking by a name any class of objects, as animal or stone, we necessarily imply that there are corresponding classes, which are *not animals* and *not stones*; about

which, it is true, we know very little, as we can only say what they are *not*. Any pair of conceptions, a positive and a privative, must, speaking absolutely, divide the whole universe. Either in man or in not-man, all objects must be found,—star, flower, form of government, or moral quality. But practically we limit this absolute division. We never think, for instance, of including an oak-tree among the number of things that are not kind, though undoubtedly it does lack the marks of kindness. It is more convenient to think of such a pair of conceptions as kind and not-kind, not as dividing between them the whole universe, but only some wider conception, as moral-beings. So that we mean to include in our notion of unkind, not every *thing* which is unkind, but every *moral being* that is so. Such a larger conception, which a positive and privative divide between them, may be called the second sphere of the positive.*

* The *deutéra ouσία* of *Aristotle* (Categ. ch. v.) may justify the term *second sphere*. Professor *De Morgan*

§ 31. *Logical Division.*

To enumerate the various co-ordinate species of which a genus is composed, is to *divide* such genus. Three rules are to be observed for correct division.

i. The constituent species, called the dividing members (*membra dividenda*) must exclude one another.

ii. The constituent species must be equal, together, to the genus divided (*divisum*).

iii. The division must be made according to one principle (*fundamentum divisionis*).

The validity of these rules depends upon the fact that logicians test every division by the possibility of reducing the constituents to two, a positive and privative. If A is a genus divisible into the species x, y and z, we may represent the dividing members as x and not-x, the latter being really equivalent to y and z. This division into two members,

propose to call it the *universe* of the positive conception. The privative has been called by some the contradictory, by others the contrary, of the positive. But either expression tends to confound conceptions with judgments.

called dichotomy (διχοτομία) is alone purely logical, because we know *a priori* (i. e. without any researches into the particular case) that it must be correct. But on the other hand, it is comparatively useless, because, of one of our constituents, and that the larger, we know nothing, but that it wants the marks of the other.* “Insincerity” connotes† nothing, except that it has not that mark or marks which sincerity has. The first and third rules are not absolutely necessary, but desirable with a view to dichotomy. Exceptions to the first rule are sometimes imperatively called for. In enumerating the species of imaginative writers, one would probably mention poets, dramatists and writers of tales, yet some poets are dramatists, and some tales

* Compare the mode of stating this objection in *Plato*, *Politicus*, 262, C. D. τοιούδε ὅλον . . . τῶν σχισθέντων. If, as *Raffow* and *Waitz* suppose, *Aristotle* has *Plato* in his mind in censuring the divisive method, as useless in the discovery of truth, (see *An. Post.* II. ch. 5, and *An. Pri.* I. ch. 31,) we believe that *Plato* saw its defects perfectly.

† i. e. implies no notes or marks. See *Mr. Mill's* *Logic*.

are poems; so that the species are not mutually opposed, but overlapping—or as Leibniz* would say, *communicant* species.

The “principle of division” mentioned in the third rule is the point of view from which we regard the conception to be divided. For we may divide one many times, in various points of view; thus man may be divided into European, Asiatic, African, American, and Australian; or again, into Christian, Mohammedan, and Pagan; or again, into just and unjust; and in the first division, locality, in the second, religion, and in the third, behaviour is the principle of division. It is always some second conception, for the marks of which we search in the conception to be divided. Now a division might happen to be right which was made on two principles; for instance, I might rightly divide the people in some island, into Europeans and Polygamists. But it would be more difficult in such a case to reduce to a dichotomy. If we wished to substitute in such a case Europeans

* Op. XIX. Ed. Erdmann.

and not-Europeans for Europeans and Polygamists, it would be difficult to ascertain that some of the Polygamists were not also Europeans.

§ 32. *Resolution and Partition.*

Besides the mode of dividing the sphere of a conception, described above, another kind of division is possible, called for distinctness' sake, resolution of a conception. It consists in the separation of the marks of a conception, as division was the separation of its species. It analyses the intension or connotation as division does the extension or denotation. It divides the matter, as division the sphere. Thus we resolve the conception weapon into its two marks, that it is an instrument, and used for offence; but divide it into cutting, striking, and missile weapons.

After the resolution of a conception, it may be included in one higher one by this mark, and in another by that. Hence it appears that a lower conception may stand in the relation of species to different genera, according as abstraction fixes on one set of

marks or another. Thus weapon is seen to stand under the two genera of instrument, and things which give offence.

The separation of the parts of any individual object, as of a sword into blade and hilt, is termed partition. An individual (*ἄτομον*) is that which cannot be divided without ceasing to be what it is; its parts cannot have the name of the whole. When a genus is divided every part of it remains unchanged, and may have the name of the genus.

§ 33. *Use of Conceptions. Distribution.*

Though all conceptions are universal, they may still have a particular *use*; in other words, we can think of part only of a conception instead of the whole, when the convenience of thought requires. Where we represent, judge of, or reason from, a whole conception, it is said, in technical language, to be *distributed*; where a part only is treated, we call it *undistributed*.

§ 34. *Abstract and Concrete Representations.*

Abstract and concrete are relative terms;

when a higher conception is seen to exist in a lower, or in an intuition, as we see the marks of animal in the conception horse or a horse, we are said to see the abstract in the concrete. So of two cognate conceptions, the more abstract bears the name of *the abstract*, the more determined (§ 29) we call *the concrete*.

The received explanation among logicians in this country is that an abstract term is the name of a quality considered apart from the subject in which we should look to find it, as prudence, strength; and that a concrete term is a name expressing the quality as residing in some subject, as prudent, strong. There is an analogy between this narrow sense, and that assigned by us; we say that the abstract is to the concrete as universal to particular, and they, that it is as the general quality to particular cases of it.*

* See the excellent note in *Trendelenburg*. Excerpta: on § 36. Also *Waitz* on Organon. Comm. on 81. 6. 3. *Trendelenburg* on Ar. de Anima, 478.

OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

PART II.

JUDGMENT.

*Οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτ' ἐκείνως πράξιν οὐδ'
ἀπραξίαν δηλοῖ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἂν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι
τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ.*

PLATO.



JUDGMENT.

§ 35. *Judgment Defined.*

EVERY act of judgment is an attempt to reduce to unity two cognitions. When one decides that "Socrates is wise," it is that hereafter one may, by combining the two notions, think of "the wise Socrates." Again, when one decides that "the world is not eternal," it is that hereafter one may refrain from combining the two notions as "the eternal world."

A Judgment then is an expression that two notions can or cannot be reconciled—that the marks of the one may or may not be henceforward assigned to the other.*

* This definition is attacked by Mr. *Mill*, *Logic*, vol. i. p. 116, seq. on the ground that a judgment ex-

Though the truth or falsehood of a Judgment, and consequently its value, depend upon its correctly representing things without us, rather than thoughts within us, it is primarily concerned with those representations in the mind by means of which alone things are brought into the arena of thought, whether as single objects or as the ground of abstract and general notions.

Every judgment has three parts; the subject, or notion about which the judgment is;

presses the agreement of *things* rather than of *notions*. But the notions are controlled by the things, otherwise assent and dissent would be arbitrary. I am *forced* to say "the day is fine," when the sky is cloudless, because my perceptions must correspond with the facts. This correspondence then the definition in the text is considered to imply, which is retained because it is believed to be the only one that includes and describes every kind of judgment. But the weight allowed to Mr. *Mill's* objection will depend on the theory of Perception we adopt, and that great metaphysical question we cannot here discuss. See however *Reid*. Int. Powers, Essay vi. 3. *Hamilton's Reid*. Appendix C and D*. *Cousin*, Histoire de la Phil. Leçon 24. Edinburgh Review, vol. LII. Art. "Reid and Brown."

the predicate, or notion with which the subject is compared; and the copula or nexus, which expresses the mode of connexion between them. The subject and predicate are called the terms of the judgment, i. e. the extremes or boundaries (*termini*) which it brings together.

§ 36. *Doctrine of Relation in Judgments.*

When we examine such a judgment as “Man is a rational animal” (which, trite as it is, will serve for our present purpose) we find that the subject and predicate are exactly co-extensive; in other words, no object comes into the class of rational animals which is not also in man, and conversely no object comes under man which is not also under rational animal. The two conceptions, the one symbolical, the other notative,* are generalized from the very same class of beings. This equality of subject and predicate is an important property of the judgment, for it conveys the power to

* P. 47.

substitute the one conception for the other, at pleasure.

Other judgments want this property. To say that "trees are plants" is to say indeed that no object is a tree which is not also a plant; but then there are plants which are not trees; so that plant and tree are not conceptions of equal extent.

It is true that the copula—the "is" or "are" which couples the conceptions—does not express the great difference we have noticed; being used in common language for either relation of the two terms. But as the correctness of some trains of reasoning depends entirely upon observing the relation of coincidence between subject and predicate, it is usual to alter the copula in some way, to express it, as by saying "Man *is defined to be* a rational animal." In the present book, instead of the copula "is" or "are," the mathematical sign of equality (=) will be employed in every affirmative judgment in which the predicate is distributed, or taken entire.

Every affirmative judgment indeed may

be regarded as an *equation* of subject and predicate, as every negative is a decision that an equation cannot be established. By "All men are mortal" I mean that all men *are equal* to some mortal creatures; and by "Some plants are poisonous" I mean that a part of my conception of plants coincides with a part of the conception of poisonous things.*

§ 37. *The Two Predicable-Classes.*

Logicians have always formed a classification of predicates according to the relation in which they stand to their respective subjects. We propose to give the simplest form to this scheme of Predicable-Classes, or classes of conceptions which can stand as predicates, taking Aristotle's doctrine as the basis.

Every judgment, according to Aristotle, declares either a genus, or the property, or the definition, or an accident† (*γένος—ἴδιον—*

* Sir William Hamilton.

† *Top.* A. ch. iv. Of the names which A. adopts for the classes, *γένος*, and perhaps *ἕρος*, seem to express ra-

ἕρος—συμβεβηκός) of its subject. The difference, or that mark or marks by which the species is distinguished from the rest of its genus, does not occupy a distinct position in Aristotle's list, but is said to belong naturally to genus (ὡς οὖσαν γενικήν).* The species may be regarded as composed, not of the marks of the genus and the difference, so well as of those of two concurrent or communicant genera; for the difference is but a genus which from its overlapping part of another is used as a distinctive mark of that part which it overlaps. If (for an easy example) in analysing our notion of "the red-flowering currant" (*Ribes sanguineum*) we regard "currant" as the genus and "red-flowering" as the difference, we may also regard "red-flower-

ther the extension, the others the intension; but he uses them as having both powers. The common division of Predicable-classes is that of *Porphry*, into Genus, Difference, Species, Property, and Accident.


* Like the genus, the difference can be predicated of many things differing in species. But the genus is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, the difference ἐν τῷ ποῖον τι. *Alex. Aphrod.* in Berlin Ed. of *Arist.* Top. A. ch. iv.

ing" as a wide genus, wider in fact than "currant," and therefore we may say that our notion of the plant is generated by the concurrence of two genera.*

This we suppose to be Aristotle's meaning in considering difference as having the nature of genus. But the immediate test which he applies to his four Predicable-classes is—Can each of them, without logical fault, change places with its subject? In other words, is each of them co-extensive with its subject or not? The results of the test will be apparent from an account of each of the classes.

Definition† is a description which manifests completely the nature of the thing defined.

* Let A be the class of "red-flowering" things, B the class "currant;" then x , the part of each which is in the other, will be our notion of "red-flowering currant."



† Top. A. ch. v. More fully treated of in Top. Z. *passim*.

Such a description would of course enable us to identify the subject, and to distinguish it from all other notions. And therefore it must be applicable only to the subject, otherwise it manifests, not the peculiar nature of the thing defined, but its *common* nature, the qualities which it shares with other things. As being applicable to the subject and to no other notion, it is co-extensive with it, and therefore may change places with it in the judgment. It is just as true to say that "every rational animal is man" as that "every man is a rational animal." But if we said that "man is a warm-blooded animal," or that "man is a civilized animal," neither of them would be a definition, nor could the predicate in either become the subject, without some limitation. The former is a description that applies to more than man, the latter to a part only of man; and of course neither of them would enable us to apprehend exactly what man's nature was.

Property* is not easily distinguished from

* Top. A. ch. iv. and v.

definition. Indeed Aristotle confesses that property (*ιδιον*) i. e. something *peculiar* to the subject, and essentially its own, is a name which would naturally include definition, and would mean some attribute which belongs to all the subject and to it only ; but he adds the special limitation “without declaring the essence or nature of the subject.” Every quality then which belongs to all the subject, and to no other, is a property, provided it be not used in the definition. It is co-extensive with the subject, and can therefore change places with it in the judgment without logical fault. Thus “Man is capable of learning to write and speak correctly” might become “every being capable of learning to write and speak correctly is a man.”

But this subtle metaphysical distinction between the definition and the property is as difficult to maintain as it is unnecessary for the purposes of pure logic. How can we rely on being able to separate our notion of the nature or essence of a thing from the properties which accompany that nature? Let it be the definition of man that he is “a ra-

tional animal" and the property, that he is "capable of speaking correctly;" and how can we say that the latter is not in the essence, yet necessarily follows from the essence of man? It is *a part* of the essence, for "rational" implies it. In like manner, all the properties seem to be implicitly contained in every perfect definition. No criterion can be given for distinguishing between the essence and the inseparable accompaniment of the essence; and a larger acquaintance with the nature of things makes it evident that what one science regards as a property another must consider as essential, and that there is no one paramount quality which is absolutely essential and can never be degraded to the rank of a property.

The predicable genus is a class of which the subject is a contained part. It declares, though not completely, the nature of the subject. A subject may be included in many different genera by different sets of marks; a man may be good, brave, rational, mortal, fallible, sick, learned, and so on. But some of these qualities, as wholly separable from

the nature of man, are to be considered not as genera but as accidents. Genus, as being of the very nature of the subject, is inseparable from it. As including the subject in common with other species, it is not co-extensive with it. Hence the transposition of the subject and predicate in a judgment which predicates the genus, cannot take place; "all roses are plants" cannot become "all plants are roses."

Accident is a quality which belongs indeed to a subject, but can be taken away from it without destroying its nature or essence. We predicate accident when we say that "a man is speaking." Accident cannot change places with its subject, because it does not apply to the whole of that subject and to it alone. But a criterion is wanting to distinguish between accident and genus or species. It is an accident to the people of this country that they were born in it; because we might conceive them to have been born elsewhere; but then it has modified their nature or essence, and we understand by Englishman not merely one who was born within the four

feas, but a man of particular feelings, views and privileges, which are parts of his very nature. Here accident and genus or property seem to become confused. It is an accident too that this nail is rusty and that guinea bright, but then it shows that the gold has a *property*—of resisting oxidation—which the iron wants, and might serve to place them in two distinct species of metals. Aristotle actually speaks of man as an accident of the genus animal ;* no doubt because we might conceive that species annihilated without the destruction of the genus. It does not appear then that the predicable accident can at all times be distinguished from the others, which would be a valid objection against retaining the doctrine in which it holds a place.

We propose to abandon, as at least unnecessary for logical purposes, the distinction between property and definition, genus and accident ; and to form, as Aristotle has also

* Cat. vii. 14. In quoting the passage *Crackanthorp* says "Omnia inferiora accidentia sunt respectu suorum superiorum." See too Cat. vii. 13. Pacius: marginal note.

done, two classes of predicables ; one of predicables taken distributively, and capable of becoming subjects in their respective judgments, without limitation, the other of such as have a different extension. In the former, the predicable has the same objects as its subject, but different marks or a different way of representing the marks. In the latter there is a difference both in the marks and the objects. The former may be called Definition, or Substitute ; the latter, Attribute.

§ 38. *Definition explained.*

Every predicate which denotes exactly the same class of things as the subject, may be called a definition of the subject. Whether it unfolds the genus and difference, or the property, or only substitutes one symbolical conception for another, it is useful to *mark out* for us more clearly the limits of the subject defined, and is therefore capable of being employed as a definition for some thinker or other. Logicians have always allowed that in our definitions we are bound to consider, not merely what is *absolutely* the explanation

of the subject, but what our hearers can adopt as an explanation. They would not allow that a definition which was conveyed in a metaphor, nor one of which the words were strange or obsolete, was properly a definition, because it would not be clear* to the hearer. They believed that there was an absolute definition; but this was to be conveyed with due regard to the hearer's needs and attainments. Now one reason for enlarging the limits of definition, is that any of the predicates we propose to include, though not the *absolute* definition, not the genus and difference, may be employed as a definition by some particular person, and may to him fulfil the purpose of the best logical definition which can be given; and therefore ought, if possible, to be comprehended under the same head. Thus, if I wish to define "honesty," I may say that it is uprightness in transactions relating to property, that it is probity, that it is the best policy; and any

* Aristotle. Top. Z. (vi.) ch. II. πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός.

one of these conceptions would enable some of my hearers to identify honesty, even though that word had not before occurred in my speech, or been suggested to their thoughts. If there were any one paramount conception, which would be to the minds of all a sufficient definition of honesty, I should employ that, and place it in a class by itself. But this is not the case. To many a humble thinker, honesty is the best policy would convey an idea, not adequate indeed but still distinct,* when honesty is uprightness in respect to transactions connected with property, would be but a string of confused words. Let us then consider definition as any conception which from having precisely the same sphere as another conception, may be used to ascertain its nature and mark out its limits. And the judgment in which definition is predicated, we call a substitutive judgment, because it furnishes a predicate identical with the subject as to sphere or extension, and therefore capable of being substituted for it.

* See p. 103.

The subject of a substitutive judgment is called also the definitum, or conception defined.

§ 39. *Sources of Definition.*

As the subject and predicate of every substitutive judgment are co-extensive, they may change places in the judgment, so that the definitum may become in its turn a definition. We may define a conception, by exhibiting in our definition its extension, or by unfolding its intension, or by the substitution of one symbol for another, or one set of marks for another. It will be found from these principles that there are six sources from which definitions may arise. i. From Resolution,* when the marks of the definitum are made its definition; as in “a pension is an allowance for past services.” It is not necessary that the marks should be completely enumerated—that the conception should be strictly adequate—but only that the marks should suffice for the identification of the

* § 32.

subject, as belonging to it all and to it alone ; so that Aristotle's Property would be included in it. ii. From Composition, the reverse of the last method, in which the definitum, a conception of which the component marks are enumerated, stands subject to a definition implicitly containing those marks ; as, " those who encroach upon the property of others are dishonest." iii. From Division, where we define the subject by enumerating its dividing members ; as " Britons are those who dwell in England, Scotland, or Wales." All the judgments called disjunctives are under this head. iv. From Colligation, the exact reverse of the last ; where the dividing members of a conception are enumerated in the subject, and the divided conception itself added to define them ; as, historical, philosophical, and mathematical sciences are the sum (i. e. *are all*, or *equal*) of human knowledge. This is the form which Inductive Judgments naturally assume. v. From change of Symbol, where both subject and predicate are symbolic conceptions, the latter being given as a

substitute for the former on a principle of expedience only ; as “ probity is honesty.” This is the nominal definition of some logic-books. vi. From Casual Substitution, where one representation is put for another on a principle of expedience only, as serving to recal the marks, which both possess in common, more readily to the hearer’s mind ; as “ the science of politics is the best road to success in life.”

TABLE OF DEFINITION.

A Conception is defined	{	By its Intension (or Marks)	{ being unfolded, = i. Resolution, or Definition proper.
			{ being re-united, = ii. Composition.
	{	By its Extension (or Sphere)	{ being divided, = iii. Division.
			{ being re-united, = iv. Colligation.
	{	By Accidental Coincidence	{ of a Symbol, = v. Nominal Definition.
			{ of Notation, = vi. Accidental Definition.

§ 40. *Attribute.*

A predicate, the exact limits of which are not determined, cannot be used to define and determine a subject. It may be called an attribute ; and conveys, not the whole nature of the subject, but some one quality belonging to it. “ Metals are heavy ;” “ Some snakes are venomous ;” are judgments in which this kind of predicable occurs.

§ 41. *The Common division of Judgments as to Relation.*

The relation in which the subject stands to the predicate in a judgment, whether as coincident or not-coincident with it, we call *the doctrine of Relation* ; as to which we find that predicates are of two kinds, substitutes or definitions, and attributes. The common account of Relation, which we are bound to consider, is somewhat different.

Judgments are divided, according to it, into three classes, the Categorical, the Hypothetical, and the Disjunctive Judgment.

The Categorical Judgment is one in which

one conception is affirmed to belong or not to belong to another, as "Men are endowed with conscience," "An enslaved people cannot be happy."

The Hypothetical expresses seemingly a relation between two judgments, as cause and effect, as condition and conditioned; for example, "If the autumn is very dry, the turnip crop is scanty," "If the heart is right, so will the actions be."

The Disjunctive Judgment expresses the relation (apparently) of two or more judgments which cannot be true together, and one or other of which must be true; as "Either the Bible is false, or holiness ought to be followed;" or the proverb—"A man is either a fool or a physician at forty."

Categorical Judgments are easily referred to the two classes, of substitutives and attributives, according as their predicates are or are not equal in extension to the subjects. This kind of judgment presents little difficulty, after the explanations already given.

Perhaps our readers may be slow to admit that for all logical purposes the hypothetical

judgment may be treated as a categorical. Yet this is the view to which we must adhere, in common with the best logicians. In the hypothetical, there are not two judgments but one. In the example "If the heart is right, the actions will be so," we neither say that any one's heart *is* right, nor that his actions will be; we do not pass a judgment about either absolutely, but we say that *if* the one is, *then* the other will be. So that what we really decide is that there is a connexion between the two facts; and the logical copula, though not expressed there, has its proper place between the two clauses, thus ["the case, fact, or notion, of the heart's being right] is [a case, fact, or notion of the actions being so."] But there are several kinds of hypothetical judgments, which have different properties.

The hypothetical judgment appears, as we have said, as two judgments, the former of them, containing the condition, being called the antecedent, and the latter, containing the effect of the condition, being called the consequent. In each of these there are two

terms, which would give four in all, if one of the terms of the antecedent did not sometimes re-appear in the consequent, when the number of distinct terms is of course but three. Now only five arrangements of these terms are possible; in four of which there are but three terms, and in the fifth, four.

They are

1. If A is B, A is C
2. If A is B, B is C
3. If A is B, C is A
4. If A is B, C is B
5. If A is B, C is D.

The following are examples of these formulæ.

1. If one of the angles of a triangle is a right angle, it must be opposite to the greatest side.
2. If this be poetry, poetry is worthless.
3. If brave men run away, you are brave.
4. If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary.
5. If the moon exerts her attractive force in the same line as the sun, the tides are at the highest.

The obvious difference between the first four and the fifth example is, that the fifth alone expresses two separate facts, brought

together as cause and effect, whilst in all the rest, from the recurrence of a term in both clauses, it is impossible to separate entirely the two things stated. This leads to the observation of a real difference in their nature. Without attempting to examine the origin of our idea of cause and effect, we may state, as a thing generally admitted, that all men are accustomed to regard some one fact as the necessary result of another, which they have observed invariably to precede or accompany it; and that they may learn, however different in nature the two facts may appear, to identify them so far as invariably to expect the effect where they have observed the cause. The drawing of a trigger is a very different fact from the sudden death of a healthy man; yet every one knows that under certain circumstances the one will infallibly cause the other. A given motion of the hands of an electric telegraph in London is a different fact from the sailing of some ships of war from Portsmouth: yet the one will cause the other. The revolution of the moon has so little apparent connexion with

the spring and neap tides, that it would be long before men observed what is really the case, that the position of the moon occasions the tide's fluctuations. Experience observes that events happen together, or in a close succession, and the mind, after adequate observations, connects them by its idea of cause. Whether this idea be also a part of the experience, or one of the primitive constituents of the mind itself, even as the eye is a constituent part of the body, is a question much debated ; but it need not occupy us. We have to remark that two facts, which do not resemble one another, between which perhaps we once saw no connexion, may be inseparably linked together in our minds, as a cause and an effect. And when the connexion between them is stated, in a hypothetical (that is, a conditional) judgment, the truth of the statement will entirely depend upon the correctness of our observation, since there can be nothing in the statement itself to serve as a criterion of its truth. In "If A is B, C is D" we have no test but the application of our idea of cause and effect to the facts

for which these letters stand. But in "If A is B, A is C," we appeal, not to the idea of cause, but to a categorical judgment of which we have the materials before us. "If A is B, A is C" will be true provided "All B is C" be true. "If this is an equilateral triangle, it is also an equiangular" must be tried by the rule "All equilateral triangles are equiangular." Here is no notion of cause; but a statement of a rule, with the supposition that some one case comes under it. It really means, not that one event is caused by another, but that a conception has certain marks; which is the function of the categorical judgment.

All judgments apparently hypothetical, but having three terms only, may be reduced to categoricals by leaving out the term that is repeated, and using the other two for subject and predicate. Thus "If this be poetry, poetry is worthless" becomes "This (poetry) is worthless:" and "If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary," means that "Virtue, (in so far as pertains to the control of the will) is the same as vice." But as they have the

conditional form, they may also be reduced to categoricals in the mode already described; —“The case of virtue being voluntary is a case of vice being voluntary.” The conditional particle *if* means in judgments of this kind “if it should prove that—or, be granted that,” since the facts exist already, and the supposition refers to our knowledge of them. But in the true conditional the “if” signifies “if it occurs that,” since the fact must come about, to necessitate the occurrence of another fact.

But whilst conditional judgments differ essentially from categoricals, the former affirming the causal connexion between two distinct facts, and the latter declaring that a thing or class of things has some property; there is also a sufficient similarity to admit of their being identified, for logical purposes. Both alike affirm the invariable connexion of their two terms. By “All the tissues of the body continually decay and are reproduced,” is meant that wherever one of the tissues of the human body exists, decay and reproduction are going on, and cannot be absent: and

in like manner, by “If the moon’s attraction acts against that of the sun, the tides are low” is meant that whenever these two heavenly bodies are found in the supposed position, we find a particular state of the tides. In both cases, one thing is affirmed to be an accompaniment of another. In the categorical, a thing has the mark expressed by the predicate; and in the conditional, a fact has another fact for its mark. In the example given of the former kind of judgment, we affirm that without the notion of decay and reproduction, our notion of the tissues of the body would be wrong and incomplete: in the other example, that our notion of that position of the heavenly bodies would be incomplete, if we did not take into view its influence on the tides. Logic, willing to simplify her formulæ, and to leave the examination of the idea of cause and effect to Metaphysics, reduces the conditional to the same rules as the categorical. The formula “The case, fact, or notion, of *this* existing, is, a case, fact, or notion of *that* existing” is sufficient for the reduction of *any* conditional

to a categorical. For true conditionals, i. e. those where the supposition relates to the occurrence of facts, not to our knowledge of facts, we shall generally say "The *fact* of his being" &c. ; for the other kinds, "The *notion*" &c. But some variations are admissible. Thus, recurring to our examples we may say,

1. The case of one angle of a triangle being a rectangle—is—a case of its being opposite to the greatest side.
2. The admission that this is poetry—would be an admission that poetry is worthless.
3. The notion that all brave men run away—is—a notion of your being brave.
4. The notion that virtue is voluntary—implies—the notion that vice is voluntary.
5. The fact that the moon exerts her attractive force in the same line as the sun—implies—the fact that the tides are at the highest.

But let it be noticed that the four first examples contain the materials not so much of a judgment, as of a perfect argument, of which one of the judgments is *supposed* to be true.

1. Every right angle of a triangle is opposite the greatest side.

This angle is a right angle,
Therefore it is opposite to the greatest side.

2. This poetry is worthless.

This poetry is *all* poetry (i. e. is a fair sample of
every kind),
Therefore all poetry is worthless.

3. Brave men are *all* those who run away.

You run away,
Therefore you are brave.

4. Virtue is voluntary.

Vice (as far as the will goes) is the same as virtue,
Therefore vice is voluntary.

Conditionals may appear either as substitutive or attributive judgments. If they set forth some cause which not only produces a given effect, but is the only cause that does so, they belong to the former class. "If the moon comes between the sun and the earth, the sun will be eclipsed"—is a judgment of this kind, for there is no other cause which produces that effect: and therefore we may either say "All cases of the moon's coming between the sun and the earth—are—cases of the sun's being eclipsed," or the simple converse "All cases of the sun's being eclipsed—are—cases of the moon's coming between the

fun and the earth." But where the cause stated is only one of several which might have produced the effect,—as in "If it rains, the flower beds will be wet," where the same effect would be produced by the falling of dew, or the use of the watering-pot,—we cannot employ the simple converse, for the predicate is wider than the subject. We may say "All cases of its having rained, are cases of the flower-beds being wet," but obviously not "All cases of the flower-beds being wet are cases of its having rained." These are attributives.

Disjunctive judgments may all be referred to the head of substitutives; for the sphere of the predicate is just equal to that of the subject, the latter being a conception, and the former the same conception logically divided.* In "Either Shakspeare is wrong, or Richard III. was a monster," our meaning may be expressed thus—"The possible cases in this matter are that Shakspeare is wrong, and that Richard III. was a monster;" which is a substitutive judgment. The real pre-

* See § 31.

mils in a disjunctive *argument* is not the disjunctive judgment itself, but, as will be shown, a certain immediate consequence from it.

§ 42. *Doctrine of Quantity, or of the Extension of the subject in a judgment.*

A judgment is either about the whole of a conception, as “all stars shine;” and this we call a universal judgment: or about part of a conception, as “Some lakes have an outlet,” and this is a particular judgment; or about an intuition, as “Northumberland House is near Charing Cross,” and this is a singular judgment.

For logical purposes we may regard all singulals as universals, because they agree in bringing in the whole, and not a part, of their subject. So that as to Quantity, judgments are either universal or particular.*

* See *Wallis' Logic. Thesis* 1. Further distinctions of judgments as to Quantity have been brought in by the acuteness of logicians, which for philosophical purposes are not very important. The judgment—“Most men are prejudiced” cannot, it is argued, be considered

§ 43. *Doctrine of Quality, or the agreement or disagreement of subject and predicate.*

Where a judgment expresses that its two terms agree, it is called Affirmative; as, All planets move in an elliptic orbit; where it expresses their disagreement, it is termed negative; as, No human knowledge is perfect. This part of the judgment is its Quality. Although the negative particle is not always connected with the copula, but may appear in other parts of the sentence, in every real negative judgment it belongs only to the

as particular, for it implies not only that *some* men, but *more than the half* of mankind are prejudiced. These are termed *plurative* judgments; and will be mentioned again in examining the syllogism. To Professor *De Morgan* belongs the merit of recalling attention to them; and in his elaborate and acute "Formal Logic," p. 325, he inserts Sir *W. Hamilton's* remark upon the use of them, that "all that is out of classification—all that has no reference to genus and species, is out of Logic, indeed out of Philosophy;" that Philosophy seeks to know whether *all* or *some* or *more* of a subject comes into a predicate, but not whether much or little, for "Philosophy tends always to the universal and necessary," to which this distinction does not seem to belong. At the same

copula. The two terms are given, and the question always is whether *is* or *is-not* shall be the connecting link between them.

But by removing the negative sign from the copula, and attaching it to the predicate, we may turn the judgment into an affirmative of a peculiar kind, sometimes called an indefinite,* which is equivalent in signification to the negative. Instead of, No human knowledge is perfect, we may say with equal truth, All human knowledge is *non*-perfect, or *imperfect*. This licence is founded on the law† that it amounts to the same thing

time the plurative judgment deserves attention, as being a possible mode, and as bringing in a curious exception to a rule of syllogism.

In the same work (p. 142), another class of propositions is mentioned, called the “numerically definite proposition,” where the number of objects both of the subject and predicate is known and specified. The same objection and defence would apply to them as to the plurative judgments; only that their practical use seems even less, and it is difficult even to invent an example likely to occur.

* By Wolff, *Phil. Rat.* § 209, and Kant, *Logik* § 22.

† Compare § 30.

whether we say that our subject is shut out from some positive conception or included in the cognate privative, for any given subject whatever must be found in one of the two. But in their use in logic these indefinite judgments may, without inconvenience, be considered as affirmatives.

To distinguish between negative judgments and such as are so only in appearance, we must consider whether the sign of negation, *not*, is meant to affect the copula, or whether it really belongs to one of the terms. In, "Not to submit would be madness," there is no negation, though the sign of it is expressed.

§ 44. *Doctrine of Modality.*

The degree of certainty with which a judgment is made and maintained, is called its modality; as being the *mode*, or measure, in which we hold it to be true. We affirm with very different degrees of assurance, the two judgments, that "An equilateral triangle is equiangular" and that "Zeno of Elea was the inventor of dialectic;" since we can prove

the former to demonstration, whilst doubts may be entertained as to the evidence on which the latter rests. Opinions differ as to the place which this doctrine ought to hold in Logic. Not without hesitation, it is here excluded from pure, to be discussed in applied Logic, on the ground that the modality of a judgment is not part of itself, and does not belong to the copula,—as seems to be shown by the fact that the degree of certainty about the same judgment fluctuates in the mind of the same person at different times, and, still more, in different persons, the mode of expression remaining unaltered.*

§ 45. *Distribution of Terms in Judgments.*

Universal judgments distribute, *i.e.* introduce the whole of, their subject; particulars do not. In “All the fixed stars twinkle” and “No man is wise at all times,” it is obvious that we are speaking of the whole of the fixed stars, and of men, respectively; and therefore each term is distributed.

* *Kant* takes the opposite view. Critick. p. 75. Eng. Transf. Ed. I.

Negative judgments distribute the predicate. If "No minerals are nutritious for animals" is asserted, it means that nothing which is nutritious for animals can have the properties of minerals; and so the term "nutritious for animals" is distributed; and if we suppose that only *some* nutritious things are asserted not to agree with minerals, it would follow that *some other* nutritious things might agree with, i. e. might be, minerals, so that we might say at the same time—"No minerals are nutritious for animals" and "Some minerals are nutritious for animals;" whereas we know that we meant by the former judgment to exclude the possibility of our receiving the latter. If the predicate of a negative is not distributed, then it can have no real negative power; for if the subject is only excluded from one part of the predicate, it may be included in some other part.

Substitutive judgments distribute the predicate. Since the predicate in them is used to define the subject, it must itself be definite, and therefore the whole of it must be

given, otherwise the uncertainty as to what *part* was meant, would make it useless for definition.

We may here remark that an ambiguity attaches to some particles which have important duties in Logic. The copula *is* means always *exists*,* but when used in a proposition, it expresses an existence modified or limited by the predicate; when employed alone, it expresses *absolute* existence, *i. e.* that the subject is among the class of really existing things. Upon this variation a well-known fallacy† was founded; that of arguing that because “Ptolemy is dead” (*i. e.* only exists to us in the way that a dead person can, by a remembered or traditionary notion) therefore “Ptolemy *is*” (*i. e.* has an actual existence among other living persons,) which is a very different statement.

Again the word *all* in its proper logical sense means “each and every;” but it stands

* See however *Waitz*, on *Organ.* 16, a. 12, for the sense of the copula in Aristotle.

† *Aristotle*, de *Soph. Elench.* ch. v. iii. Tauchnitz.

sometimes for "all taken together." "All these claims upon my time overpower me." Hence may arise an ambiguity; instead of the *all* in its logical use, we may put *every*; but to exercise the same liberty with the other sense of it would be absurd. The example given could not mean "Every single claim upon my time overpowers me."


The word *some* is likewise the cause of confusion, in its logical use. In what sense is the "some" of a particular proposition to be understood? Does it mean "Some, we know not how many," or "A certain number, which we have in our thoughts"? Suppose that historical reading leads to the conviction that "Some democratic governments have ended in a tyranny," it may be doubtful whether this result includes precisely those democracies which we have found in our researches were consummated by despotism, and no others, in which case the conception in our minds is definite and precise, though conveyed in an indefinite expression: or only expresses that this has occasionally happened to democracies, possibly to others besides

those which we have studied, in which case the conception "some democracies" would be purely indefinite. The word appears to be employed in the two senses of "Some or other," and "Some certain," in common language; and it becomes a question in which sense it is to be regarded in Logic.

Now the different steps in attaining knowledge are marked by the acquirement of new laws or rules, that is to say, of universal judgments, expressing that to the whole of a given class of things or facts, some mark or property belongs. And wherever a definite number of things is ascertained to possess a mark, it is the tendency of the mind to set them apart from other things that most resemble them, by some name, which may stand for them both in thought and speech, for the sake of making the statement universal. If by "Some democracies have ended in despotism," we mean simply to assert that in three or four countries, with the history of which we are familiar, and which we could name, this result has occurred, the statement is really universal, only that our subject is a species only

of the genus "democracies;" and we ought to say "The democracies (three or four) whose history we have traced." But as our having studied them is not of importance enough to found a distinction upon, a universal assertion of this kind would have no philosophical value; and by "Some democracies end in despotism" we should mean to declare that in trying to find the agreement between these two terms, we had not succeeded in establishing the rule, the universal judgment, but that a partial agreement had appeared, the extent of which, though it was discovered from some particular cases, was not, so far as we knew, limited to them, but remained thoroughly indefinite. Every term then which, though indefinitely expressed, refers to a definite class of things, should be rendered definite. Wherever the things denoted by the subject are really definite, as having some marks that group them in a smaller class by themselves, science requires that instead of appearing as part of the larger, they should have their own name and position.

SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF JUDGMENTS.



§ 46. *Table of all the Judgments.*

The following table contains examples of the fix kinds of judgments, with their Quantity, Quality and Relation expressed, and the vowels which may conveniently be used as symbols of them.

EXAMPLE.	QUANTITY.	QUALITY.	RELATION.	SIGN.
All the salts are soluble.	Universal	Affirmative	Attributive.	A.
No right action is inexpedient.	Universal	Negative	Attributive.	E.
Some muscles act without our volition.	Particular	Affirmative	Attributive.	I.
Some plants do not grow in the tropics.	Particular	Negative	Attributive.	O.
Common salt is chloride of sodium.	Universal	Affirmative	Substitutive.	U.
Some stars are all the planets.	Particular	Affirmative	Substitutive.	Y.

An inspection of the table will shew that of the fix judgments there are three of universal and three of particular quantity ; that there are four of affirmative and two of negative quality ; that there are two of attributive and two of substitutive relation, whilst the two negatives, as denying that

either relation subsists between the subject and predicate, are undetermined as to relation. The vowels in the last column are very useful in abbreviating the processes of Logic; for instead of saying that a given judgment is a universal affirmative judgment, it is sufficient to say that it is an A, which conveys to one conversant with Logic, the same meaning. The last example, of Y, is given in the words best adapted to shew the distribution of its terms; but in practice it would probably occur as “Stars *include* the planets,” which has precisely the same import. But this form of judgment is seldom used* because, the subject being the principal notion in every judgment, it is unnatural to put an indefinite (i. e. undistributed) conception in the principal place, and a definite (i. e. distributed) conception in the place of second im-

* The old logicians would have called it, probably, an “*inordinata propositio*,” or unnatural proposition. *Keckermanni Log. B. II. § i. cap. 1*, not quite upon the same grounds. *Comp. Arist. An. Post 1, xxii. 3*; and *Zabarella* upon it, p. 909.

portance. That notion of which we had the whole before us, would naturally occur first ; and this, it seems, is the psychological principle in which "All planets are stars" is a more obvious and natural judgment than its converse "Some stars are all planets." Nor is the predicate of Y strictly definitive, since it only serves that purpose for *a part* of the subject.

§ 47. *Table of Judgments according to Sir W. Hamilton.*

To the six judgments just given, a very distinguished logician adds two. Extending the doctrine of distribution, he says that in negative judgments, as well as in affirmative, we may speak of—the whole of both terms—part of both terms—the whole of the subject and part of the predicate—part of the subject and the whole of the predicate ; so that there are four kinds of affirmatives and four of negatives. Putting X and Y to stand for any subject and predicate, we may exhibit them thus :—

Sign.	Affirmatives.	Negatives.	Sign.
U.	All X is all Y	No X is Y.	E.
I.	Some X is some Y	Some X is not some Y.	ω .
A.	All X is some Y	No X is some Y.	η .
Y.	Some X is all Y	Some X is no Y.	O.

On comparing this table with that given in the last section, it will be found that with the exception of the two negatives marked η and ω , each judgment here has a counterpart there. Why have we ventured, in accordance with the practice, it is believed, of all logicians, to exclude these two?

The answer is, that whilst Sir William Hamilton gives a table of all *conceivable* cases of negative predication, other logicians have only admitted *actual* cases. It is not inconceivable that a man should say "No birds are *some* animals," (the η of the Table) and yet such a judgment is never actually made, because it has the semblance only, and not the power, of a denial. True though it is, it does not prevent our making another judgment of the affirmative kind, from the same terms; and "All birds are animals" is also true. Though such a negative judgment

is conceivable, it is useless; and feeling this, men in their daily conversation, as well as logicians in their treatises, have proscribed it.—But the fruitlessness of a negative judgment where both terms are particular is even more manifest; for “Some X is not some Y” is true, whatever terms X and Y stand for,* and therefore the judgment, as presupposed in every case, is not worth the trouble of forming in any particular one. Thus if I define the composition of common salt by saying “Common salt is chloride of sodium,” I cannot prevent another saying that “*Some* common salt is not *some* chloride of sodium,” because he may mean that the common salt in *this* salt-cellar is not the chloride of sodium in *that*. A judgment of this kind

* Except of course they represent individuals; and *all* that could be inferred from such a judgment *would* be that its terms were general, not individual—conceptions not intuitions. Even this however is provided for, as we know from their being particular, that they must be capable of division, and therefore general. “Some Nicias” could only be said with propriety, if there were several men bearing that name.

is spurious upon two grounds ; it denies nothing, because it does not prevent any of the modes of affirmation ; it decides nothing, inasmuch as its truth is presupposed with reference to any pair of conceptions whatever. In a list of *conceivable* modes of predication, these two are entitled to a place.

§ 48. *Import of Judgments. Extension and Intension. Naming.*

Upon the examination of any judgment which appears to express a simple relation between two terms, we shall find it really complex, and capable of more than one interpretation. "All stones are hard"—means in the first place that the mark, hardness, is found among the marks or attributes of all stones ; and in this sense of the judgment, the predicate may be said to be contained in the subject, for a complete notion of stones contains the notion of hardness and something more. This is to read the judgment as to the intension (or comprehension) of its terms.*

* See p. 127.

Where it is a mere judgment of explanation, it will mean "the marks of the predicate are among *what I know to be* among the marks of the subject:" but where it is the expression of a new step in our investigation, of an accession of knowledge, it must mean "the marks of the predicate are among *what I now find* to be the marks of the subject."*

Both subject and predicate however not only imply certain marks, but represent certain sets of objects. When we think of "all stones," we bring before us not only the set of marks—as hardness, solidity, inorganic structure, and certain general forms—by which we know a thing to be what we call a stone, but also the class of things which have the marks, the stones themselves. And we might interpret the judgment "All stones are hard" to mean that "The class of stones is contained in the class of hard things." This brings in only the extension of the two terms; according to which, in the example before us, the subject is said to be contained

* See next §.

in the predicate. Every judgment may be interpreted from either point of view ; and a right understanding of this doctrine is of great importance. Let it be noticed, against a mistake which has been re-introduced into logic, that all conceptions, being *general*, represent a class, and that to speak of a "general name" which is not the name of a class, is a contradiction in terms. But this is very different from asserting that a class of things corresponding to the conception actually exists in the world without us. The conceptions of giant, centaur and firen are all of classes ; but every one knows, who realizes them, that the only region in which the classes really exist, is that of poetry and fiction. The mode of existence of the things which a conception denotes is a mark of the conception itself ; and would be expressed in any adequate definition of it. It would be insufficient to define "Centauræ" as a set of monsters, half-men and half-horses, who fought with the Lapithæ, so long as we left it doubtful whether they *actually* lived and fought, or only were feigned to have done

so ; and by some phrase, such as “ according to Ovid ” or “ in the Mythology ” we should probably express that their actual existence was not part of our conception of them.

The judgment selected as our example contains yet a third statement. We observe marks ; by them we set apart a class ; and lastly we give the class or name a symbol, to save the trouble of reviewing all the marks every time we would recall the conception.* “ All stones are hard ” means that the name hard may be given to every thing to which we apply the name stones.

All judgments then may be interpreted according to their Intension, their Extension, and their application of names or descriptions ; as the following examples may help to show.

A. “ All the metals are conductors of electricity ” means

Intension. The attribute of conducting electricity belongs to all metals.

Extension. The metals are in the class of conductors of electricity.

Nomenclature. The name of conductors of electricity may be applied to the metals (among other things). †

* P. 47.

† “ Among other things.” This qualification is re-

- E. "None of the planets move in a circle" means
 Intension. The attribute of moving in a circle does not belong to any planet.
 Extension. None of the planets are in the class (be it real, or only conceivable) of things that move in a circle.
 Nomenclature. The description of things that move in a circle cannot be applied to the planets.
- I. "Some metals are highly ductile" means
 Intension. The mark of great ductility is a mark of some metals.
 Extension. Some metals are in the class of highly ductile things.
 Nomenclature. The name of highly ductile things may be applied to some metals.
- O. "Some lawful actions are not expedient" means
 Intension. The attribute of expediency does not belong to some lawful actions.
 Extension. Some lawful actions do not come into the class of expedient things.
 Nomenclature. The name of expedient cannot be given to some lawful actions.
- U. "Rhetoric is the art of persuasive speaking" means
 Intension. The attributes of the art of persuasive speaking, and of Rhetoric, are the same.
 Extension. Rhetoric is co-extensive with the art of speaking persuasively.

quired by the rules of distribution, for metals are only *some* conductors.

Nomenclature. "The art of persuasive speaking" is an expression which may be substituted for Rhetoric.

Y. "The class of animals includes the polyps" means Intension. The attributes of all the polyps belong to some animals.

Extension. The polyps are in the class of animals.

Nomenclature. The name of polyps belongs to some animals.

§ 49. *Analytic and Synthetic Judgments.*

Some judgments* are merely explanatory of their subject, having for their predicate a conception which it fairly implies, to all who know and can define its nature. They are called analytic judgments, because they *unfold* the meaning of the subject, without determining anything new concerning it. Though they cannot be said to augment our knowledge of the subject, the habit of thinking of things without realizing all their marks, is so common, that judgments in which the marks are predicated anew are useful to revive our remembrance of them; whilst they are indispensable in explaining to

* *Kant. Logik.* § 36, and *Prolegomena*, § 2.

others the nature of our subject, of which they may not have an adequate notion. If we say that "all triangles have three sides," the judgment is analytic; because "having three sides" is always implied in a right notion of a triangle. Such judgments, as declaring the nature or essence of the subject, have been called "essential propositions."*

Judgments of another class attribute to the subject something not directly implied in it, and thus increase our knowledge. They are called synthetic, from *placing together* two notions not hitherto associated. For example—"All bodies possess power of at-

* *Mill's* Logic. B. I. ch. vi. It is however a misnomer to call them all "identical propositions." "Every man is a living creature" would not be an identical proposition unless "living creature" denoted the same as "man;" whereas it is far more extensive. *Locke* understands by identical propositions only such as are tautologous—"by identical propositions I mean only such wherein the same term, importing the same idea, is affirmed of itself." (*Hum. Under.* iv. viii. 3.) But he condemns the use of what we have called analytic judgments likewise, (*Hum. Under.* iv. viii. 4.) as adding nothing to real knowledge: he would probably admit them as *explanatory* propositions.

traction" is a synthetic judgment; because we can think of bodies without thinking of attraction as one of their immediate primary attributes. But if our knowledge of any object were complete, we should conceive it invested with *all* its attributes, and no synthetic judgments would be required.

We must distinguish between analytic and tautologous judgments. Whilst the analytic display the meaning of the subject, and put the same *matter* in a new *form*, the tautologous only repeat the subject, and give us the same matter in the same form, as "Whatever is, is." "A spirit is a spirit." Whether in thinking or in teaching, the tautologous judgments are useless.*

* *Kant. Logik.* § 37. *Locke. Hum. Under.* iv. viii. 2.—They may accidentally, and by a particular emphasis, become the vehicles of emotion or rebuke. The "Sensation is sensation" of Dr. Johnson means "One cannot help feeling." So too the obvious analytic judgments, "A negro has a soul, please your honour," of *Sterne's* Corporal, and "He has no wife" of the agonized Macduff, convey a pathos from their accidental use, and from the train of judgments they suggest, but disdain to express, which their mere logical import does not account for.

OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

PART III.

SYLLOGISM. REASONING.

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶ τεθέντων, ὥστε
λέγειν ἕτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων.

ARISTOTLE.





SYLLOGISM. REASONING.

§ 50. *Syllogism.*

WHEN the state of our knowledge does not warrant us in judging at once whether two conceptions agree or differ, we seek for some other judgment or judgments, that contains the grounds for our coming to a decision. This is called reasoning, which may be defined “the process of deriving one judgment from another.” The technical name for that one single step of the process, of which the longest chains of reasoning are but the repetition, is syllogism, or “computation,” a word which has probably come to be employed in its present sense from the resemblance between computation proper, i. e. gathering the results of a sum, and that gathering of the result of other

judgments that we call reasoning. A fyllogism has been defined "A sentence or thought in which, from something laid down and admitted, something distinct from what we have laid down follows of necessity."* The form or essence of a fyllogism therefore consists, not in the truth of the judgments laid down or of that which is arrived at, but in the production of a new and distinct judgment, not a mere repetition of the antecedents, the truth of which cannot be denied without impugning those we have already accepted for true.

The new judgment which is to be drawn, and which gives occasion for the reasoning process, is called, *before* proof is found, the question or problem, and *after* proof the conclusion. The judgments used to establish the conclusion are termed the premisses; and

* *Aristotle*, Pri. An. I. I. I say "a sentence or thought" because λόγος means both *ratio* and *oratio*. The words "laid down and admitted" have no exclusive reference to disputation, for we may lay down judgments for *our own* use alone, when there is no disputant in the case. *Trendelenburg* and *Waitz*, on this passage.

the connexion between the premisses and conclusion, that entitles us to gather the one from the other, is the consequence; as appears from the phrases "by consequence," "consequently," so often employed in argument. Sometimes the conclusion, as following "by consequence" has itself the name of consequence, although consequent would be more strictly correct. Latin writers have applied the names *complexio* and *connexio* to the same part of the syllogism.

§ 51. *Immediate and Mediate Inference.*

In some cases we are unable to decide that the terms of the question agree with or differ from one another, without finding a third, called the *middle*, term, with which each of the others may be compared in turn. This is mediate inference. If one suspects that "this liquid is poison," it may be impossible to convert the suspicion into certainty, until one has found that "it contains arsenic;" "containing arsenic" will then be the middle term, which will be compared in a judgment

with each of the others in turn; and the whole argument will run "This liquid contains arsenic; and every thing that contains arsenic is poisonous; consequently this liquid is." We will say nothing at present of the means of finding middle terms, although, as in the given example, long trains of thought or patient observation may be required to secure them.

But sometimes, instead of a third term, differing entirely from the other two, the premises only need contain the two terms of the conclusion, or some modification of them. Thus from "All good rulers are just" we infer that "No unjust rulers can be good," a judgment introducing indeed no new *matter*, *i. e.* making us acquainted with no new facts; but still distinct from that from which we drew it, as representing the matter under a new form. Here, for purposes of inference, there are not three different terms, because *just* and *unjust*, though they stand for two separate sets of objects, have a particular relation, each implying the existence of the

other.* Some logicians refuse the name of inference to this and similar processes, on the ground that "there is in the conclusion no new truth, nothing but what was already asserted in the premises, and obvious to whoever apprehends them."† That the conclusion is *virtually* asserted in the premises, is true not only of these immediate inferences, but of all syllogisms whatever; even in the inductive, the mere consequence—the act of concluding—brings in nothing which is not known potentially as soon as we have the whole grounds before us. So that the objection proves too much; as it would disqualify a set of inferences which no one thinks of rejecting. If however there is absolutely nothing new—if the concession of the premise is not only a virtual, but an actual and express declaration of the conclusion, there is no inference, but mere repetition. But who can say that "No unjust rulers are good" is a bare repetition of "All good ru-

* See § 30. † *Mill's* Logic, B. II. ch. 1, § 2.

lers are just?" In the one we affirm, in the other deny; in the one the subject of thought is "good rulers," in the other "unjust rulers." They are, in these two points at least, distinct judgments, and as the passing of the one makes it possible without further observation or decision upon facts, to collect the other, there is an inference. In many such cases, it is true, the inference is so obvious, so certain to occur upon the first glance at the premises, that it seems needless to draw it out; but all the inferences we are about to specify are used from time to time, and this entitles them to our consideration.

The same objection would lie against all attempts to give rules for the immediate inferences, as would be brought against a definition of the colour *blue*, or scientific directions for walking; namely, that the things themselves are so simple that we understand them perfectly without directions. It is easier to discover for ourselves the principle of any case that may arise, than to charge the memory with a list of all the cases and their laws; and therefore few students

will go beyond the simple examination of the following sections, which are necessary for the completeness of our analysis of thinking.

§ 52. *Opposition and Inferences depending on it.*


Opposition of judgments is the relation between any two which have the same matter, but a different form, the same subject and predicate, but a different quantity, quality, or relation. Between "No form of government is exempt from change," and "Some forms of government are exempt from change," there is an opposition, called by logicians contradictory, the rule of which is that one or other of the judgments must be true, that no intermediate one is possible, and that both cannot be true together. Hence it results, that if I lay down that "No A is B," I imply the impossibility of laying down "Some A is B," or in technical phraseology, if I posit the one I remove the other. And again, the refusal to adopt "No A is B," is equivalent to laying down

that "Some A is B;" the removal of one implies the position of the other. The doctrine of opposition has to show what may be inferred as to the truth or falsehood of any other kind of judgment, from the truth or falsehood of a given one, the subject and predicate remaining always the same. Arbitrary names, sanctioned by the earliest usage, have been given to the relation between each pair of judgments, to which some addition has been rendered necessary by the new judgments *U* and *Y*. But the terms chosen are such as convey their own meaning; and where it was possible, the well-known names have been extended to new relations, instead of introducing new ones.

TABLES OF OPPOSITION OF JUDGMENTS.

I.			
A . . Contrary . .		E . . Contrary . .	U
Subaltern . . .	Contradictory . .	Subaltern . . .	Inconsistent . .
	Contrary . . .		Contrary . . .
I . Subcontrary .		O . Subcontrary .	Y

II.



There are five kinds of Opposition, Contradictory, Contrary, Inconfiscent, Subaltern, and Subcontrary.

Contradictory opposition* is the most perfect, as we can infer both from the position of our judgment the removal of its contradictory, and from the removal of the judgment the position of its contradictory, as has been shewn above. It only exists between the judgments E and I. Other writers describe A and O as contradictories; but the fact is that we cannot tell from the removal of O, whether we ought to replace

* *Aristotle* often called judgments of this kind simply "opposites" (ἀντικειμεναί), as if he considered contradictory opposition the opposition *par excellence*. *Waitz* on *Org.* ii. b. 16.

it by A or U. Let the O "Some men are not rational animals" be removed, i. e. its truth denied, and that removal will not establish the A, "All men are (some) rational animals." A third judgment is possible, namely that "All men are all rational animals"—the only rational animals there are and which of these two is to apply, cannot be inferred from the O, but must be ascertained from the facts of the case.

Contrary opposition exists between affirmative and negative judgments which cannot be true together, but which may be false together; that is, between A and E, E and U, E and Y, U and O, and A and O. From the position of a judgment we are able to infer the removal of its contrary; but the judgment may be removed or denied, without the position of the contrary. If it is laid down that "All men have a right to freedom," it becomes impossible to lay down that "No men have a right to freedom;" but of course it does not follow from the refusal to admit that "All men have the right," that therefore *no* men have.

Inconsistent opposition lies between any two affirmative judgments which cannot be correct together, but may be false together; that is, between A and U, U and Y, and A and Y. Here it becomes necessary to attain a more precise notion of the difference between A and U. Suppose the example of U to be "Animals are things endowed with life and sensation;" which means—that "animals" and "things endowed with life and sensation" are but two modes of representing the same thing, and are therefore interchangeable. Let the example of A be "All men are animals;"—can we say these two are the same? can we put "animals" wherever "men" should come into our thoughts? No; "animals" is a very wide class, containing "men" and a vast number of other species. We mean by our judgment, not that men and animals are just the same things, but that men are *contained in* the wider class animals. This relation would be best represented to us by making "men" a small circle, within "animals" a large one; whilst the relation be-

tween subject and predicate in U would be best conceived as that of two equal circles laid one upon the other. Now every judgment which is really A, and not U, i. e. which really has an undistributed predicate, means that the predicate is wider than, and contains, the subject; whereas every U means as certainly that the predicate is no wider than the subject. It is true that we sometimes form an A where we might form a U; as in saying that "All men are (*some*) rational animals," from a belief that in a higher state of being, or in another planet, there may be rational animals to whom it would be improper, from their other characteristics to apply the name of men: when another disbelieving the existence of any creatures besides men, to whom the name could apply, may hold that "All men are *all* rational animals." But this does not make the judgments true together. *Which* is true depends upon the facts; and the reason that two persons hold the two judgments together, or one person holds them at different times, is that they know the facts with different de-

degrees of correctness. Where the facts judged upon are fairly and fully known, an A and U can never represent them with equal correctness, nor can ever be true together. They are inconsistent.

Subaltern opposition is between any pair of affirmative or negative judgments, when the one has fewer terms distributed than the other. That in which there is more distribution is called the subalternant, and that which has less or none, the subalternate; or they may be termed the higher and lower. The inference here is that when the higher is laid down the lower follows; but nothing follows from denying the higher, or laying down the lower. I is the subalternate to A, O to E, I to U, and I to Y; so that from any A, U or Y follows an I, and from any E, an O. The name of opposition less properly applies here, as the relation of the judgments is really a partial agreement.

Subcontrary opposition is between particular judgments, of which one is affirmative and the other negative, viz. I and O, O and

Y. The name subcontrary is altogether arbitrary and without meaning, as the judgments have no real contrariety, but rather a presumption of agreement. If "Some men are wise" be *the whole* truth, "Some men are not wise," its subcontrary, follows of course; and it has been ingeniously remarked by an old logician, that in this kind of opposition there is not the same subject in the two judgments, for we mean in one "Some men" and in the other "Some *other* men." Each pair of judgments *may* be true together; and I and O cannot be false together. The opposition of Y and O, though we have not given it a separate name, has these peculiar properties, that if Y be true, O must be; and that they may be false together. To distinguish it, we may call it *false-contrary* opposition.

Two judgments* cannot be called opposites unless the same subject be joined with

* *Aristotle*, de Interp. ch. vi. § 5. The Latin logicians say that in both judgments we must speak *de eodem, secundum idem, ad idem, eodem modo, eodem tempore*.

the same predicate at the same time and under the same circumstances in both. "The English are very rich," and "The English are not very rich," may be true together, if English *capitalists* are referred to in the former, and *the public revenue* of England in the latter. Moreover, if the judgment imply an act of comparison with some third thing as a standard, the same standard must be preserved in the opposite judgment. It is not uncommon to hear two such judgments as "This house is very large" and "This house is very small," pronounced by two people who are comparing it with two different standards, the one perhaps with his own little cottage, the other with Blenheim or Stowe. But these rules resolve themselves into one—we must be perfectly sure, by distinctly understanding the subject and predicate, that they are in all respects the same in both judgments.

§ 53. *Conversion of Judgments, and Inferences from it.*

Conversion is the transposition of the sub-

ject and predicate of a judgment, to form a new one. The judgment to be converted is called the convertend, and the new one which results from the transposition, the converse. By conversion, for example, "Some salts are fusible," would become "Some fusible substances are salts." The converse, as having a different subject of thought (see § 35 and § 49) from the convertend, is a new judgment, not merely a different statement of the convertend; for it cannot be the same to think of "salts" and ascertain what can be attributed to them, as it is to think of "fusible substances," and ascertain what is to be predicated of *them*. And as the converse depends entirely for its truth upon the convertend, we must regard it as an inference from it.*

In right conversion, the *quality* of the judgment is preserved, and each term that was distributed is distributed in the converse, but no other. Hence we cannot infer

* This is the view of many logicians besides the Wolfian school.

from "Some sceptics are vicious" that "*All* vicious persons are sceptics;" we should distribute the term "vicious persons," where the premises exhibited it undistributed. Remembering this rule, we may dispense with the common division into simple,* and accidental, conversion. The six kinds of judgments give the following converses respectively,

A is converted to Y					
E	E
I	I
O	"
U	U
Y	A

Upon the conversion of A it may be remarked, that since any judgment and its converse are but two *forms* of the same *mat-*

* Simple conversion is where the converse is of the same Quantity as the Convertend; conversion *per accidens* where the rule of distribution given above, obliges us to make it particular. Those who are curious about the matter will find an explanation of the expression *per accidens* in *Keckermann, Log. II. vi.*

ter, i. e. two modes of thinking upon the same facts, we ought to be able to recover by re-conversion the same judgment we at first converted, otherwise, if we are obliged to rest contented with a weaker form we find that our knowledge of the facts is less now than when we began to convert. By the common rules, A is to be converted to I, and that can only be reconverted to I.

The judgment O is usually considered inconvertible by the ordinary method. But unless we regard the essential difference of subject and predicate, it is hard to see the reason. Unquestionably in such a judgment as "Some substances do not transmit light," there are two terms, the distribution of which we know; why then may we not transpose them, into "No things which transmit light are some substances?" Because every judgment should express some new truth concerning its subject, which this converse appears not to do. The former judgment might be the result of experiments, and contains substantial information, namely that there are substances not permeable by light.

But it is useless to know that no things which transmit light are some substances, for after all they may be some *other* substances.* We ought to treat O then as inconvertible, because its conversion seems to be fruitless.

§ 54. *Immediate Inference by means of Privative Conceptions.*

Every conception, we have seen,† has a corresponding conception called a privative. The positive conception has marks, but all we know of the privative is that those marks are wanting to it. "Unwise," a privative conception, includes whatever "wise," the positive, does not. Now it is impossible to pass any judgment upon a positive conception, without implying others upon the privative; and hence arise many immediate inferences. They are here submitted in a tabular form,‡ not of course to be committed to memory, but to be carefully examined, as a preparation for the practice of

* See § 47.

† See § 11.

‡ Professor *De Morgan* has furnished the pattern for

supplying similar ones to any judgments that occur—an exercise favourable to acuteness, and readiness in interchanging equivalent statements. In the examples, privative words with the prefixed syllable *un* or *in*, have been employed, to avoid a multitude of puzzling negative particles. In each group of three judgments, the first is the premise, and the other two are inferences from it; and in the first division the premises of each group contains positive conceptions; in the second, privative.

this Table in his "Formal Logic," p. 61. The additions I have made are such as the two additional judgments U and Y made indispensable. No earlier writer has taken the trouble to draw out so carefully and clearly the various judgments in which privatives may be employed. The common books use it in two cases, of which these are examples; "All animals feel," then "Nothing which does not feel can be an animal:" "Some judges are not just," then "Some not-just persons are judges." *Aristotle* omits it. *Leibniz*. (Op. xx. p. 98. *Erdmann's* Ed.) indicates that there are many forms of privative predication, but does not pursue the subject.

DIVISION I.

- A. All the righteous are happy ;
Therefore, None of the righteous are unhappy ;
And, All who are unhappy are unrighteous.
- E. No human virtues are perfect ;
Therefore, All human virtues are imperfect ;
And, All perfect virtues are not human.
- I. Some possible cases are probable ;
Therefore, Some possible cases are not improbable ;
And, Some probable cases are not impossible.
- O. Some possible cases are not probable ;
Therefore, Some possible cases are improbable ;
And, Some improbable cases are not impossible.
- U. The just are [all] the holy ;
Therefore, All unholy men are unjust ;
And, No just men are unholy.
- Y. Some happy persons are [all] the righteous ;
Therefore, All who are unrighteous are unhappy ;
And, No righteous persons are unhappy.

DIVISION II.

- A. All the insincere are dishonest ;
Therefore, No insincere man is honest ;
And, All honest men are sincere.
- E. No unjust act is unpunished ;
Therefore, All unjust acts are punished,
And, All acts not punished are just.
- I. Some unfair acts are unknown ;
Therefore, Some unfair acts are not known,
And, Some unknown acts are not fair.

- O. Some improbable cases are not impossible ;
Therefore, Some improbable cases are possible ;
And, Some possible cases are not probable.
- U. The unlawful is the [only] inexpedient ;
Therefore, The lawful is the expedient ;
And, The lawful is not the inexpedient.
- Y. Some unhappy men are all the unrighteous ;
Therefore, No happy men are unrighteous ;
And, Some unhappy men are not righteous.

Let it be remarked that the substantives we insert into these judgments prove that we do not divide the *whole universe* into happy and unhappy, just and unjust, &c. but some more limited class of existences, such as *cases, acts, persons*.* And as to the use of such inferences as these, it may be noticed that men frequently throw a judgment into one of these inferential forms, before they can determine upon its acceptance or rejection. It would be natural, upon being assured that "All the righteous are happy," to exclaim—"What? Are all the unhappy persons we see then to be thought unrighteous?" Among the above inferences

* See § 11.

there are no mere conversions, so that from any premiss its converse may be inferred besides.

§ 55. *Immediate Inference by added Determinants.*

Some mark may be added to the subject and predicate, which narrows the extent of both, but renders them more definite—better *determined*. (§ 29) And from the simple judgment, we may infer that which has the additional mark, provided that the distribution of terms remain unchanged. Thus “A negro is a fellow creature, Therefore a negro in suffering is a fellow-creature in suffering.” Even two judgments* may be amalgamated upon this principle; thus “Honesty deserves reward, and a negro is a fellow-creature, Therefore a negro who shows honesty is a fellow-creature deserving of reward.”

* See *Leibniz*, Op. xix. Theor. 3. Si coincidentibus addantur coincidentia, fiunt coincidentia. Si $A = B$ et $L = M$ erat $A + L = B + M$. See also Op. xx. 4.

§ 56. *Immediate Inference by Complex Conceptions.*

This inference* is parallel to the last; instead of a new conception added as a mark to subject and predicate, the subject and predicate are added as marks to a new conception. For example, "Oxygen is an element, so that the decomposition of oxygen would be the decomposition of an element." Here again, the terms must be distributed in the conclusion or not, according to their distribution in the premises.

§ 57. *Immediate Inferences of Interpretation.*

It has been shown already (§ 48) that a judgment may be interpreted in two or three different ways, according to which of the two *wholes* of thought we bring into view. These are not strictly inferences from the judgment, because whenever it is perfectly un-

* See *Leibniz*, Op. xix. Theor. 3. "Si eidem addantur coincidentia, fiunt coincidentia." This valuable paper would be much clearer, if the great author had distinguished between extension and intension.

derstood, they are parts of it; but relatively to a mind not fully perceiving all that the judgment really conveys, they are inferential, and we may call them inferences of interpretation.

Lambert* has given one or two other formulæ which may come under the same title. "A is B, therefore B exists" and "A is B, therefore where A is we find B." These may be resolved into one, of which an example may shew the use. "Howard exhibited this high philanthropic spirit, therefore such philanthropy really exists," i. e. is not merely imaginary. We make a tacit distinction between our notions of real objects and those from imagination or from grounds that are palpably false.† Taking our notions of Socrates, Heracles, and the Chimæra, we see that in the case of Socrates a conviction is implied that he is a *real* person, in that of Heracles that the representation we have of him is at most only partly real, in that of the Chimæra that it is a mere

* Neues Org. i. ch. i. § 259.

† See p. 94.

invention of the poets. In all our real notions we imply the mark of existence, and a neglect of it leads invariably to an absurdity. I cannot call it, with M. Duval-Jouve,* a judgment, because it is rather the *result* of a former judgment; when we think of volcanoes, we do not *judge* that they exist, because we have long since done so, and always think of them as existent. Farther, every attribute of a real object is itself real; and therefore when we say "that Howard was an exalted philanthropist" we of course imply that the existence of exalted philanthropy is established by the fact of Howard's existence. But where doubts were entertained that our ideal of philan-

* Logique. § 13. Also *Damiron*, Logique p. 12. who regards judgment as the termination of all the acts of the understanding, whereas in the present work it is treated as preparatory to conception, as undertaken for the sake of more precise and complete notions. But of course an "Existential judgment" may be formed, as any other analytic judgment may, with any real conception as the subject; "Man exists, the world exists." Compare *Reid*, Essay vi. ch. 1, p. 413, of Sir *W. Hamilton's* Edition.

thropy had ever been realized, the example before us would have place.

§ 58. *Immediate Inference from a Disjunctive Judgment.*

A disjunctive judgment expresses an act of Division, as "The teeth are either incisors, canine, bicuspid or molar teeth." According to the rule of mutual exclusion of the dividing members (§ 31) we might infer from the judgment just given, that "The molar teeth are neither incisors, canine, nor bicuspid." According to another rule, that the members must completely exhaust the divisum, we infer that the part of the divisum not contained in one member, must be in some other. "All teeth which are not molar, are either canine, incisors, or bicuspid teeth."

FORMULA I.

All A is X Y or Z.

Therefore the X of A is not the Y or Z of A.

FORMULA II.

All A is X Y or Z.

Therefore the not-X of A is the Y or Z of A.

G G

§ 59. *Immediate Inference by the Sum of several Predicates.*

After examination of the properties of any subject, it is necessary to collect the various predicates which have been assigned it, in order to combine them for a definition. The definition of copper, for example, that it is “a metal—of a red colour—and disagreeable smell—and taste—all the preparations of which are poisonous—which is highly malleable—ductile—and tenacious—with a specific gravity of about 8·83,” is the result of as many different prior judgments as there are properties assigned. From a sufficient number of judgments in A, having the same subject, a judgment in U may be inferred, whose predicate is the sum of all the other predicates.

§ 60. *Concluding Remark.*

Whilst it is at once admitted that these immediate inferences—syllogisms of the understanding as they are called,* not amount-

* By *Kant* and his school.

ing to reasoning—are obvious enough when they appear singly, the great number and variety of them, may be thought a sufficient reason for examining them. Could any person not accustomed to exercises of this kind, draw out fully *all* his own meaning, when he utters the simplest proposition? I think not. The judgment “All men are mortal,” (a plainer cannot be found) tells us—that man is one species in the class of mortal beings—that the mark of mortality should always accompany our notion of man—that the word mortal is a name which may rightly be given to man—that, if *all* are mortal, any one man is—that any statement which affirms that no men are mortal must be quite false—that even the statement that *some* men are not mortal is equally false—that since man is contained in the class of mortal things, which is a wider class, it would be wrong to say all mortal things are men—that, however, the assertion “Some mortals are men” would be true enough—even “Some mortals are *all* men”—that no men can be immortal—that any immortal beings must be other than

men — that mortality really exists, being found in man, whom we know to exist—that a man with immortal hopes is a mortal with immortal hopes—that (since heaven is immortality) a man expecting heaven is a mortal looking for immortality—that he who honours a man, honours a mortal. Thus from this simple judgment fourteen judgments have unfolded themselves, or, as some would say, the judgment has been put in fifteen different ways, in the last three of which only is any new matter introduced. And yet any man of common sense would say that his proposition really implied them. And having undertaken to give an analysis of the whole process of thinking, we could not well omit inferences which form so large a part of it.

§ 61. *General Canon of Mediate Inference.*

The law upon which all mediate inference depends may be thus expressed. *The agreement or disagreement of one conception with another, is ascertained by a third conception, inasmuch as this, wholly or by the same part,*

agrees with both, or with only one of the conceptions to be compared. The mediate fyllogism or (as it is usually called) the fyllogism is a comparison of any two notions with a third, in order to ascertain whether they agree or not. Suppose the question is whether this disease is mortal; in order to ascertain the agreement of the two notions, so that we may say "This disease is mortal," we find a third notion, that it is a consumption, which we know to be mortal, and then the whole fyllogism will be

All consumptions are mortal
This disease is a consumption;
Therefore it is mortal.

All the properties of a fyllogism depend upon the Canon just laid down; as will be seen when they are enumerated.

1. A fyllogism will contain three notions and no more, namely, the two whose agreement or disagreement we strive to ascertain, and the third which we employ as a means of doing so. They are called *terms*; and the third notion, interposed between the others in order to compare them, is the

middle term, whilst the other two may be called from their place in the concluding judgment of the syllogism, the *subject* and *predicate*.

Formerly, the subject of the conclusion was called the *minor* term, and the predicate the *major*, because in one form of inference, supposed to be the most perfect, the major was by its position most extensive, and the minor least; thus, in the syllogism "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal"—mortal, the major term, is more extensive than Socrates, the minor; for, in mortal we include Socrates and all other men. But in negative inference it is impossible to ascertain the comparative extent of the terms. If the conclusion were, "No beasts of prey are ruminant," it would be impossible to ascertain which term were the more extensive,—whether "beasts of prey" applied to more objects than ruminant—inasmuch as the judgment itself declares that they have nothing to do with one another, and one cannot therefore be applied to measure the other. The so-called major term

might happen to be a good deal less than the minor. When the concluding judgment is particular, the same absurdity attaches to the names. In "Some brave men are prudent" it is impossible to say whether brave men or prudent men is the more extensive. The names of major and minor then are only descriptive, when applied to some particular forms of syllogism. But they are so interwoven with logical phraseology, that it will be better occasionally to annex them in a parenthesis to the less objectionable ones.

2. A syllogism must contain three judgments and no more. Since it contains three terms, each of which is to be compared, once only, with every other, there would be three acts of comparison, each expressed by a judgment. Three terms cannot be joined in more than three pairs without repetition.

The two judgments in which the middle term occurs, are called the premisses, and the remaining one the conclusion. That premiss in which the predicate (major term) is compared with the middle, was formerly called the Major premiss, and the other, in

which the subject (minor term) occurs, was the Minor premiss. The former was also sometimes called the Proposition, and the latter the Assumption, and sometimes the Subsumption. But all these names are inconsistent with the wider view of inference now taken; and it will be sufficient to call the premisses *first* and *second*, the first being always that in which the predicate of the conclusion occurs, whether it stands first in order or not.

3. One premiss at least must be affirmative. The canon provides that one term at least must agree with the middle, that is, must be united with it in an affirmative judgment; and without this, there can be no inference about the two terms which are to be compared. With the premisses "No rash man can be a good general, and Xenophon was not a rash man," we could neither have the conclusion that Xenophon *was* a good general, nor that he was *not*. The premisses afford no data for discovering in what sort of judgment the terms Xenophon and good general may come together.

4. The *worst* relation of the two terms with a third, that may be established in the premisses, shall be expressed in the conclusion. Now the best and most intimate relation of two terms is that of absolute identity of matter, as in "An animal is a being with life and sensation;" the next exists where the whole of one term coincides with part only of the other, as in "All organized structures decay;" the lowest relation, where part of one term coincides with part of another, as in "Some flowers are blue." If the two premisses express two different relations, the conclusion must follow the *inferior*. Thus "All triangles = figures with three sides, A B C is a triangle, Therefore A B C is (some) figure with three sides:" where the chief-predicate though distributed in the premiss is not in the conclusion. The worst positive relation then which the premisses contain, is all that can be inferred in the conclusion.

5. On a similar principle, if one of the premisses be negative, the conclusion must also be negative. The Canon only supposes two conditions, under one of which an infe-

rence must be made ; that of agreement of two terms with a third, expressed by affirmative premisses, and consequent agreement of the two terms, expressed by an affirmative conclusion ; and that of agreement of one term and disagreement of another with the third term, expressed in an affirmative and a negative premiss, and consequent disagreement of the two terms, expressed in a negative conclusion. The latter condition obtains wherever there is a negative premiss, and therefore the conclusion will also be negative.

6. The comparison of each of the two terms must be either with the whole, or with the same part, of the third term. And to secure this either the middle term must be distributed in one premiss at least, or the two terms must be compared with the same specified part of the middle, or in the two premisses taken together the middle must be distributed and something more, though not distributed in either singly.

The wife are good

Some ignorant people are good

Therefore some ignorant people are wife.

This is only a fyllogism in appearance, for

the two terms have only been compared with part of the third term good; if the wife are *some* good people, and some of the ignorant are *some other* good people, we have compared with two different parts of a term, which is the same as using two different terms—a condition not contemplated by the Canon, and one under which there can be no inference whatever. But in the next example the two terms meet upon common ground in the third term, because the *whole* of it is once introduced.

All the mineral acids are poisons
 Spirit of salt is a mineral acid
 Therefore it is a poison.

Here, to whatever portion of the class of “mineral acids” we refer “spirit of salt,” it must be a poison, because *the whole class* of mineral acids was brought in as poisonous, so the inference is good. If the first premises were “*half* the mineral acids are poisons” there would be no inference, because the “spirit of salt” might be in the other half. There would be a comparison with two different parts only of a third term.

The next example secures a comparison

with the same part of a third term, not indeed by bringing in every part of it but by specifying which part is intended in both premisses alike.

Certain Sciences are classificatory

These sciences = Mineralogy, Botany and Zoology

Therefore Mineralogy, Botany and Zoology are classificatory.

The same part of the term sciences being used, the other two terms must agree. But it is more correct to regard "certain sciences" as the whole of a smaller term (§ 47), than as the part of a larger, sciences in general. The word "certain" marks it off so definitely that we may consider it a distinct conception.

In the next example, that unusual mode of distribution is seen, which is gathered from the two premisses combined, although neither contains it separately.

Three-fourths of the army were Prussians

Three-fourths of the army were slaughtered

Therefore some who were slaughtered were Prussians.

For, even supposing that the whole of that fourth that were not Prussians, but (say) Austrians, were slaughtered, there still remain two fourths, mentioned in the second premiss as slaughtered, who must have been Prussians.

And this kind of inference may be drawn wherever the mode of expression satisfies us that something *more than all* the middle term has been mentioned in the premisses; the extent of the agreement between the terms of the conclusion being exactly measured by the excess, over and above the whole of the middle term. Thus, "three-fourths of the army," taken twice, make six-fourths, so that the terms of the conclusion agree to the extent of two-fourths at least of the middle term. Let these three lines represent the terms.

Prussians _____
 Army ┌ _____ ┐
 Men slaughtered ┌ _____ ┐

It appears that the middle line, for two-fourths of its length, runs parallel with both the others, and for that distance therefore they run along with each other.

7. Neither term of the conclusion must be distributed, unless it has been so in its premiss. For, the result of the comparison as stated in the conclusion must not be greater than the comparison itself as made in the premisses; if therefore *all* of a term appears in

the conclusion as agreeing with another, a comparison of all of it with the middle must have been made in the premisses.

Such an inference as

Pittacus is good

Pittacus is wife

Therefore *all* wife men are good,

is faulty, because the premisses do not contain "*all* wife men."

These seven general rules of syllogism are not new principles, to be studied in connexion with the Canon. They are directly evolved from it, and are so many cautions to employ it properly. The Rule of Syllogism is one and one only, but its consequences are various, and the concise form of expression adopted in it renders some development of them necessary, which these general rules are calculated to supply. They should be studied till they are perfectly understood,* but the Canon alone need be committed to memory.

* They may be remembered by the following hexameters.

Distribuas medium, nec quartus terminus adfit,

Utraque nec præmissa negans [nec particularis]

Señetur partem conclusio deteriozem,

Et non distribuat, nisi cum præmissa, negetve.

§ 62. *Order of the Premisses and Conclusion.*

Although an invariable order for the two premisses and conclusion, namely, that the premiss containing the predicate of the conclusion is first, and the conclusion last, is accepted by logicians, it must be regarded as quite arbitrary. The position of the conclusion may lead to the false notion that it never occurs to us till after the full statement of the premisses; whereas in the shape of the problem or question it generally precedes them, and is the cause of their being drawn up. In this point the Hindu Syllogism (see p. 5) is more philosophic than that which we commonly use. The premisses themselves would assume a different order according to the occasion. It is as natural to begin with the fact and go on to the law, as it is to lay down the law and then mention the fact. "I have an offer of a commission; now to bear a commission and serve in war is (or is not) against the divine law; therefore I am offered what it would (or would not) be against the divine law to accept." This is an

order of reasoning employed every day, although it is the reverse of the technical ; and we cannot call it forced or unnatural. The two kinds of *forites*, to be described below, are founded upon two different orders of the premisses ; the one going from the narrowest and most intensive statement up to the widest, and the other from the widest and most extensive to the narrowest. The logical order cannot even plead the sanction of invariable practice.* Neither the school of logicians who defend it, nor those who assail it, take a comprehensive view of the nature of infe-

* “ In confirmation of the doctrine that the common order of the premisses should be reversed, may be added, what not one of its modern advocates seems to be aware of, that this, instead of being a novel paradox, is an old, and until a comparatively recent period, an all but universal practice. It is not even opposed by *Aristotle*. For to say nothing of certain special recognitions by him of the legitimacy of this order, his usual mode of stating the syllogism in an abstract or scientific form, affords no countenance to the prior position, in vulgar language of what logicians call the major proposition. *Aristotle* is therefore to be placed apart. But in regard to the other ancient logicians, who cast their syllogisms in ordinary language, I am able to state as follows ; and this in di-

rence. Both orders are right, because both are required at different times. The one is analytic, the other, synthetic; the one, most suitable to enquiry, and the other to teaching.

§ 63. *The Three Figures.*

Syllogisms have been divided into three Figures, according to the position of the middle term in the premisses. This may be the subject of the first premiss (major) and the predicate of the second (minor), in which

rest contradiction not only of the implicit assumptions of our later logicians, but of the explicit assertions of some of the most learned scholars of modern times; that the Greeks (Pagan and Christian, Peripatetic, Academic, Stoic, Epicurean and Sceptic) down to the taking of Constantinople, with very few exceptions, placed first in syllogistic order what is called the minor proposition. The same was done by the Arabian and Hebrew logicians." [I may add the Hindu *Gotama* to these authorities.] "As to the Latins they, previous to the sixth century, were in unison with the Greeks. To the authority and example of *Boethius* I ascribe the change in logical practice. He was followed by the Schoolmen, and from them the custom has descended to us." *Sir W. Hamilton.*

case we say that the syllogism is of the First Figure: or it may be the predicate of both, which constitutes a syllogism of the Second Figure: or the subject of both, which gives the Third Figure. Thus,

I.			II.			III.		
M	P		P	M		M	P	
S	M		S	M		M	S	
∴ S	P		∴ S	P		∴ S	P	

It has been usual to call the first Figure the most perfect, because it exemplifies most directly a certain law of syllogism called the *dictum de omni et nullo*. The law is to this effect*—"Whatever is affirmed or denied of a class, may be affirmed or denied of any part of that class;" so that if one affirms of plants that they require light, one may affirm it also of sunflowers, as a part of the

* *Aristotle*, Cat. ch. 5. *Kant* puts it *Nota nota est nota rei ipsius*, viewing the intension of the judgments. *Leibniz*, *Contentum contenti est contentum continentis*, viewing (I think) their extension. *Leib.* seems to employ *includere* for the Aristotelian *ὑπάρχειν*, the word that refers to the intension of terms; but he does not sufficiently distinguish between the two.

class of plants. This would require three judgments, one to state what we meant to affirm of the class—"All plants need light;"—a second to mention something as part of the class, "Sunflowers are plants;" and a third to affirm the same of the part as had been affirmed in the outset of the whole; "Sunflowers require light." These three judgments, it will be found, have their terms arranged according to the first figure. And on the assumption that the *dictum de omni et nullo* was the paramount law for all perfect inference, and therefore the first figure was alone perfect,* rules have always been given for reducing, as it is termed, every syllogism in the less perfect figures to the first. This can readily be done by changing the order of the terms by conversion, or, in the few cases in which conversion will not apply, by substitu-

* *Aristotle*, Pri. An. i. ch. 5 and 6. *Kant*, in a little Tract, goes over the same ground, contending that all the figures but the first, require the converse of one or other of the judgments to be inserted, to make them pure and natural acts of reasoning. My reason for dissenting will be given in the text.

ting a privative for a positive judgment,* and then converting. But the question was raised—is the *dictum* the sole law of perfect inference? Is it not simply an account of the process of the first figure, and might not each of the other figures have its *dictum* too? The discovery of new *dicta*† put the process of reduction in a new light. Each of the figures was found to have its own functions, and an attempt to bring the two last to the first figure, only spoilt them as examples of their

* See § 54.

† These are not introduced into the text, because they belong to a system of Logic in which no affirmative judgment was held to distribute its predicate, and in which, to comply with the general rules of syllogism, the second figure must always have a negative conclusion, and the third a particular. With our present enlarged list of judgments, they would have a very partial application. However, to illustrate the older treatises they are here given. In the 1st Fig. the *dictum* given above. The Fig. is useful in arguing from a general to a specific statement. For the 2nd Fig. the *dictum de diverso*—"if one term is contained in, and another excluded from, a third term, they are mutually excluded." Useful for showing the differences of things, and preventing confusion of distinct conceptions. For the 3rd Fig. the *dictum de exemplo*—"Two terms which contain a common

own rules. Reduction was therefore unnecessary.

We must not suppose that the division of fyllogisms according to the figures is a mere useless subtlety, the result of an arbitrary attempt on the part of logicians to display the middle term in every possible position. For, first, the premisses we choose to establish some conclusion by, may be judgments to which we are so accustomed, that it would be unnatural to take their converse instead, as might be requisite to bring them into

part, partly agree, or if one contains a part which the other does not, they partly differ." Useful for bringing in examples, and for proving an exception to some universal statement. Thus, if it were stated that all intellectual culture improved the heart and conduct, it would be natural to say, in this Figure, Mr. So and So does not act as he ought, yet "Mr. So and So is a person of cultivated mind, therefore one person at least of cultivated mind does not act as he ought." See *Keckermann*, Logic III. ch. 7, 8, and 9. Also *Lambert*, N. Org. I. iv. §. 229. But Mr. *Mill* is in an error, shared by *Buble* (*Geschichte*, vi. 543) *Troxler* (*Logik* ii. p. 62), in thinking that *Lambert* invented these *dicta*. *Keckermann's* work had put them before the world more than a century earlier. *Keckermann* however ignored the 4th Figure, and *Lambert's* explanation of that may be new.

the first Figure. It makes some difference whether "Kings can do no wrong" is to be the judgment, or the much more awkward form "Some persons who can do no wrong are kings." But, next, it did not escape Aristotle that the more extensive of two terms ought to be the predicate, that the genus should be predicated of the species. This is the natural, though not invariable, order; and it is worthy of remark that in negative judgments, where from the negation the two terms cannot be set together to determine their respective extension, if, apart from the judgment, we know that the one is a small and the other a large class, the one a clearly determined and the other a vague notion, we naturally take the small and clearly determined conception for our subject. Thus it is more natural to say that "The Apostles are not deceivers" than that "No deceivers are Apostles." So that, if our minds are not influenced by some previous thought to give greater prominence to the wider notion, and to make it the subject, reversing the primary order, the figure of the syllogism will be determined by the extension of the mid-

dle term. If this term is obviously wider than the other two, the second will be the natural figure, because there it will be predicated of both. If again, it is obviously narrower than both, the third, in which it can stand twice as subject, will be the natural figure. Thus when it was desirable to show by an example that zeal and activity did not always proceed from selfish motives, the natural course would be some such syllogism as the following.

The Apostles sought no earthly reward,
The Apostles were zealous in their work,
Some zealous persons seek not earthly reward.

Admitting that where the extension of the conceptions is not very different, either of them would stand subject as well as the other, we contend that since in some cases natural reason prescribes the third figure or the second, and rejects the first, the doctrine of the distinction of three figures is not a mere arbitrary invention, but a true account of what takes place in the mind.

§ 64. *Special Canons of the Figures.*

Although the Canon of Syllogism applies

sufficiently to all the figures, it is possible to modify it so as to comprehend the order of the terms in each figure.*

Canon of the First Figure.

In as far as two notions are related, either both positively, or, the one positively and the other negatively, to a third notion, to which the one is subject, and the other predicate, they are related positively or negatively to each other as subject and predicate.

Canon of the Second Figure.

In as far as two notions, both subjects, are, either each positively, or, the one positively, the other negatively, related to a common predicate notion,—in so far are those notions positively or negatively subject and predicate of each other.

Canon of the Third Figure.

In as far as two notions, both predicates, are, either each positively, or, the one positively and the other negatively, related to a common subject notion,—in so far are those

* These are communicated by *Sir W. Hamilton*.

notions positively or negatively subject and predicate of each other.

§ 65. *The Fourth Figure.*

Besides the three that have been given already, only one other combination of the terms of a syllogism is possible, namely, where the middle is predicate of the first (major) and subject of the second (minor) premiss. The introduction of this combination as a fourth figure, is attributed to Galen on the authority of Averroes.* It would fall into this form—

* The words of *Averroes* are *Et ex hoc planum, quod figura quarta, de quâ meminit Galenus, non est syllogismus super quem cadet naturaliter cogitatio.* (In 1 Pri. An. ch. viii. vol. i. p. 63.) Zabarella has written a book in answer to Averroes' remarks against this figure (Op. Log. p. 101). I have inspected the *Dialectic of Galen*, published for the first time at Paris in 1844, by Minoides Menas, a Greek, from a MS. of the eleventh century found in the East; and am of opinion—that Galen did not adopt the *fourth* figure, and that an occasional transposition of the premisses in the 1st figure may have led to the erroneous belief that he did. That his modern editor confounds the 1st and 4th figures is beyond dispute.

	P	M
	M	S
∴	S	P

Many logicians have condemned the use of this figure. It is described as a mere perversion of the first, in which the proper conclusion does not appear, but the converse of it, gained by immediate inference. The meaning of this will appear from an example (taken from Abp. Whately's Logic).

What is expedient is conformable to nature,
 What is conformable to nature is not hurtful to society,
 What is hurtful to society is not expedient.

Here it is contended that the mind naturally expects the converse of the conclusion,—What is expedient is not hurtful to society,—which would bring it at once to a syllogism in the *first* figure, and that we tacitly draw the proper conclusion before passing on to the unnatural one. But whilst it is plain that such a conclusion from such premisses disappoints the expectation, we are unwilling to admit that there is any interpolation of a judgment, without some good

reason, especially as Kant supposed the same sort of process to have place in the 2d and 3d figures also, where it is certainly not required. The reason now to be given for dismissing the 4th figure as really an indirect way of stating the 1st, has not, it is believed, been pointed out before. The subject and predicate, we remarked, are different in order of thought, the subject being thought of for itself, and the predicate for the subject. Now in the 1st figure, the subject of the conclusion was a subject in the premisses, and the predicate was a predicate, so that the order of thought is strictly preserved. So to speak, we do not depose a subject, and set up a predicate in its place. No primary thought becomes secondary nor any secondary primary.

All M is P

All S is M

∴ All S is P

The conclusion no way disturbs the order of terms established in the premisses. But in the 2d figure, the order is somewhat dif-

turbed; the subject of the conclusion was indeed a subject in the premisses, but the predicate was not a predicate.

No P is M

All S is M

∴ No S is P

This makes the figure one degree less natural than the first; it departs from directness in its use of the predicate (major term). In the third figure the same indirectness occurs; the subject of the conclusion was not a subject in its premiss. But in the fourth figure the order is wholly inverted, the subject of the conclusion had only been a predicate, whilst the predicate had been the leading* subject in the premiss. Against this the mind rebels; and we can ascertain that the conclusion is only the converse of the real one, by proposing to ourselves similar sets of premisses, to which we shall always find ourselves supplying a conclusion so arranged that the syllogism is in the first figure, with the second premiss first.

* From standing first; *πρῶτον τῇ θέσει.*

§ 66. *The unfigured Syllogism.*

A fyllogism may be stated without making the terms either subjects or predicates; so that it belongs to no figure.* Thus “since copperas and fulphate of iron are identical, and fulphate of iron and fulphate of copper are not identical, it follows that copperas and fulphate of copper are not identical.”

§ 67. *Modes of Syllogism.*

The *mode* of a given fyllogism is the formal value of its three judgments; as expressed by the three letters that denote them. These, with the addition of the number of the figure to which it belongs, convey the whole form of the fyllogism; thus A I I. Fig. I. is known to mean

All M is P
Some S is M
∴ Some S is P

The few persons who take the trouble to

* Sir W. Hamilton.

analyse the arguments of works they read, by noting these and like symbols in the margin, will bear witness to the attention and exactness which the practice cultivates, and to the not unfrequent detection of fallacies by means of it.

§ 68. *Table of all the Legitimate Modes in all Figures.*

The following Table is an index of the modes in which a good inference can be drawn.* It is arranged according to the order in which the vowels occur in the alphabet, so that, when any mode has been omitted, as not available for inference, the eye can detect and supply it, and the mind examine the reason for its omission.

Some of these modes exemplify different special rules and theorems of logical writers, of which a few are subjoined.

* Another Table is given below, with such additional modes as contain the doubtful negative judgments η and ω .

FIG. I.	FIG. II.	FIG. III.
A A A....	A A I
A I I....	A E E....	A I I
A U A....	A O O....	A U A
A Y I....	A U Y....	A Y A
E A E....	A Y Y....	E A O
E I O....	E A E....	E I O
E U E....	E I O....	E U E
E Y O....	E U E....	E Y E
I U I....	E Y O....	I A I
I Y I....	I U I....	I U I
	I Y I....	
O U O....		O A O
O Y O	O U O
U A A....	U A A....	U A Y
U E E....	U E E....	U E E
U I I....	U I I....	U I I
U O O....	U O O....	U O O
U U U....	U U U....	U U U
U Y Y....	U Y Y....	U Y A
	Y A A....	Y A Y
Y E E....	Y E E
	Y I I....	
Y O O....		
Y U Y....	Y U A....	Y U Y
Y Y Y....	Y Y I....	

Fig. I. A A A and A A I are the only modes to which the *dictum de omni* directly applies—"Whatever is said of a class may be said of a contained part of the class."

Fig. I. A U A is a formula into which a "perfect

induction" might fall, where we affirm something of a whole class, because we have found it true of all the individuals or species which the class contains. Thus

x y and z are P

$S = x$ y and z

Therefore S is P

Leibniz gives the formula "Cui singula infunt, etiam ex ipsis constitutum inest."

Fig. I. $E A E$ and $E I O$ are the only modes to which the *dictum de nullo* applies. "What is denied of a class must be denied of any part of the class.

$E U E$ and $U E E$ in all figures. "Si duorum quæ sunt eadem inter se unum diversum fit a tertio, etiam alterum ab eo erit diversum." Leibniz.

Fig. I. and II. $U A A$. "Quod inest uni coincidentium, etiam alteri inest." Leibniz.

$M = P$

All S is M

\therefore All S is P

$U U U$ in all figures. "Quæ sunt eadem uni tertio, eadem sunt inter se."

§ 69. *A mode of Notation.*

To be able to represent to the eye by figures the relation which subsists in thought between conceptions, tends so greatly to facilitate logical analysis, that many attempts have been made to attain it. Of two impor-

tant schemes, that of Euler and that which Sir W. Hamilton has by improving made his own, an account will be given hereafter. The scheme now to be explained is that which Lambert makes use of, in his *Neues Organon*.

A distributed term is marked by a horizontal line, with the letter S, P or M attached, to denote that it is the subject, predicate or middle term of the syllogism.

P —————

An undistributed term is marked, not by a definite line, but by a row of dots, to show its indefiniteness, thus

S

These are the two forms of quantity in which separate conceptions may occur. But when two conceptions are joined in a judgment, another power as to quantity must be represented also. Let the judgment be, "All plants are organized," and let the lower line represent the subject and the upper the predicate; will this representation convey the whole truth?

P

S —————

L L

In one point it is inadequate, that the term "organized" is not wholly indefinite. We mean indeed by it, only *some* organized things; but then one part of it is *made* definite by affirming it of plants. We do not know how many, or what, individuals, come into the conception "Some organized things" by itself; but when it occurs in this judgment, we are certain of some individuals in it, viz. those which are "all plants." This we are able to express by a line partly definite, partly undetermined, thus

P —————
 S —————

Every affirmative judgment may be represented by a line drawn *under* another, the lower being always the subject. Negative judgments, which express that one conception cannot be contained under another, are represented by two lines drawn *apart from* each other, the predicate being a little higher than the subject, thus—

 P —————
 S —————

But in a syllogism there are three terms, so that we require three lines to represent their

relations; and the diagram thus drawn will supply some important illustrations of the nature of inference. Suppose the premisses are "All matter undergoes change, and the diamond is a kind of matter," the relations of the three terms may be thus exhibited.

P ... —————
M —————
S —————

From this notation besides the two premisses given,

1. All M is P
2. All S is M

we may by reading downwards, gather that

3. Some P is M, and
4. Some M is S

which are in fact immediate inferences by conversion from each of the premisses respectively. But further, from knowing that M stands under P, and S under M, we have learnt that S stands also under P, and this we may express, leaving M altogether out of our statement,

5. All S is P
6. Some P is S,

the former being the proper conclusion from

our premisses, and the latter the converse of the conclusion.

Where our premiss is negative, and by the canon of fyllogism one only can be of that quality, the notation will be

$$\begin{array}{c} P \text{ —————} \\ M \text{ —————} \\ S \text{ ————} \end{array}$$

which would be read thus,

No M is P

All S is M

Therefore, No S is P.

Finally, every universal judgment of substitution, or U, may be expressed by two equal lines

$$\begin{array}{c} P \text{ —————} \\ S \text{ —————} \end{array}$$

But when such a judgment expresses a logical division, as “Organized beings are either plants, brutes or men,” the divided character of the predicate may be expressed by breaking up the line which represents it, thus

$$\begin{array}{c} P \text{ — } x \text{ — } y \text{ — } z \\ S \text{ —————} \end{array}$$

which would be read, “All S is either x y

or z." The contrary process, of logical composition, which is used to express induction, as "Plants, brutes, and men are the only organized beings" would appear as

P —————

S — x — y — z

and be read "x y z make up the sum of P." —The reader will find great advantage in comprehending the rules of syllogism, from figuring the syllogisms to which they happen to apply, according to these directions.*

§ 70. *Equivalent Syllogisms.*


Though the Reduction of Syllogisms, from a so-called imperfect, to the perfect, figure, is no longer requisite, now that the power of the *dictum de omni et nullo* is confined to the proper limits, the relations of three conceptions can be expressed, commonly, in more than one syllogism of the same figure, and always in different figures. And the advantage of any adequate system

* This scheme of notation has likewise been improved by *Sir William Hamilton*, but the view in the text is quite sufficient for our present purpose.

of notation is that it not only represents to us the fyllogism itself, which is one way of stating the mutual bearing of three conceptions, but, in making that mutual bearing visible, it furnishes the means of stating it in other fyllogisms. An example will illustrate this.

“ No agent more effectually imitates the natural action of the nerves, in exciting the contractility of muscles, than Electricity transmitted along their trunks, and it has been hence supposed, by some philosophers, that electricity is the real agent by which the nerves act upon the muscles. But there are many objections to such a view; and this very important one among the rest,—*that electricity may be transmitted along a nervous trunk which has been compressed by a string tied tightly round it, whilst the passage of ordinary nervous power is as completely checked by this process, as if the nerve had been divided.*”* This argument may be thrown into the following fyllogism, as the most direct form of statement.

* Carpenter. Animal Physiology, p. 437.



Electricity will travel along a tied nerve.

The nervous fluid will not travel along a tied nerve,

∴ The nervous fluid is not electricity.

This is a fyllogism in the second figure, and of the mode A E E, which will be found in the Table in the preceding section, and is therefore a valid mode. The middle term is the conception “ Travelling along a tied nerve;” and one of the other terms is under it, and the other not, so that they cannot agree; and this mutual relation may be conceived by the following lines :—

M —————
 P ————— S ———

The question now is—whether having obtained this relation, we cannot find other modes, besides A E E. Fig. ii., in which to express it.


As the physiologist is most engaged with the parts and functions of the animal economy, to him “ The nervous fluid” would be the most prominent term, the subject of thought, and therefore would very properly be the subject of the whole fyllogism. But the *same* three conceptions would be the grounds for arguing.


The nervous fluid will not travel along a tied nerve.
 Electricity will travel along a tied nerve.
 ∴ Electricity is not the nervous fluid.

This is E A E. Fig. ii. which is also a valid mode; and it would best suit one who was examining electricity. It is the same as the last statement, except that the present is the converse of the former conclusion. Again, though somewhat less naturally, we may state it,

Nothing that travels along a tied nerve can be the nervous fluid,
 Electricity travels along a tied nerve,
 ∴ Electricity cannot be the nervous fluid.

This is E A E. of the first Figure. From what has been said we see that the relations between any three conceptions in our mind are permanent, that the mode of statement is not permanent, but may appear now as one mode of syllogism, now as another; that the conditions which determine us to one form as more natural than another are, partly, the difference of extension in the conceptions, where it is ascertainable, partly the greater prominence of one conception in





A. Balanced Middle; Unbalanced Extremes. B. Unbalanced Middle; Balanced Extremes.
C. Unbalanced Middle and Extremes.



our thoughts at the time, which entitles it to be the subject ; that any one of the fyllogifms founded on the conceptions is fufficient to ascertain their relations; and that by a fcheme of notation we may represent, not merely *one* of the cognate fyllogifms, but the ground of all of them, from which they can afterwards be drawn out feparately.

§ 71. *Sir William Hamilton's Scheme of Moods and Figures of Syllogifms.*


A mode of notation propofed by Sir William Hamilton is, beyond doubt, one of the moft important contributions to pure Logic which has ever been made fince the fcience was put forth ; and I am fortunate in being permitted to annex it. Its excellences are—that it is very fimple, that it fhows the equivalent fyllogifms in the different figures at a glance, that it fhews as readily the convertible fyllogifms in the fame figure, that it enables us to read each fyllogifm with equal facility according to extenfion and intenfion, the logical and the metaphyfical whole. Many of the different elements of the nota-

tion are not new, but the novelty lies in the completeness and simplicity of the whole scheme.


In this Table M denotes the middle term; and C and I the two terms of the conclusion. A colon (:) annexed to a term denotes that it is distributed, and a comma (,) that it is undistributed. Where the middle term has a : on the right side, and a , on the left, we understand that it is distributed when it is coupled in a judgment with the term on the right, and undistributed when coupled with the other.


The syllogisms actually represented are all affirmatives, being twelve in each figure; and the affirmative copula is the line , the thick end denoting the subject, and the thin the predicate, of extension. Thus C: , M would signify "All C is (some) M." In reading off the intension, the thin end denotes the subject.

But from each affirmative can be formed two negative syllogisms, by making each of the premisses negative in turn. The negation is expressed by drawing a perpendicular,

stroke through the affirmative copula ; thus . In the negative modes the distribution of terms will remain exactly the same as it was in the affirmatives from which they were respectively formed, with some few exceptions in which the conclusion has a term distributed which was not when it was affirmative.

The line beneath the three terms is the copula of the conclusion ; and in the second and third figures, as there may be two conclusions indifferently, a line is also inserted above, to express the second of them.

The mark  under a mode denotes that when the premisses are converted ; the syllogism is still in the *same* mode.

But a  between two modes signifies that when the premisses of either are converted, the syllogism passes into the other.

The middle is said to be *balanced* when it is distributed in both premisses alike. The extremes, or terms of the conclusion are balanced, when both alike are distributed, unbalanced when one is and the other is not.

According to this scheme there are 12 affir-

native Moods in each Figure, and 24 negatives, or 36 altogether. All the *possible* moods of syllogism are here exhibited; but the value of the inference in some of them is so small that they would never actually be employed. For example, by making negative the first premiss of No. vii. Fig. II. we have such a syllogism as—

Some stones do not resist the action of acids,
 Some metals resist the action of acids,
 ∴ Some metals are not *some* stones,

where there is undeniably an inference, but one which can scarcely be said to add to our knowledge of the subject of it. To facilitate a comparison of this Table with the former one (p. 255) its Moods are *translated* into equivalent letters; and an examination will prove that every mood not containing the vowel η or ω ,* occurs in both tables, which, after deducting the disputed moods so marked, coincide in all respects.

* The objections to the employment of the judgments denoted by this will be found at p. 187.

TABLE OF MODES.

	FIG. I.		FIG. II.		FIG. III.	
	Aff.	Neg.	Aff.	Neg.	Aff.	Neg.
i	UUU	EUE UEE	UUU	EUE UEE	UUU	EUE UEE
ii	A Y I	η Y ω A O ω	Y Y I	O Y ω Y O ω	A A I	η A ω A η ω
iii	U Y Y	E Y O U O O	U Y Y	E Y O U O O	U A Y	E A O U η O
iv	A U A	η U η A E η	Y U A	O U η Y E η	A U A	η U η A E η
v	U A A	E A E U η η	U A A	E A E U η η	U Y A	E Y E U O O
vi	Y U Y	O U O Y E E	A U Y	η U O A E E	Y U Y	O U O Y E E
vii	A I I	η I ω A ω ω	Y I I	O I ω Y ω ω	A I I	η I ω A ω ω
viii	I Y I	ω Y ω I O ω	I Y I	ω Y ω I O ω	I A I	ω A ω I η ω
ix	U I I	E I O U ω ω	U I I	E I O U ω ω	U I I	E I O U ω O
x	I U I	ω U ω I E η	I U I	ω U ω I E η	I U I	ω U ω I E η
xi	A A A	η A η A η η	Y A A	O A η Y η η	A Y A	η Y η A O η
xii	Y Y Y	O Y O Y O O	A Y Y	η Y O A O O	Y A Y	O A O Y η O

Sum of all the valid Modes in each Figure.

This Table.

Former Table.




i. 36 (= 12 aff. + 24 neg.) — 14 weak neg. = 22

ii. 36 (= 12 aff. + 24 neg.) — 16 weak neg. = 20

iii. 36 (= 12 aff. + 24 neg.) — 15 weak neg. = 21

§ 72. *Euler's System of Notation.*

Perhaps the most celebrated plan of notation is that of Euler, as described in his *Lettres à une princesse d'Allemagne*. But, as it only represents the extension of the terms, and not the opposite capacity, of intension, it is far inferior to that which has just been described. The sphere of a conception is represented by a circle; an affirmative judgment by one circle wholly or partly contained in another; and a negative by two separate circles. The judgment that "All men are mortal" has the effect of *including* men in the class of mortal beings, which would be represented by a small circle for "men," in a large one for "mortal." The annexed diagram exhibits (I) the Mood A A A, (II) E A E, (III) A I I, and (IV) E I O, all of the first Figure.



§ 73. *Inference in Extension and in Intension.*

That a judgment may be interpreted either in its extension or intension has been already shown (§ 48). Every syllogism has the same property. Thus,

All metals are lustrous,
Iridium is a metal,
∴ It is lustrous.

may either be read in extension

The class of metals are some lustrous things,
Iridium is in the class of metals,
∴ Iridium is among lustrous things.

or in intension

The notion of some lustrous things attaches to the notion of all metals ;
The notion of some metal is implied in Iridium
∴ The notion of some lustrous thing attaches to that of Iridium.

Although any argument may be so expressed as to give the one or the other capacity greater prominence, it is at all times possible to read an argument in both its powers, preserving of course the distribution of terms unchanged. The most important term in

the extensive point of view is the least in the intensive, because it embraces most objects, but we know least of its nature; in the example, "lustrous" contains the other terms *under* it, and more, but "iridium" implies *in* it the notion of lustrous and much more; "lustrous" therefore has the greatest extension, "iridium" the greatest intension. Where the terms are equal, as in U U U of all Figures, extension and intension are *in æquilibrio*.

§ 74. *Conditional Syllogisms.*

With any one of the conditional judgments described in § 41, for a first premise, and either the antecedent or consequent of it as an absolute assertion, for the second, a syllogism may be formed which has the other member of the conditional for its conclusion. Thus,

If the angle of a triangle is a rectangle, it must be
opposite to the greatest side.

This angle is a rectangle,

Therefore it is opposite to the greatest side.

or, with the same conditional,

This angle is not opposite to the greatest side,

Therefore it is not a rectangle.

or, with an affirmation of the consequent for the second premiss,

If the moon comes between the earth and the sun,
there is an eclipse.

There is (now) an eclipse,

Therefore the moon is between the earth and the sun;

or, with a denial of the antecedent,

The moon is not between the sun and the earth,
Therefore there is no eclipse.

But, unless the conditional judgment expresses a cause and an effect which are co-extensive and inseparable, or (which is the same thing) unless it can be exhibited as U, we cannot argue from a denial of the antecedent nor an affirmation of the consequent. This is only saying that unless any conditional syllogism can be brought to one of the valid modes of ordinary syllogism, it is faulty; and there is no necessity to lay down fresh rules for arguments of the conditional kind, as they are governed without exception by the rules of the common syllogism.

When the conditional judgment contains but three terms, we may throw away that which is twice employed, and with the other

two form our first premiss (p. 167). Thus our first example may appear,

Every rectangle in a triangle must be opposite its
greatest side.

This is a rectangle in a triangle,

∴ It must be opposite its greatest side;

which is in A A A. Fig. i.

When there are four terms, the manner of proceeding described above must be employed. Thus,

The case of the moon's coming between the sun and
earth, = the case of an eclipse.

This is a case of an eclipse,

∴ This is a case of the moon's coming between the
sun and the earth;

which is in U A A. Fig. ii. With these examples, the conditional syllogism will not, it is thought, impede our progress with any difficulty.

§ 75. *Disjunctive Syllogisms.*

An argument in which there is a disjunctive judgment (p. 162) is called a disjunctive syllogism. A *pure* disjunctive argument, (i. e. one in which no immediate inference has to be supplied) may be at once referred to its proper mode; the disjunctive judg-

ment being always in U. The principal formulæ of such fyllogisms are annexed.

1. (In A U A. Fig. I.)
C D and E are B.
All A is either C, D, or E,
∴ All A is B.
2. (In E U E. Fig. I.)
Neither C nor D nor E is B.
All A is either C or D or E,
∴ A is not B.
3. (In U E E. Fig. II.)
All B is either C, D, or E.
A is neither C nor D nor E,
∴ A is not B.
4. (In E U E. Fig. II.)
B is neither C nor D nor E.
A is either C or D or E,
∴ A is not B.

From these forms the pure disjunctives may be easily understood. One or two concrete examples may however be given.

3. (In U E E. Fig. II.)
Every judgment is either an affirmation or negation,
A conception cannot be either an affirmation or negation,
∴ A conception is not a judgment.

(In the same Mode.)

A science is either a pure, or an inductive, or a mixed science,

Astrology is none of these,

∴ It is not a science.

The complex disjunctives are founded upon the principle that if a genus is divided into so many species, what is in one of the species cannot be in another (§ 58). In bringing them to the form of common syllogisms, we are to take away the disjunctive judgment and put in its place a judgment immediately inferable from it. Thus,

All A is B or C.

This A is not B,

∴ It is C ;

would become

[All A is B or C, therefore]

All (A that is not B) is C.

This is an (A that is not B),

∴ This is C.

All sciences are either pure, inductive, or mixed sciences.

Astronomy is not a pure nor an inductive science,

∴ It is a mixed science ;

would stand as a syllogism in A A A. Fig i.

Sciences that are not pure nor inductive are mixed.

Astronomy is a science that is not pure nor inductive,
 \therefore It is a mixed science.

§ 76. *The so-called Inductive Syllogism.*

Induction is the process of reasoning from particulars to universals—from the judgment that some mark belongs to several parts of a class to the judgment that it belongs to the whole class. All reasoning from particular facts to general laws is inductive, into whatever mode of syllogism it may fall; and we shall find that in the various steps, introductory, collateral and direct, various modes are needed. The canon of the induction by simple enumeration—what is true of all the parts of a conception is true of the whole—only applies to one act of the process; and the mode which best exemplifies it is the same as the first disjunctive syllogism given in the last section, except that the second premise is converted, and so becomes a copulative instead of a disjunctive judgment.

C, D and E are B,

C, D and E = A,

\therefore All A is B.

This is in A U A. Fig. iii. It would give a *complete* induction, i. e. one in which every

one of the particular cases is brought in, so that we may be certain *a priori* that a given property belongs to the whole. But it is evident that if an examination of every case were requisite, before we were at liberty to state a law, the sciences properly called inductive, those which lay down the laws that govern the universe, could never have existed. Human observation is insufficient for the task of collecting every single case which a law does govern or has governed. Hence we must be satisfied with an enumeration of cases less than the whole, which is termed incomplete Induction. But no conclusion can be stronger than its own grounds, and if in the premises we have only spoken of *some* cases, we have no right to speak of *all* in the conclusion, unless we can show that the cases we have selected are a sufficient sample of all—that what we have brought in are really as good as all. This must be done by an argument independent of the inductive syllogism itself, as by arguing that the laws of nature are uniform, and that therefore what we find to prevail in several cases we may believe to be invariable.

Hence no incomplete induction can be exhibited as a single syllogism, whereas a complete one can. Where the incomplete induction is sufficient, and upon what condition its sufficiency depends, are among the principal questions which *applied* Logic has to answer; and it must show at the same time how many processes belong to Induction besides the method of simple enumeration that usually monopolizes the name.

§ 77. *Complex Syllogisms. Sorites.*

The simple syllogism is the type of all reasoning, and the test to which all reasoning may be brought. But there are more complex forms of argument, not less natural than the syllogism itself, which do not *require* to be reduced to syllogisms to show their correctness, just as we know ice to be ice without reducing it to the needle-shaped crystals with which freezing commences. Of this kind is the Sorites.

Three or more premisses in which the predicate of each is the subject of the next, with a conclusion formed from the first subject and last predicate of the premisses, have

been called a Sorites, or accumulating argument—from the Greek word *σωρός*, a heap. The name is not very appropriate; the German title of chain-argument (*kettenschluss*) expresses better the nature of a process in which the mind goes on from link to link in its reasoning, without thinking it necessary to draw out the conclusions as it passes. Where the premisses are all universal affirmative attributive judgments, not the least confusion can arise from thus postponing till the end the realization of the results. But where the premisses are judgments of different kinds, the reasoning is more difficult to follow, and it may be necessary to draw out each syllogism separately, in order to see whether it is in a valid mood, and, if otherwise, what is the fault in it. This is done as follows.

All the premisses but the first are leading premisses of so many distinct syllogisms; therefore there are as many syllogisms, minus one, as the Sorites has premisses. For the second premiss of the first syllogism the first judgment of the Sorites must be taken ;

whilst to each succeeding one the conclusion of its predecessor must be the second premiss.

A diagram will make this much clearer.

1. A is B,
2. B is C,
3. C is D,
4. D is E,

Therefore A. is E.

Reduced to

- | | |
|-------------|-------------|
| I. | II. |
| 2. B is C, | 3. C is D, |
| 1. A is B, | [A is C], |
| [∴ A is C], | [∴ A is D], |
| III. | |
| 4. D is E, | |
| [A is D], | |
| ∴ A is E. | |

These fyllogisms are all in A A A. Fig. 1. a valid mode. An invalid mode occurring before the last fyllogism would not only be wrong itself, but, as furnishing a premiss to its successors, would vitiate every fyllogism that follows.

The number of conclusions which these premisses admit of, is greater than actually

appears. We may conclude A C, A D, A E (which appear;) and B D, B E, C E. Five premisses instead of four would increase the number of conclusions to ten.* There is a form of the Sorites to which the name of Goclenius its inventor has been attached, which is the same as the common form, except that the premisses are reversed. It would run

D is E,
C is D,
B is C,
A is B,
∴ A is E.

In the Goclenian Sorites extension is made more prominent by starting with the premiss which has the two widest terms; in the common form intension predominates, as the narrower terms precede. The former

* Com. *Arif.* Pri. An. i. 25. The formula for ascertaining the number of conclusions is this.

Let the number of premisses = n , the number of terms = $n + 1$; then the number of conclusions = $\frac{n(n-1)}{1 \cdot 2}$

descends in extension from the predicate of the conclusion ; the latter ascends, in intension, from the subject.

In the following example a mixed order prevails :—

That which thinks, is active,
 That which is active has strength,
 That which has strength is substance.
 The soul thinks,
 Therefore it is substance.

§ 78. *The Dilemma.*

The Dilemma is a complex argument, partaking both of the conditional and disjunctive argument. It is a syllogism with a conditional premiss, in which either the antecedent or consequent is disjunctive. It may prove a negative or an affirmative ; in the former case it is said to be in the mode of removal (*modus tollens*) because it removes or refutes some conclusion that has been proposed for proof ; in the latter, it is in the mode of position (*modus ponens*) because the proposed question is *laid down* as proved. The following forms of it, with the manner in which they are presented as syllogisms, may be sufficient.

I.

If A is B or E is F, then C is D.

But either A is B or E is F,

∴ C is D.

II.

If A is B, then C is D or E is F.

But neither C is D nor E is F,

∴ A is not B.

III.

If some A is B, either the m that are A or the n that are B.

But neither the m that are A nor the n that are A are B,

∴ A is not B.

The same regarded as simple syllogisms.

I.

[The cases of A being B and E being F] are [cases of C being D].

This is [a case of A being B or E being F],

∴ This is [a case of C being D].

II.

[The case of A being B] is [a case of C being D or E being F].

This is not [a case of C being D or E being F],

∴ This is not [a case of A being B].

III.

Neither m of A nor n of A are B.

All A is either m or n,

∴ No A is B.

The word Dilemma means "double pro-

position," so that the whole argument takes its name from the one mixed judgment in it. When this is *more* than double, as in "If a prisoner is legally discharged, either the magistrate must refuse to commit, or the grand jury ignore the bill, or the common jury acquit, or the crown exercise the prerogative of pardon," the argument has been called a Trilemma, Tetralemma, or Polylemma according to the number of members the judgment may have. The popular notion of a Dilemma, that it is a choice of alternatives, each of them fatal to the cause or the character of an adversary, is countenanced by many logicians, but can have no place in pure Logic, into which the object to be gained by arguments, or the personal consequences which follow from admitting them, ought not to enter, and the properties of the arguments themselves are the sole object of consideration.

If the criminal knew the consequences of his act, he was wicked ; if he did not know the consequences, he was insane.

This is really two distinct hypothetical

judgments, associated because they happen to have a common term—"the criminal;" and because one or other of them must be true; and two distinct syllogisms would be founded upon them, as the counsel for the defence would probably take for his second premiss—"He did not know the consequences of his act, therefore he is insane," whilst the counsel for the prosecution would maintain that "He did know the consequences, and therefore was guilty." No doubt it is a great detriment to a prisoner to be found either guilty or insane, but this does not appear upon the face of the argument, and therefore pure Logic does not take it into account. A new judgment would be required to show the connexion of the two notions; so that besides the two conditional syllogisms contained in the argument itself, a third is tacitly admitted, that shews the connexion of the other two. The view of the Dilemma taken by the Wolfian school, has therefore been adopted instead of the popular notion.

§ 79. *Incomplete Syllogisms.*

The arguments used in thinking, speaking or writing are never drawn out in strict technical form, except by practised logicians, desirous of exhibiting their art to those who, like themselves, are conversant with it. A sentence which contains the materials of a syllogism, not technically expressed, has been called an enthymeme, or an enthymematic sentence. Aristotle understands by enthymeme a syllogism such as would be used in rhetoric, where the full and orderly expression of premisses and conclusion would seem laboured and artificial. And as the omission of one of the premisses is a common, perhaps the commonest, feature of enthymemes, logicians have defined them as syllogisms with one premiss suppressed. But we may also omit the conclusion, or invert the order of premisses and conclusion; and unless we extend the name enthymeme to these cases, we put a considerable restriction upon its original meaning. Let the enthymeme then be defined—an argument in the form in which

it would naturally occur in thought or speech.

§ 80. *Prosyllogism and Episylogism.*

In a chain of reasoning, one of the premisses of the main argument may be the conclusion of another argument, in that case called a *prosyllogism*: or the conclusion of the main argument may be a premiss to a supplementary one, which is called an *episylogism*. Let us take the syllogism which a coroner's jury might have to go through. The *question* is "Has A. B. been poisoned?" and the syllogism is "A man who has taken a large quantity of arsenic has been poisoned, and A. B. is found to have done so, therefore he has been poisoned;" with the addition of a *prosyllogism* and *episylogism* the reasoning would run—"A man who has taken arsenic has been poisoned; and A. B. has taken arsenic, for the application of Marsh's and Reinsch's tests discover it (*Prosyl.*); therefore A. B. has been poisoned, and therefore we cannot return a verdict of death from natural causes. (*Episyl.*)



OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

PART IV.

APPLIED LOGIC.

“ Mais, parce que l'esprit se laisse quelquefois abuser par de fausses lueurs, lorsqu'il n'y apporte pas l'attention nécessaire, et qu'il y a bien des choses que l'on ne connaît que par un long et difficile examen, il est certain qu'il serait utile d'avoir des règles pour s'y conduire de telle sorte, que la recherche de la vérité en fût et plus facile et plus sûre ; et ces règles, sans doute, ne sont pas impossibles.”

ARNAULD.



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APPLIED LOGIC.

§ 81. *Logical Truth.*



INDEPENDENT of the truth which consists in the conformity of thoughts to things, called scientific,—and of that which lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts, called moral truth,—there is a truth called logical, depending on the self consistency of thoughts themselves. The rules of pure logic seek to establish this and this only: they afford no criterion for deciding that observations made on external nature are correct, or moral or theological principles are truly laid down; but they attempt to furnish criteria for comparing our thoughts with one another, and for deciding that they are mu-

tually consonant or dissonant. Four tests of this kind have been discovered, and in different forms advocated by logicians.

1st. CRITERION. *The principle of contradiction.* "The same attribute cannot be at the same time affirmed and denied at the same time of the same subject." To illustrate this—at a particular era in the history of Astronomy, it was believed that the portions of a planet's orbit actually observed were parts of a circle, and in consequence the erroneous theory was adopted that the planetary orbits are circular. Now if an astronomer had, upon these observations, enounced that the orbits were *elliptic*, he would have come more near the true state of the case, as discovered by later and more accurate observations; but he would have violated the fundamental principle of contradiction, in thinking that the planet had an orbit whose *parts* were parts of a circle, at the same time that the whole of the orbit was an ellipse. From our conceptions of a circle and an ellipse we know that to say a thing is a circle as well as an ellipse, is to

say that it is and is not a circle at the same time. In obedience to the law of contradiction, where observations are at variance with a theory, or some case seems to violate a law that ought to operate in it, we are bound either by revising the theory and the law so as to take in the observations, or by correcting the observations till they comply with the theory, to bring our thoughts into self-consistency; as was indeed actually done from time to time in astronomy, when the phenomena were found not to agree with the theory of circular revolutions, by the addition of epicycles, and the final substitution of the elliptic theory.

2d CRITERION. *The principle of identity.* "Conceptions which agree can be in thought united, or affirmed of the same subject at the same time." This principle is the complement of the former.

3d CRITERION. *The principle of the middle being excluded, (lex exclusi medii.)* "Either a given judgment must be true of any subject, or its contradictory; there is no middle course." So that if we think a judg-

ment true, we must abandon its contradictory; if false, the contradictory must be accepted. This law also applies to the dialectical contrivance known to logicians as *reductio per impossibile*.

4th CRITERION. *The principle of sufficient reason.* "Every judgment we accept must rest upon a sufficient ground or reason." From this law follow such principles as these. I. Granting the reason, we must grant what follows from it. On this syllogistic inference depends. II. If all the consequents are held to be true, the reason must be true. III. If we reject the consequent, we must reject the reason. IV. If we admit the consequent, we do not of necessity admit the reason, as there may be other reasons or causes for the same effect.

These tests, in the mode in which they are here stated, apply only to *logical* truth. They may be employed to bring our thoughts into harmony with each other, but are wholly inadequate to ascertain whether our thoughts accurately represent the world around us. They belong to pure Logic alone.

§ 82. *Objective, or Metaphysical Truth.*

But all men believe that their intellectual powers are capable of far greater things than the preservation of self-consistency in thinking. Thought is valueless to them except in so far as it leads to correct knowledge of things; a higher truth than the merely logical, in subservience to which alone the logical is desirable. The reason that we sedulously avoid the purely logical error of holding two contradictory propositions is that we believe one of them to be a fair representation of facts, so that in accepting the other we should admit a falsehood, which is always abhorrent to the mind. If we call the logical truth, subjective, as consisting in the due direction of the thinking subject, we may call this higher metaphysical truth, objective, because it depends on our thoughts fairly representing the *objects* that give rise to them.

Every one believes that he knows what truth is; and perhaps if we were to define it as a right knowledge of the nature and

causes of things, we should find many to accept the explanation of its meaning. Yet in reality the greatest difference of opinion prevails upon this subject. To constitute truth and knowledge, two elements must be presupposed, a person who thinks, and a thing or object about which he thinks ; whether the latter is entirely independent of him, or is part of himself, as when he reflects on his own state of mind, and thus becomes his own object.

But the notions conceived of things are subject to variation ; what appears good at one time is found to be evil at another ; what appears great in relation to one object is small in comparison with another. As man is always earnestly striving to conquer these variations and to see things as they are, free from the tints of his own mind, he is led to the belief that there must be an Absolute, Eternal Mind, not subject to these changes of state, and therefore able to see the very nature of things, and to know what is permanent and good and right in a world which is full of change and of mixed good and evil.

These are the elements, I think, of which an honest, intelligent person, without any particular philosophic bias, would find his thoughts to be composed. But doubts may be raised upon any of the three elements. "There is no absolute standard of truth," it may be said. "What we think true or good, *is* so. The greatest crime might become right and laudable, if all mankind agreed to award praise to it. The opinion of man is the rule of truth." Or again (by one who was disposed to deny the existence of the object) "How do you prove that there is an external world? Impressions upon your mind can only prove that the mind is impressed; you have no right to infer any thing as to the nature of the things which make them. The sky overhead, and all the stars that look unsteadily upon you from its purple depth, are not what you think, but are a mere impression which God wills that you shall receive." Or a more subtle scepticism still may urge that one's own existence cannot be proved but by arguments which assume it, and so beg the question.

Thus the famous *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes has been forced into the syllogism *Si sum, sum; Sum autem; Sum igitur*. But leaving these metaphysical enquiries, let us assume the fact of our personal existence, which forces itself upon our belief from the moment we begin to think; and the fact of the existence of created substances, which also forces itself upon us when we take note of their different qualities; and lastly, the fact of the existence of something eternal and unchangeable, which is also inferred from the mutual operation of the other two. And let us further notice that these three fundamental elements are removed from our *direct* cognizance. Consciousness—the existence of all that we mean by “I”—is only to be seen in its effects, in the modes in which things around us act upon it; substance can only be known in its attributes; and as for the Eternal, “No man hath seen him at any time,” and (independently of revelation) he can only be known by that peculiar power of reason, of finding a privative idea from a positive, the infinite from the finite, the immutable

from the mutable, the eternal from the contemplation of things which endure but for a day.

Applied Logic has to explain how the mind proceeds in the attainment of objective or metaphysical truth, in as far as this can be done by laying down universal principles, and not such as are confined in their application to any one or two sciences. It must also show that the rules of pure Logic are actually employed in the discovery of truth, and how far they are modified by the necessities of our position with regard to the objects of research.

§ 83. *Belief, and degrees of Belief.*

In forming any judgment we cannot avoid attaching to it a particular degree of credence, which might be, and often is, expressed by the insertion of some adverb to qualify the copula; thus "To-morrow will (possibly) be fine," and "Two straight lines (indisputably) cannot enclose a space." Although one of these judgments admits a degree of doubt, which the other excludes,

the difference lies in our knowledge of the things spoken of rather than in the things themselves. To-morrow will be fine or will be stormy, and it is fixed by the decree of nature which shall happen; but *to us* the matter is purely doubtful, because we cannot see into the order of nature as to this particular. Doubtful statements may become certain, without any alteration in the facts to which they relate, by changes in our knowledge. A child sees with wonder a lunar eclipse, and thinks that *possibly* another may happen to-morrow; when he has learnt Astronomy he may be able to say from exact calculations, upon what day one may positively be expected. Yet here the order of things remains the same. The amount of belief which we have in our judgment has been called its Modality, as being the *mode* in which we hold it for truth. Arranging the degrees of Modality in an ascending scale, we find that a judgment may be

1. Possible, where upon the first view we have no cause to think that the predicate may not be truly said of the subject, but

have not examined. Does this amount to a judgment? or is it the step which must precede the formation of the weakest kind of judgment?

2. Doubtful, where we have tested it in some cases, and found that some seem to confirm it, whilst some are doubtful.

3. Probable, where all the trials we have made are favourable, but the number of them is not sufficient to warrant certainty.

4. Morally certain for the thinker himself; where from examination of the matter, or prejudice, or interest, he has formed his own belief, but cannot put forward sufficient grounds for it, so as to control that of others.

5. Morally certain for a class or school; where the judgment rests upon grounds which are sufficient for all men of the same habits of thought, or the same education as the thinker.

6. Morally certain for all; as for example the belief that there is a future state, which though not absolutely demonstrable, rests upon such grounds that it ought to influence the conduct (*mores*) of every man.

7. Physically certain, with a limit. For example, the astronomical law called "Bode's law of distances," which has (I believe) a close approximation to the truth, admits some exceptions that may hereafter open to us another higher law to absorb and supersede it.

8. Mathematically certain; where doubt cannot be admitted. *Ex. gr.* the axiom—Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, or the theorem—The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal.

All these degrees of belief may, upon a broader principle of division, be resolved into three.

Our judgments, according to Aristotle, are either problematical, assertive, or demonstrable; or in other words, the results of Opinion, of Belief, or of Science.

The problematical judgment is neither subjectively nor objectively true, that is, it is neither held with entire certainty by the thinking subject, nor can we show that it truly represents the object about which we judge. It is a mere opinion. It may how-

ever be the expression of our presentiment of certainty ; and what was held as mere opinion before proof, may afterwards be proved to demonstration. Great discoveries are problems at first, and the examination of them leads to a conviction of their truth, as it has done to the abandonment of many false opinions. In other subjects we cannot from the nature of the case advance beyond mere opinion. Whenever we judge about variable things, as the future actions of men, the best course of conduct for ourselves under doubtful circumstances, historical facts about which there is conflicting testimony, we can but form a problematical judgment, and must admit the possibility of error at the moment of making our decision.

The assertive judgment is one of which we are fully persuaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief that shall compel men in general to coincide with us. It is therefore subjectively, but not objectively certain. It commends itself to our moral nature, and in so far as other men are of the same disposition, they will accept it likewise.

The demonstrative judgment is both subjectively and objectively true. It may either be certain in itself, as a mathematical axiom is, or capable of proof by means of other judgments, as the theorems of mathematics and the laws of physical science.

§ 84. *Anticipation.*

Events occur in a certain order, and those which are usually said to depend upon chance are doubtful only *to us*. The issue of a horse race that shall take place next year, depends upon the superior physical qualifications of a certain horse, the mode in which he is treated in the interim, and the honesty with which his owner and rider make use of his strength and speed in the contest; and we are only uncertain because we cannot see these causes and ascertain how far they will operate. Now the mind is anxious to penetrate into the uncertain, and make it clear and evident. We cannot be content with knowing that “*perhaps* the earth revolves round the sun,” and “*perhaps* the preparations of arsenic are all poisonous;”

an eternal impulse of our nature prompts us to seek for certainty out of the variable and contingent, for universal laws and rules out of particular cases. The more exactly to appreciate the power of this impulse, let us conceive the condition of a being not endowed with it. Suppose that a mind could exist with no power of knowing any thing beyond the facts actually submitted to the eyes, but with full power to record and "register" these. What would be his surprise to hear us dealing in general statements! "You say that all men are mortal," he might exclaim, "but for my part I have no cognizance of the actual mortality of more than two or three thousand people at the most: nor can you possibly predict that the two hundred millions of men now alive will perish without exception; so that your statement is rash and unwarrantable." And yet we do not fear to trust ourselves to statements of the highest generality;—"Every unsupported body will fall to the ground." "All organized matter must suffer decomposition." "The angles of every triangle

are equal to two right angles." Whatever be our justification for a procedure apparently so precipitate, in many subjects we do not hesitate from two or three cases of a given property to infer at once that it will be found in *all* like cases; when, for example, we observe two or three times that a stone dropped from the mast of a ship in motion falls at the foot of the mast and not behind it, we find in these few trials full evidence (*fulgor quidam, mentis assensum rapiens*) of the operation of some general law, and desist from our experiments with the conviction that if they were a thousand times repeated, the result would be invariably the same. We do not indeed omit to ascertain the reason of the result we have obtained, and should endeavour to find among the known mechanical laws some that would explain it: and if it proved inconsistent with any law of the truth of which we were already convinced, probably we should suspect the accuracy of our observations, and seek occasion to repeat them with a view to their rectification. But still we should be

pretty certain to hasten to a general statement, believed at first with hesitation, but after many trials with certainty, from a number of cases wholly insufficient in themselves to warrant it. This power of divination, this sagacity, which is the mother of all science, we may call Anticipation. The intellect, with a doglike instinct, will not hunt until it has found the scent. It must have some presage of the result before it will turn its energies to its attainment.

The system of anatomy which has immortalized the name of Oken, is the consequence of a flash of anticipation which glanced through his mind when he picked up, in a chance walk, the skull of a deer, bleached by the weather, and exclaimed after a glance, "It is a vertebral column!" When Newton saw the apple fall, the anticipatory question flashed into his mind "why do not the heavenly bodies fall like this apple?" In neither case had accident any important share; Newton and Oken were both prepared by the deepest previous study to seize upon the unimportant fact offered to them,

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and show how important it might become; and if the apple and the deer's skull had been wanting, some other falling body, or some other skull would have touched the string so ready to vibrate. But in each case there was a great step of anticipation; Oken thought he saw the type of the whole skeleton in the single vertebra and its modifications, whilst Newton conceived at once that the whole universe was full of bodies tending to fall; two truths that can scarcely be said to be contained in the little occurrences in connection with which they were first suggested.

A mistaken notion prevails that this rapid anticipation does not belong to the philosophic cast of mind—that it is precisely what Bacon condemns as the method which “hurries on rapidly from the particulars supplied by the senses to the most general axioms, and from them as principles, and their supposed indisputable truth, derives and discovers the intermediate axioms.” It is thought that caution, and deliberate examination of every particular we can find, before we allow our-

selfes to form any conclusion whatever, are the conditions of all sound physical enquiry. There is here a confusion of two distinct things. Scrupulous caution should be exercised before an hypothesis is considered to be *proved*; and the law that we believe to be true should be applied to every fact where it can be supposed to operate, and to every other law with which it might interfere, in order to verify exactly what was at first only a happy conjecture. Bacon meant to complain that this sober process did not always follow the bright thought and brilliant suggestion; and perhaps that the bright thought itself was not suggested in the region of facts but in that of words. When the ancient Astronomy, rushing to the general axiom that "the circular motion is the most perfect," deduced from it the intermediate axiom that the motion of the heavenly bodies must be the circular, it might be reasonably charged with undue use of anticipation; because the highest axiom, having no precise and definable meaning, cannot have really sprung from the contemplation of any facts, nor do it and the axiom drawn from

it, square with the facts they pretend to embrace. Where these conditions are obeyed, Anticipation is, as we have called it, the mother of science. "To try wrong guesses" says Dr. Whewell, "is, with most persons, the only way to hit upon right ones. The character of the true philosopher is, not that he never conjectures hazardously, but that his conjectures are clearly conceived, and brought into rigid contact with facts. He sees and compares distinctly the ideas and the things; —the relation of his notions to each other and to phenomena. Under these conditions, it is not only excusable, but necessary for him, to snatch at every semblance of general rule, —to try all promising forms of simplicity and symmetry." Anticipation then is the power whereby the mind presages a truth before it is fairly proved, before she makes the attempt to establish it by exact and cautious methods. Philosophy proceeds upon a system of credit; if she never advanced beyond her tangible capital, her wealth would not be so enormous as it is. She works with a principle as true before she knows it

to be so, because in watching how it operates upon facts, consists the best means of establishing its truth; but she must be prepared at the same time to abandon and dismiss it whenever it is found to be in direct and irreconcilable conflict with established facts.

§ 85. *Analysis and Synthesis.*

There are two opposite, but correlative, modes of procedure in investigating truth, Analysis and Synthesis. Analysis is the resolution of any whole into its parts; Synthesis is the composition of any whole by bringing its parts together.

Logical analysis may be illustrated by the analogous process in Chemistry, in which tangible or visible substances are decomposed into their elements. The beautiful stone called Lapis-lazuli is employed in the manufacture of ultra-marine-blue; but from its scarcity the colour long bore a high price and was sparingly employed in the arts. The Chemist found that the components of the stone were silica, alumina, soda, sulphur, and a trace of iron. Naturally the question, so

successfully applied to other cases by the chemist every day, was asked—can we not by synthesis, by throwing together the same proportions of those five substances under proper conditions, manufacture lapis-lazuli? but in this case some doubts were felt as to the answer, because the elements as given by the analysis seemed inadequate to account for its rare colour.

But perfect success attended the attempt; and ultra-marine manufactured by this artificial process, is now employed for purposes to which, on account of the extravagant price it bore, the lapis-lazuli could never be applied. In this instance the synthetic process was rewarded by considerable profit, and by the possession of a beautiful pigment, in quantities limited only by the will of the producer, which could not be obtained before except in small quantities at an enormous price.

We are only concerned with the mental process which accompanies these acts of analysis and synthesis; and we notice in the first place that they were suggested by an act of simple conversion (§ 53)—“Ultra-marine is

filica, alumina, soda, sulphur and iron in certain proportions; therefore filica, alumina, soda, sulphur and iron brought together in certain proportions are ultra-marine." To achieve the separation in the first instance and the union in the second, many difficult and delicate operations were requisite, and many syllogistic acts would suggest or accompany them; for example (to prove that iron was present) one syllogism might be "What gives a blue precipitate on the addition of ferrocyanide of potash, contains iron; now a certain solution of lapis-lazuli does this; Therefore it contains iron." But the *result* of the analysis may be simply converted into the result of the synthesis, and the latter is the "immediate consequent" of the former (p. 215); so that the process may be referred to an appropriate place in pure Logic. Further it is to be noticed that, in this case at least, the synthesis could not have been performed unless the analysis had preceded. It is very true that in the many admixtures of various substances which the chemist has occasion to make, the five components of

ultra-marine might have been thrown together by accident; and indeed in 1710 the colour in question was produced by chance, in a furnace used for the manufacture of an alkali, before the synthesis had been intentionally effected. But such an accident gives us no power to repeat the combination at will; either we must remember what the various substances we threw together were, which produced so striking a result,—and this is a kind of analysis; or, taking the product, we must by painful processes suggested by chemistry ascertain precisely what it contains; if we would construct a formula to enable ourselves and others to obtain the same product at will. Again, we may observe that, for a perfect knowledge of the chemical composition of ultra-marine, the analysis just described is not sufficient; that an inventive mind would go on to inquire in which of the components the brilliant colour resided, whether in one or two or all of them together; and he would find, probably after another careful investigation, that sulphuret of sodium was the basis of it.

And further, we may notice that sagacity, or the power of anticipation, contributed a large share of the success which attended the analysis. The labour of testing any unknown substance would be infinite, as it would involve the application of tests for every known element in the universe, were it not for the power we use so freely, of conjecturing what components are most likely to occur; which gives a sagacious chemist an immense advantage over a less acute competitor, in devising new and suitable means to detect the ingredients with clearness and certainty.

So far we have only observed the process of the mind when a substance is to be analysed into its elements; let us take an example of a not less important kind, where a known effect is to be traced to its causes. Our result in the preceding case would be expressed by a categorical judgment; in that which follows, by a hypothetical. We shall be content, as before, with a rough statement, leaving the more careful examination of the process for another section. When a shot is

fired from a cannon directed horizontally, it does not preserve the horizontal direction impressed upon it, but describing a particular curve, it finally comes to the ground. Now the artillery-man desires to be able to predict at what point the curved path of a given shot he is about to deliver, will terminate. He might do this in a rude and inaccurate manner by pointing the gun horizontally as before, and using the same kind of ball with the same quantity of powder; or even, after a great number of experiments, acquire the *tact* which the sportsman possesses, of directing his piece aright, without being able to account for his own exactness. But experiments on so large a scale are wasteful and troublesome; and if by analysing the laws which the cannon shot obeys, we can, synthetically, compel it to describe the same course, we shall be able at least to diminish the number of the experiments, though, for reasons we shall soon mention, they can never be dispensed with entirely. The principal laws are discovered to be these—the law of gravitation, deflecting the shot from the

horizontal, and finally bringing it to the ground—the law of momentum, impelling it forward from the cannon—and the law of atmospheric resistance. In so far then as we can determine the momentum which a given weight of powder will communicate to a ball, the resistance which the air will oppose to it, and the invariable force of gravitation acting in conjunction with the two variable forces, we shall be able to predict the course of a cannon-ball, though it has never yet fulfilled its mission of destruction; allowing, however, for some sources of error not yet mentioned. I say “in so far,” because it is more difficult and as necessary to determine the *amount* of operation of the several causes, as to ascertain the causes themselves. The resistance of the air was once regarded as an unimportant element in determining the cannon-ball’s flight; but it has since been stated that the resistance to a musket ball at the moment it leaves the barrel is equal to 120 times the weight of the ball, and in a certain direction of the piece, reduces its range to half a mile, though, if this cause did

not operate, it would describe a parabola, it is calculated, of 17 miles. There is a further difficulty, fruitful of errors, that of ascertaining *all* the causes which concur to produce an effect; for it often happens that some less prominent parts of the complex fact are overlooked, or attributed to the obvious causes, when they really have a hidden cause of their own, that ought to be ascertained. Thus the calculations about projectiles are disturbed by what is called the *windage*, or the striking of a ball that does not quite fill the barrel, now against one part of it and now against another, which affects its course materially after it has left the mouth. Since the discovery of this operating cause, means have been taken to obviate it, by rifling the barrel, or slightly contracting it above the charge, and with some success. But other disturbing causes, not wholly removable, exist in the varying strength and explosiveness of the powder, the form and material of the bullet, and the motion of the wind added to the mere passive resistance of the atmosphere. In this case then, a per-

fectly accurate analysis is unattainable, and by consequence a perfect synthesis. The result of each train in the analysis is a hypothetical judgment; and that of the whole, a compound hypothetical formed from all the simple forms. Thus,

1. If a body is left unsupported, it is attracted to the earth at the rate m .
2. If a quantity, n , of powder is exploded in a gun, a ball of o weight is propelled to the distance p .
3. If the resistance of air amounts to q , it will reduce the range of a ball by the length r .

Representing these judgments by letters, we may exhibit the inference thus,

1. If A is present, X must occur.
2. If B is present, Y occurs.
3. If C is present, Z must occur.

Therefore, If A B C are present, X Y and Z occur.

But since causes counteract each other, B only operates as far as the opposing power of C permits.

§ 86. *Induction and Deduction.*

Induction is usually defined to be the process of drawing a general rule from a sufficient number of particular cases; deduc-

tion is the converse process, of proving that some property belongs to the particular case from the consideration that it belongs to the whole class in which the case is found. That all bodies tend to fall towards the earth is a truth which we have obtained from examining a number of bodies coming under our notice, by induction; if from this general principle we argue that the stone we throw from our hands will shew the same tendency, we adopt the deductive method.

Mere Logic requires that for the establishment of the general rule, *all* the cases it affects should be examined; if one single case is left unexplored, we cannot deny the formal possibility that it may prove to be the exception, and it would be necessary to resort to some other consideration not apparent on the face of the argument, to silence a captious objection of this kind;—thus we might urge that nature never acted capriciously, and that the law that governed her in many cases would prevail in all. But this is travelling into a new argument, by way of shielding the vulnerable point of the one

affailed. We are compelled however to resort to it ; and probably the incompleteness of many arguments in themselves gives the chief impulse to our curiosity and love of enquiry, exciting us to correct one set of observations by another, to confirm observations by experiments carefully devised, to try the newly obtained law upon other cases as they arise, in order to reduce to the minimum the formal incorrectness in a chain of reasoning, which if it had been at first proved to demonstration would perhaps have been stated and coldly dismissed as exhausted. The conditions upon which we may be content with a smaller number of cases than the whole, as a ground for the general law, are to be carefully ascertained hereafter.

More exactly, we may define the inductive method as the process of discovering laws and rules from facts, and causes from effects ; and the deductive, as the method of deriving facts from laws, and effects from their causes. There is evidently a virtual identity between induction and logical analysis, between deduction and logical synthesis ;

and one set of canons will suffice for both. The difference seems to be that we think of analysis as performed for the sake of ascertaining the nature of the fact or thing, whereas induction only regards facts as subservient to the law to be sought for in them: synthesis again seems to be undertaken for the sake of producing the thing or tracing the effect, and deduction, to prove the truth and applicability of the general to particular cases. They differ then not in the nature of the process, but in the point of view assumed by the thinker. In analysis and synthesis he gives prominence to the single case, the phenomenon, the world of the senses, the concrete; in induction and deduction, the universal, the law, the world of conceptions, the abstract, are made to predominate. But both connect the general with its cognate particulars; and even this distinction between them, though traceable occasionally in the use of the words, may not perhaps be generally recognized.

§ 87. *The Syllogism, the Instrument both of Deduction and Induction.*

The prevalent view, that fyllogism is identical with deduction, and that inductive reasoning is of another nature, and requires its own distinct rules, is one of the greatest mistakes into which a logician can fall. The origin of it is easily discovered. Aristotle's *dictum*—that whatever is affirmed or denied of a whole class may be affirmed or denied of each part of that whole—applies only to deductive inference, and to those four modes of the first figure which Aristotle considered to be the patterns of that method, A A A, E A E, A I I and E I O. The unfortunate expedient of bringing into one or other of these favoured modes every fyllogism of the other figures, for the sake of compelling a forced compliance with a dictum which really was inapplicable to it, gave to the four modes in question an undeserved pre-eminence. If fyllogisms not deductive—*not* drawing the particular case from the universal rule—could be reduced to others of the de-

ductive kind, then deduction was paramount in the whole syllogistic scheme. Accordingly deduction and the syllogism were regarded as one and the same; and the words are used as interchangeable by some of the first logicians of the present day.

The popular doctrine of the uses of the syllogism is nearly as follows. "We are at liberty, in conformity with the general opinion of logicians, to consider the forms of the first figure as the universal type of all correct ratiocination;"* because arguments in the other figures may be *reduced* to the first. In this figure we find as the first premiss a general proposition such as—All men are mortal,—in which something is affirmed (or denied) of a whole class; and another proposition in which some species or individual is said to be part of that class, as—The Pope is a man;—followed by a conclusion, in which the same thing is said of the part, that had been of the whole in the first premiss—The Pope is mortal. Now it is argued

* Mr. J. S. Mill's Logic, i. p. 233.

that an argument of this kind cannot help us in the search for truth. In such a proposition as—All men are mortal—we include each and every man, so that we have said already *by implication* that The Pope is mortal, and therefore the conclusion declares no new truth—nothing which was not granted us when we were allowed to say All men are mortal ; it only unfolds what was wrapt up in the first premiss. How then can such an instrument as the syllogism help us in our enquiries, since whatever truth we are warranted in holding, as the conclusion, was already latent in the premisses ?

Our inferences, it is argued by the same acute logician, are really made, not from any general rule like the given example, but from other particular facts of the same kind which we have observed. We infer that this man is mortal, because A. B. and C. D. and other men have been observed to die. Still the deductive syllogism is not quite useless. It cannot help us to discover truth, but we register our discoveries, though really made from particular facts, by general propositions,

which we preserve as useful formulæ, whence we may draw at pleasure particular assertions.

This distinction between the acquirement and the "registering" of knowledge, deserves all attention, although the word "register" is inappropriate to express an act in which the mind goes far beyond its facts. I may register the fact that A. B. and C. D. are mortal, because I know they are dead; but if I pass from this fact to the vast assertion that all men must die, I do more than merely register my facts; I build a bold inference upon them, to which they bear a very small proportion.

But as a full account of the value of the syllogism, the view we have given contains some remarkable mistakes. Whether the amplification of the first figure proposed by us, which destroys its exclusively deductive character, is correct, or not,—we are not at liberty to leave out of view two of the three figures, unless we can show that all their uses and properties are answered by the first, which we retain. So far is this from being true, that logicians have always regarded the third

figure as the best adapted for arguing from particulars to generals, that is, for the very opposite to the deductive process. Now does reduction to the first figure confer upon the third that deductive quality which it does not originally possess? No; it only turns a natural into an unnatural form.

Aristides was just,
 Aristides was a pagan,
 Therefore some pagans (or pagan) are just.

would appear in the first figure as

Aristides was just,
 Some pagan was Aristides!
 Therefore some pagan was just.

There is not one trace of deduction—of arguing from the general to the particular—in this reduced form. So that the pretensions of the syllogism rest upon all the figures, and not upon the first alone; and syllogisms forced into the first figure by reduction are not to be confounded, as they have often been, with those which naturally belong to it, because they cannot by reduction assume their properties. Mr. Mill discards reduction, but retains its worst consequence, in

treating the modes of the first figure, four in number, as fair representatives of the whole nineteen modes usually recounted by logicians. Upon a larger view it will be found that we may reason, either in the first figure or the third, from particular cases to a universal law. If then all syllogisms are not deductive, a complaint that the truth of the conclusion is implied in the first premiss, which only amounts to saying that they *are* deductive, will fall to the ground.

Moreover, though it is true that when the premisses are given the conclusion is also conceded by implication, we must not assume that the premisses always precede. In the discovery of truth we have seen that there is always some preface of the conclusion ; in the form of a "question" or judgment to be proved, it really precedes the premisses. Given the premisses, the conclusion is always implied, and any schoolboy can draw it out ; but in most cases the difficulty is to *find* premisses, or (which is the same thing) to find a middle term in which the two terms of the question agree. Though the faculty

of doing this is thought to be the sign of a logical mind, it rather denotes inventive than reasoning power. But, as has been observed, the study of any subject and a wide acquaintance with facts concerning it must have disciplined a natural quickness of invention, before any great discoveries can be made and secured. It might puzzle an uninstructed person even to make an equilateral triangle; and the employment of equal circles, of which the three sides would be common radii, and therefore equal, as in the first Proposition in Euclid, would be a real discovery, a proof of ingenuity. But the ingenuity lies in bringing in the middle notion of radii of a circle at all, which has no apparent connexion with the problem of making three given sides of a figure equal. When the premisses are secured, no one can suppose that any acuteness is requisite to discover the conclusion.

The radii of the same or equal circles are equal,
The three sides of this figure are radii of the same or
equal circles;
Therefore they are equal.

When the deductive fyllogism is used for

invention, its premisses are not found until some question has set us upon the search for them.

But the question is not whether the fyllogism is useful for discovery, but whether we can express our procedure in seeking truth by any simpler and more general formula than that of the fyllogism. We propose to shew from one or two examples impartially chosen, that every step of the inductive method that has the character of reasoning,—in other words, every step but those of the suggestive and inventive faculty, assumes one or other of the forms already described in the pure Logic.

§ 88. *Employment of defective Syllogisms.*

When we are unable to draw a conclusion from premisses sufficient to afford it, we do not immediately desist from the attempt to reason; indeed we should forfeit thereby many conclusions of which we become at last the most firmly convinced. A few examples of the defective forms will enable us to determine their value and employment.

THE RHETORICAL ENTHYMEME, as described by Aristotle, is a sentence which contains the materials of a fyllogism in the mode A A A. Such a fyllogism is perfectly legitimate in the 1st Figure, and therefore amounts to absolute proof. But if our knowledge of the facts obliges us to state it in the second or third Figure, the mode A A A will be found formally incorrect. Thus “As we may see by the example of Socrates, all wise men are good”—would be

Socrates is good,
Socrates is wise,
Therefore *all* wise men are good ;

which is in the mode A.A A, Fig. III. and draws a conclusion much too wide for the premisses. Is it therefore quite useless? is it a form which would never be employed? Rather it is the natural step by which we should be led to notice an invariable connexion between wisdom and goodness. And if in this one case we see that not only Socrates is wise and good, but that his goodness is inseparably connected with and caused by his wisdom (which connection, however,

we should have to state and prove by other arguments) the conclusion does follow from the premisses. Even where no such intimate connexion can be proved, the concurrence of several defective syllogisms of this sort are equivalent to one demonstrative one. In the investigation of the authorship of the letters of Junius, Mr. Taylor employs of necessity a string of enthymemes in the second Figure, each in itself defective, but all together forming a very strong case. Thus,

The author of "Junius" wrote a particular hand,
 Sir Philip Francis wrote the same kind of hand,
 Therefore Sir Philip Francis is the author of "Junius."

The author of "Junius" made certain mistakes in
 correcting proof-sheets,
 Sir Philip Francis made the same mistakes,
 Therefore Sir Philip Francis is the author of "Junius."

The author of "Junius" had a particular style,
 Sir Philip Francis wrote the same style,
 Therefore Sir Philip Francis is the author of "Junius."

The author of "Junius" is guilty of an anomalous
 use of certain words,
 Sir Philip Francis is guilty of the same,
 Therefore Sir Philip Francis is the author of "Junius."

The author of "Junius" employs certain images,

Sir Philip Francis employs the same,
Therefore Sir Philip Francis is the author of "Junius."
The author of "Junius" ceased to write at a particular time,
Sir Philip Francis must have ceased to write at the same time,
Therefore Sir Philip Francis is the author of "Junius."

The results of these and several similar arguments are summed up in a syllogism which I think conclusive, to the effect that two persons who in so many points are not found to differ, must be one and the same. The rhetorical enthymemes then of all the Figures are available; but in the second and third Figures they are not formally conclusive in themselves—they are used tentatively, to be confirmed or refuted by other arguments.

THE EXAMPLE in like manner conceals a defective syllogism, and yet there is no argument so commonly employed. "The French Revolution of 1792 will end in an absolute monarchy, because the English Revolution of 1640 did so." Such reasoning is only valid provided we can conclude from the fate of the English Revolution that *all*

revolutions tend to absolute monarchy, a judgment which may be true in itself, but cannot be formally concluded from the given premises. We require other comparisons and arguments to show that the tendency to absolute monarchy is an inseparable mark of revolution, and not a mere accident, belonging to the English Revolution only. And yet examples are so suggestive that they often appear almost to amount to demonstration; and it would be absurd to endeavour to expel them from rhetoric or from science, on the ground that they are not formally complete.

The argument known to logicians as **IMPERFECT INDUCTION** stands upon the same footing. Where a complete enumeration of all the cases governed by a given law is impossible, either an incomplete must be employed, or we must refrain from ascertaining that law. Yet the incomplete form is not only useful in default of a better, but has powers which the more perfect form does not possess. Thus, it was discovered that the distances of Mercury, Venus, the Earth,

Mars, Saturn and Uranus from the Sun followed a certain law called “Bode’s law of distances;” but between Mars and Jupiter the interval was so much greater than this law would lead us to expect, that Jupiter appeared an exception in a series otherwise perfectly regular. Still the law was considered worthy of record—

Mercury, Venus, &c. observe a certain relation of
distance from the Sun,
Mercury, Venus, &c. are planets,
Therefore *all* the planets observe this relation.

Now in the apparently exceptional interval, between Jupiter and Mars, four small planetary bodies were afterwards discovered which are considered to remove the exception, and to complete the series; so that a law founded upon all the cases but one, proved applicable to all without exception. The discovery that what seemed a departure from uniformity was no departure, would confer a pleasure which the mere observation of the law without the check of any difficulty could not have done. It would give confidence in the fixedness of natural laws,

and embolden enquirers to *predict* in other like cases. Though we should not be content with an imperfect argument where a perfect one was attainable, there is a peculiar pleasure in finding that our imperfect one is confirmed by subsequent observations; and this is one of the principal rewards of the natural philosopher for his laborious researches. We shall be prepared then to find that defective arguments, such as are employed in other subjects, occur in the inductive method also.

§ 89. *Causes and Laws.*

It is difficult to define accurately what we mean by a natural cause, and to distinguish it from a natural law. Gravitation is the *cause* of the fall of a stone; and the stone falls in obedience to the *law* of gravitation. But in the notion of cause we seem to imply power and energy; a man *causes* the death of another, who by his own act and power brings death upon him. In the field of nature power can only be improperly and metaphorically attributed to causes. All power resides in

the great First Cause, and the earth has not, in the proper sense of the word, *power* to attract the stone, so much as a necessity of attracting it. We may notice that a principle may be regarded as cause or law according as we look on it in connexion with the thing produced, or with the higher necessity that produces it ; in the former case we assign it the notion of power, as being the immediate channel of a power that flows from a higher fountain, and in the latter we attribute to it rather the notion of subjection and necessity, and look for the producing power at some higher link in the chain.

In order to constitute any fact or principle, the *cause* of other facts, it should possess the following characters.*

A. "Invariable connexion, and, in particular, invariable antecedence of the cause and consequence of the effect, unless prevented by some counteracting cause."

B. "Invariable negation of the effect with absence of the cause, unless some other cause

* Sir John Herschel's Preliminary Discourse, p. 151.

be capable of producing the same effect." The application of this principle has been called the Method of Difference.

C "Increase or diminution of the effect, with the increased or diminished intensity of the cause, in cases which admit of increase and diminution."

D "Proportionality of the effect to its cause in all cases of direct unimpeded action."

E "Reversal of the effect with that of the cause." The application of the three last principles constitutes the Method of Concomitant Variations.

From these principles follow some practical rules for ascertaining causes; such as—

1. The cause of a given effect *may be* the same as we know to produce some similar effect in another case better known to us.

For example, Berzelius records that a small bubble of the gas called seleniuretted hydrogen, inspired by accident through the nose, deprived him for some hours of the sense of smell, and left a severe catarrh which lasted for fifteen days. Dr. Prout suggests that

the corresponding effects in Influenza *may* be traceable to the same cause as undoubtedly produced them here, to the admixture namely of this or some similar substance with the air we breathe ; and as a suggestion or anticipation this is perfectly legitimate, and may prove highly valuable. Its inadequacy as a proof may be shewn by throwing it into syllogistic form—

The case of inspiring seleniuretted hydrogen is a case in which loss of smell and severe catarrh follow ;
Cases of influenza exhibit these effects,
Therefore cases of influenza are cases in which the said gas has been inspired.

This is the mood A A A, Fig. ii. invalid because it does not distribute the middle term (p. 234). It is one of the arguments described as Rhetorical Enthymemes in the last section.

2. “ If in any of the facts we have to account for, there be even one in which a particular character is wanting, that character cannot be the cause in question ; for the true cause can never be absent.”

3. As the laws of nature are uniform, and

never capricious, we are entitled to expect that a cause which in several cases produces a given effect will always do so ; and if it appears to be otherwise, we should either search for some counteracting causes, or suspect the accuracy of our observations.

4. " Causes will very frequently become obvious by a mere arrangement of our facts in the order of intensity in which some peculiar quality subsists : though not of necessity, because counteracting or modifying causes may be at the same time in action."

" For example : sound consists in impulses communicated to our ear by the air. If a series of impulses of equal force be communicated to it at equal intervals of time, at first in slow succession, and by degrees more and more rapidly, we hear at first a rattling noise, then a low murmur, and then a hum, which by degrees acquires the character of a musical note, rising higher and higher in acuteness, till its pitch becomes too high for the ear to follow. And from this correspondence between the pitch of the note and the rapidity of succession of the impulse, we conclude that

our sensation of the different pitches of musical notes originates in the different rapidities with which these impulses are communicated to our ears." To make such an arrangement however we must have a preface, and no uncertain one, of the cause of our phenomena; and therefore it is rather useful for verification, than for suggestion, of a theory.

5. "If we can either find produced by nature, or produce designedly for ourselves, two instances which agree *exactly* in all but one particular, and differ in that one, its influence in producing the phenomenon, if it have any, *must* thereby be rendered sensible. If that particular be present in one instance, and wanting altogether in the other, the production or non-production of the phenomenon will decide whether it be or be not the only cause: still more evidently, if it be present *contrariwise* in the two cases, and the effect be thereby reversed. But if its total presence or absence only produces a change in the *degree* or intensity of the phenomenon, we can then only conclude that it acts as a concurrent cause or condition with some other to

be sought elsewhere. In nature, it is comparatively rare to find instances pointedly differing in one circumstance and agreeing in every other ; but when we call experiment to our aid, it is easy to produce them ; and this is, in fact, the grand application of *experiments of enquiry* in physical researches. They become more valuable, and their results clearer, in proportion as they possess this quality (of agreeing exactly in all their circumstances but one), since the question put to nature becomes thereby more pointed, and its answer more decisive."

6. "Complicated phenomena, in which several causes concurring, opposing or quite independent of each other, operate at once, so as to produce a compound effect, may be simplified by subducting the effect of all the known causes, as well as the nature of the case permits, either by deductive reasoning or by appeal to experience, and thus leaving, as it were, a residual phenomenon to be explained. It is by this process, in fact, that science, in its present advanced state, is chiefly promoted."

“ A very elegant example may be cited, from the explanation of the phenomena of sound. The enquiry into the cause of sound had led to conclusions respecting its mode of propagation, from which its velocity in the air could be precisely calculated. The calculations were performed ; but, when compared with fact, though the agreement was quite sufficient to shew the general correctness of the cause and mode of propagation assigned, yet the *whole* velocity could not be shewn to arise from this theory. There was still a *residual* velocity to be accounted for. At length La Place struck on the happy idea, that this might arise from the *heat* developed in the act of that condensation which necessarily takes place at every vibration by which sound is conveyed. The matter was subjected to exact calculation, and the result was at once the complete explanation of the residual phenomenon.”

These are specimens of the methods according to which researches into causes are conducted. I add one example, combining the 4th, 5th and 6th rules, and exhibiting

Proportionality of cause and effect, Experiment and Residual Phenomena in one set of enquiries. Beyond this, the limits I have prescribed myself do not suffer me to go.

In Sir Humphrey Davy's experiments upon the decomposition of water by galvanism, it was found that besides the two components of water, oxygen and hydrogen, an acid and an alkali were developed at the two opposite poles of the machine. As the theory of the analysis of water did not give reason to expect these products, they were a *residual phenomenon*, the cause of which was still to be found. Some chemists thought that electricity had the power of *producing* these substances of itself; and if their erroneous conjecture had been adopted, succeeding researches would have gone upon a false scent, considering galvanic electricity as a *producing* rather than a *decomposing* force. The happier insight of Davy conjectured that there might be some hidden cause of this portion of the effect; the glass vessel containing the water might suffer partial decomposition, or some foreign matter might

be mingled with the water, and the acid and alkali be disengaged from it, so that the water would have no share in their production. Assuming this, he proceeded to try whether the total removal of the cause (B. p. 339) would destroy the effect, or at least the diminution of it cause a corresponding change in the amount of effect produced—(C. p. 340). By the substitution of gold vessels for the glass without any change in the effect, he at once determined that the glass was not the cause. Employing distilled water, he found a marked diminution of the quantity of acid and alkali evolved; still there was enough to show that the cause, whatever it was, was still in operation. Impurity of the water then was not the sole, but a concurrent cause. He now conceived that the perspiration from the hands, touching the instruments, might affect the case, as it would contain common salt, and an acid and an alkali would result from its decomposition under the agency of electricity. By carefully avoiding such contact, he reduced the quantity of the products still further, until

no more than slight traces of them were perceptible. What remained of the effect might be traceable to impurities of the atmosphere, decomposed by contact with the electrical apparatus. An experiment determined this; the machine was placed under an exhausted receiver, and when thus secured from atmospheric influence, it no longer evolved the acid and the alkali.

A formal analysis of these beautiful experiments will illustrate the method of applying the rules of pure Logic in other cases.

- I. Statement of the case, the *residual* cause being still undiscovered.
 - “ The decomposition of water by electricity, produces oxygen and hydrogen, with an acid and an alkali.”
- II. Separation of the *residual* from the principal cause.
 - a. “ The decomposition of water produces oxygen and hydrogen.”
 - b. “ The production of an acid and alkali in the decomposition of water *may be caused* by action on the glass vessel containing the water.” (Problematical Judgment—A.)
- III. The latter Judgment—b—disproved by a syllogism in Mood E A O, Fig. iii, with a conclusion that *contradicts* it.

- “ A case in which I employ a vessel of gold cannot involve any decomposing action on a glass vessel,
 - “ A case in which I employ a gold vessel still gives the acid and the alkali,
 - “ Therefore cases of the production of the acid and alkali are not always cases in which glass is decomposed.”
- IV. Another attempt to suggest the residual cause.
- “ The acid and alkali are produced by the decomposition of impurities in the water employed.”
- Syllogism in A A I, Fig. iii. *tending to* prove this.
- “ An experiment with *distilled* water must admit *less* impurity,
 - “ An experiment with distilled water gives *less* acid and alkali,
 - “ Therefore sometimes with less impurity we have less acid and alkali.”
- V. “ The contact of moist hands” may be an additional cause of the residual phenomenon.
- Improved syllogism in A A I, Fig. iii. to include this concurrent cause.
- “ An experiment with distilled water, and apparatus kept from contact of hands will admit *still less* impurity ;”
 - “ An experiment, &c. results in the production of still less acid and alkali,
 - “ Therefore sometimes with still less impurity we have still less acid and alkali.”
- VI. Amended syllogism. A A A. Fig. iii.

- “ A case where we use these precautions *in vacuo* is a case of *no* impurity,”
- “ A case where we use, &c. *in vacuo* is a case of *no* acid and alkali,
- “ Therefore a case of no impurity is a case of no acid and alkali.”

VII. Immediate inference from last conclusion.

- “ Cases of no-impurity are cases of non-production of acid and alkali,”
 - “ Therefore” (according to the example in p. 219, Division II, of inference from A.)
 - “ All cases of production of acid and alkali are cases of some impurity ;”
- which was to be proved.

An example like this brings into a strong light many of the characteristics of inductive reasoning. Forms usually considered to be deductive are here freely employed. The later steps tend to confirm the earlier, on which, however, they themselves depend ; so that a mutual confirmation is obtained from setting them together. When the chemist substituted gold vessels for the glass, and inferred from the continuance of the effect under this change that the glass could have nothing to do with its production, it was formally possible in the then state of know-

ledge that the glass might be the cause in the one experiment, and the decomposition of the gold in the other. But the later steps, which shewed that the effect varied with the variations in a circumstance wholly distinct from the decomposition of glass or gold, reduced the possibility of maintaining such a view to the very lowest amount. Even the premisses of particular syllogisms in the chain are sometimes tested and corrected by the conclusion, although formally the conclusion should entirely depend upon the premisses. The experimenter expected to find that the use of distilled water would exclude *all* impurity; and he intended that his premiss (see No. IV.) should assert as much; but when it turned out in the conclusion that the supposed products of the impurity were still present, he was reduced to the choice between abandoning that cause and re-casting his premiss so as to admit that the cause was still present—"the use of distilled water gives *less* impurity."

§ 90. *Colligation of Facts in Induction.*

The difficulty of finding a law to explain some groups of facts arises from the want of some conception which may bind them together, or (to use Dr. Whewell's expression) effect their Colligation. The discovery of a suitable conception is considered by some the most important act of Induction. A further step is required to complete it; the conception must be capable of Explication or Definition, not indeed of *adequate* definition, since we shall have to alter our description of it from time to time with the advance of knowledge, but still capable of a precise and clear explanation. For example, a large class of facts are bound together by the notion of "chemical affinity," and could not be understood and arranged without the thread of this conception to run through them. To refer them to this their proper conception is one operation; to give a proper explanation of chemical affinity another.

DEFINITION. — Chemical affinity is the power by which the particles of one elementary body are

made to cohere with those of another, so as to produce a new substance with characters either distinct from or opposed to those of the constituents separately.

PROPOSITION.—The tarnishing of metals, the neutral salts, &c. &c. are instances of the action of chemical affinity ;

Therefore we expect to find in them the characters mentioned in the definition.

This is a fyllogism in U A A. Fig. 1.; and whilst our reasoning faculty can draw it out and appreciate its truth and applicability, reason alone could not have suggested the premisses. No rules can be given for the discovery of the appropriate conception that explains our facts ; “ Such events,” says Dr. Whewell, “ appear to result from a peculiar sagacity and felicity of mind — never without labour—never without preparation ; yet with no constant dependence upon preparation, upon labour, or even entirely upon personal endowments.” The suggestion of the conception may be due almost entirely to accident ; the explication of it, often by far the more difficult step, cannot be accidental, but will proceed from a natural fa-

gacity highly disciplined by scientific pursuits.

Conceptions not wholly correct may serve for a time for the Colligation of Facts, and may guide us in researches which shall end in a more exact Colligation. The theory of *circular* motions of the heavenly bodies was of this kind; and in its turn the conception of epicycles. The theory of Phlogiston in chemistry made many facts intelligible; before the correcter one of Oxidation superseded it. So with the theory of "Nature abhors a vacuum," which served to bring together many cognate facts, not previously considered as related. Any incorrect conception of this kind has a place in science, whilst and in so far as it is applicable to facts and renders them intelligible. As soon as facts occur which it is inadequate to explain, we either correct, or replace it by a new one.

§ 91. *Verification of Inductions.**

"It is of great moment to distinguish the

* I transcribe this § from the *Quarterly Review*, vol. 68, p. 233, as I despair of expressing its purport in words of mine, half so clearly and elegantly.

characters of a sound induction. One of them is its ready identification with our conceptions of facts, so as to make itself a part of them, to engraft itself into language, and by no subsequent effort of the mind to be got rid of. The leading term of a true theory once pronounced, we cannot fall back even in thought to that helpless state of doubt and bewilderment in which we gazed on the facts before. The general proposition is more than a sum of the particulars. Our dots are filled in and connected by an ideal outline which we pursue even beyond their limits,—assign it a name, and speak of it as a *thing*. In all our propositions this *new thing* is referred to, the elements of which it is formed forgotten; and thus we arrive at an inductive formula, a general, perhaps a universal, proposition.”

“ Another character of sound inductions is that they enable us to predict. We feel secure that our rule is based upon the realities of nature, when it stands us in the stead of more experience; when it embodies facts, as an experience wider than our own would

do, and in a way that our ordinary experience would never reach; when it will bear, not stress, but torture, and gives true results in cases studiously different from those which led to its discovery. The theories of Newton and Fresnel are full of such cases. In the latter, indeed, [the theory of Polarization] this test is carried to such an extreme, that *theory* has actually remanded back *experiment* to read her lesson anew, and convicted her of blindness and error. It has informed her of facts so strange as to appear to her impossible, and showed her all the singularities she would observe in critical cases she never dreamed of trying."

"Another character which is exemplified only in the greatest theories, is the *consilience of inductions*, where many and widely different lines of experience spring together into one theory which explains them all, and that in a more simple manner than seemed to be required for either separately. Thus in the infinitely varied phenomenon of physical astronomy, when all are discussed and all explained, we hear from all quarters

the confentaneous echoes of but one word, GRAVITATION. And fo in Optics—each of its endless claffes of complex and fplendid phenomena being interpreted by its own conception—when thefe conceptions are afsembled and compared, they all turn out to be tranflations into their peculiar language of the fingle phrafe TRANSVERSE UNDULATION. Mr. Whewell has given us, as examples of the ‘Logic of Induction,’ what he terms inductive tables of each of thefe noble generalizations, which enable us to trace, as in a map, the feparate rills of difcovery flowing at firft each in its own narrow bafin, thence confluent into important fstreams, which uniting at length into one grand river, bear downwards to an ocean of truth beyond our tracing.”

§ 92. *Canon of Induction.*

The difcovery that in a certain cafe an effect has followed from particular caufes would be of fmall practical value, unlefs there were fome ground for believing that in other fimilar cafes the fame caufes had

not have been known without observation, they contain a notion of necessity not to be gathered from any observed facts. Experience may tell us, it is argued, that "If equals are added to equals, the wholes *are* equal;" but the axiom really means that the wholes *are and must be* equal, and it is impossible for experience to reach so far. Questions like this, as respecting the grounds and origin of our ideas, belong to Metaphysics, Logic being content to examine the laws that govern our use of ideas.* Whatever share induction may have in originating axioms, it is certain that they are self-evident, and need no inductive support; and therefore the mathematical sciences, which are founded on them, are called deductive.

In the other sciences deduction and induction are mutually confirmatory. A deduction is correct in proportion as its general

* A brilliant polemic on this never-to-be-settled question may be found in *Whewell's* Phil. Ind. Sci. B. I. ch. vi. *Mill's* Logic, II. ch. v. *Quarterly Review*, vol. 68. Art. on Whewell, and Phil. of Ind. Sci. vol. II. p. 669.

premiss is warranted by induction; whilst we are assured of the soundness of an induction by attempting to use it deductively, as applied to new facts. All the sciences therefore of nature and the universe are by turns inductive and deductive. The one method predominates in the earlier, as the other in the later stages of their history. Thus the grand generalizations of Astronomy seem to leave us little to hope from further inductions; whilst in Chemistry the indications of connexion between Electricity, Magnetism, Light, Heat and Crystallization, afford us ground for hope that the science is about to make a grand stride in the inductive direction.

§ 94. *Syllogisms of Analogy.*

Analogy has been defined "The similarity of ratios or relations;" and as each relation supposes two cognate things, a comparison of relations would imply four things, and four terms to express them. Thus (to employ one of Archbishop Whately's examples) when Mandeville uses as an argument against

popular education, that "If the horse knew enough he would soon throw his rider," he intends to imply two pair of related terms—

As the horse is to its rider, so is the people to its rulers,

and to assert further that since the one relation depends upon the continuance of ignorance on the part of the horse, the other depends upon ignorance also. Common sense suggests the refutation of such an argument; we deny that the relations *are* similar, or at least that the similarity reaches so far as to warrant such an assertion as is founded upon it. Similarity of relations may exist however where there is no resemblance between the related things.

But in popular language we extend the word analogy to include resemblances of things, as well as of relations. Analogy in this sense has exercised an immense influence on the formation of language. In numberless cases visible or tangible things lend their names to invisible and spiritual, from a resemblance more or less striking between them. *Transgression* in its primary sense

means the crossing over a visible boundary ; *right* means straight, and *wrong* means twisted. We speak of a *clear* statement, a *lofty* mind, and a *deep* thought, all these adjectives being drawn from the analogies of the material world. Whilst we can exhibit these in the form of a statement of proportions, so as to vindicate the original sense of analogy, it is not necessary, nor in all cases natural, to do so. We may consider therefore that similarity of attributes, as well as of relations, may have the name of analogy.

Employed as an argument, analogy depends upon the canon—*the same attributes may be assigned to distinct but similar things, provided they can be shown to accompany the points of resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference.* But since the presupposition of a power of discerning to what part of the things the attributes belong, is indispensable, the argument itself depends for its weight upon something external to itself, and sinks into a mere exposition. In a syllogism proving that the metropolis, as the heart of a state, should not be suffered

to become too large, because a large heart is diseased, the real dispute would not be about the syllogism itself—

The heart in relation to the body should not be too large,

The heart in relation to the body = (partly) the metropolis in relation to the state,

Therefore the metropolis to the state should not be too large.

This inference (in E U E. Fig. iii.) is faultless, provided we admit that the partial identity established between the heart and the metropolis includes the point of size; and to decide this, other arguments will be requisite, which, if unsuccessful, will render the present one false, if successful, needless. And therefore arguments of this kind, founded on a questionable resemblance, are used rather to suggest comparisons and so persuade, than to compel conviction; and philosophers have had great cause to complain of the many fallacies which become current through false "Metaphorical analogies."

But where the resemblance between two things is undoubted, and does not depend on one or two external features, analogy tends

much more strongly to persuasion at least, though it cannot amount to demonstration. Its principle would be—*When one thing resembles another in known particulars, it will resemble it also in the unknown.* The expression of their agreement must be a *qualified* judgment of identity—a U. They must not be of the same kind, but only of a similar one, otherwise the argument is a mere case of Example. Neither must the usual tests have been applied (see p. 339) to prove that the known particulars invariably accompany the unknown, otherwise, as Mr. Mill observes, we trench upon the ground of Induction. In venturing thus to assign attributes to a thing, because other things of a different class have them, we show our dependence on the regularity and consistency of creation. When the geologist discovers a fossil animal with large strong blunt claws, he infers that it procured its food by scratching or burrowing in the earth, trusting that a conformation which in other kinds of animals accompanies this particular mode of life, would not be arbitrarily and exception-

ally assigned in this case to an animal of different pursuits. The following example, from Bishop Butler, of a false analogy, and its refutation, will show the syllogistic treatment of analogies :—

“ There is little presumption that death is the destruction of human creatures. However there is the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is—the supposed likeness which is observed between the decay of vegetables and of living creatures. And this likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. But, in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that there appears no ground even for the comparison, as to the present question ; because one of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that which is the principal and chief thing in the other, the power of perception and of action ; and which is the only thing we are enquiring about the continuance of. So that the destruction of a vegetable is an event not similar, or analogous, to the destruction of a living agent.”

This may be resolved into two syllogisms.

I. Analogy—in A U A, Fig. iii.

The decay of vegetables is total destruction,

The decay of vegetables = (for present purposes) the decay of living creatures,

Therefore the decay of living creatures is total destruction.

II. Refutation.

The decay of animals is that of living acting creatures,
The decay of vegetables is not that of living acting creatures,

Therefore the decay of vegetables is not the same as that of animals.

The Conclusion E of the latter syllogism is opposed as a contrary (p. 208) to the premises U of the former.

§ 95. *Syllogisms of Chance.**

Chance may be described as the amount of probability with which we expect one or other, out of two or more uncertain events. Uncertain events are those for which we can see no cause or law to determine the occurrence of one rather than of another. As all questions into which this notion enters demand a numerical statement, the doctrine of chances is always regarded as a branch of mathematics; and its intricacies can only be explained by persons deeply conversant with that science, who have turned their at-

* I have borrowed parts of this section from a great authority in calculations of Chance—Professor *De Morgan*. Formal Logic. ch. ix.

tention to this special branch of enquiry. I purpose at present only to lay down the elements of it, and give a few of the simplest examples of their application.

The probability that a wholly uncertain event will happen, is as the number of cases in which it *can*, to the number of those in which it *cannot* occur.

To give a familiar illustration of this axiom, let us enquire what are the chances, in tossing up a halfpenny, that it will give a head at or before the third throw? We must assume that the coin has no tendency in itself to give a preponderance to head or tail, as the least appearance of such a law puts calculations of chances into confusion, unless indeed we happen to be able to calculate the precise amount of its action: if the parts in relief on the face of a coin are much greater than on its reverse, perhaps they may have a sensible influence upon the number of tails thrown with it, as the heavier side of it will tend to reach the ground first. Now here are eight events, any one of which may occur in three throws—

1. No head may be thrown.
2. The 1st throw only may be a head.
3. The 2nd _____
4. The 3rd _____
5. The 1st and 2nd _____
6. The 1st and 3rd _____
7. The 2nd and 3rd _____
8. All three may be heads.

Out of the eight, the first alone is adverse to our chance; in all the rest a head *is* thrown at or before the third trial; and according to the axiom, the chances in our favour are seven (events) to one (event); or $\frac{7}{8}$ of the cases make for us.

That this result is fairly calculated may be gathered from another mode of proof. Suppose that eight distinct trials are made, to see at what throw the first head comes; we may calculate that in seven out of the eight trials it is likely to occur at or before the third. As heads are as likely to be thrown as tails, we expect that in half, that is four, cases, heads will make their appearance the first time. The same principle applies to the other four cases, in which we must go on to

a second throw; in half of the second throws, that is, two, we expect heads. There remain only two cases in which it will be necessary to proceed to a third trial, to get the head; and half of them, or one, will be heads. Thus—

In 4 cases, a head first throw.

In 2 —, — second —

In 1 —, — third —.

7

leaving only one of the eight trials in which it will be necessary to go further. Here again we have seven favourable events to one unfavourable; in common language the odds are seven to one.

There is no difficulty in stating the result thus attained, in a syllogism.

$\frac{7}{8}$ of the groups of three throws give a head,

This trial is to be a group of three throws,

Therefore this trial ($\frac{7}{8}$) will give a head.

The fraction written after the subject of the conclusion is to be read "It is 7 chances out of 8;" or, taking the numerator for the chances on the one side, and the difference

between it and the denominator for those on the other, "The odds are 7 to 1."

The origin of the axiom is involved in the same difficulty as attends the axioms of geometry. How do we come to expect that in the long run head and tail will nearly divide the throws between them? Why do we not look for a long unbroken series of one or the other? Experience, no doubt, first suggested this absolute indifference of nature, to two events neither of them having any known cause that should give it a preponderance. But it may still be questioned whether the intricate calculations founded on this axiom are mere generalizations of experience, and whether our faith in the necessary truth of the axiom be not more than the sum of our experiments. Certain it is that experience confirms it. In two series of 2048 sets of throws, made by Buffon and by a pupil of Professor de Morgan's, the results coincided very closely with each other and with the *a priori* calculation. A slight excess of tails over heads in both experiments may be accounted for by the disturbing cause

suggested above—the superior weight of the head-side of the coin.

In calculations like the preceding, whilst we assume that all the operating causes are equal ; that neither gravitation, nor the mode of applying the force, has any tendency to bring more heads than tails, we may proceed safely without particular experiments, on the general principle that governs *all* events of equal uncertainty. But the doctrine of chances is applied to other subjects in which we have no means of calculating the amount of the causes in one scale or the other, except by collecting many observations of their effects. An Insurance Company ascertains in this way the average duration of life, and calculates its premiums a little higher than this average requires ; whatever is over being profit. It must even take into account the localities from which it is to expect clients ; an average calculated for London, where, according to M. Quetelet, 1 in 46 die, annually, would be ruinous in Paris, where the deaths are as many as 1 in 32. Certain unascertainable causes deter-

mine the number of deaths; and, looking at past results, the insurers fix, not the causes, as in induction, but the amount of expectation they entertain that the same effects will be again and again repeated, it being supposed that all the causes continue in operation.

To verify by experiment the axioms of chance, a wide range of facts is required, because a series of a few cases often exhibits great aberrations from a rule that never fails to vindicate itself in a longer course of trials. An Insurance Office with five or ten clients only, might be ruined in a year by two deaths. In some of the experiments alluded to above, a head was not thrown till the 11th, the 14th and the 16th throws. It is not unusual to find a family with six or eight sons and no daughters; and yet the whole number of male, is very nearly equal to that of female, births throughout the world.

In many cases chance affects both premises of our argument. Imagine a gold, a silver and a leaden urn, the first containing four white and two black balls, the second

and third six white balls each ; and suppose that I am to draw one ball blindfold from one of the three urns, I know not which;— what are the chances in favour of my fixing on a black ball? The black ball can only be drawn from the golden urn ; and the chance that I go to that at all is $\frac{1}{3}$. If I find the urn, the black balls in it are only $\frac{2}{6}$ of the whole. Now another axiom applies to this case, viz. That when one uncertain event depends upon another uncertain event, the chance of its happening is as the product of the chances in favour of both uncertain events to the product of the chances against them. Here then is the syllogism—

My drawing from the golden urn is $\frac{1}{3}$ of the possible cases,

My drawing a black ball is $\frac{2}{6}$ of the possible drawings from that urn,

Therefore my drawing a black ball is $\frac{2}{9}$ of the possible cases.

or

B is $\frac{1}{3}$ A,

C is $\frac{2}{6}$ B,

\therefore C ($\frac{1}{9}$) is A.

In other words, there are 16 to 2, or 8 to 1,

against my drawing a black ball. This easy case may be verified by considering all the balls as thrown into one urn; when there would be two black and 16 white—or $\frac{2}{18}$ black. Two or three other formulæ for the application of this axiom are added for the reader to fill up.

A E E. Fig. II.

All A ($\frac{1}{2}$) is B,

No C ($\frac{2}{3}$) is B,

Therefore No C ($\frac{1}{3}$) is A.

Here the fractions denote—even chance—two to one—and one to two—respectively.

A A I. Fig. III.

All A ($\frac{3}{4}$) are B,

All A ($\frac{4}{5}$) are C,

Therefore some C ($\frac{3}{5}$) are B.

In Lambert's Organon, vol. II. this subject is pursued and many formulæ given, some of a highly complicated kind. We shall leave them to mathematicians, upon the borders of whose province we are at present standing.

We must beware of extending the doctrine of chances to cases not really pertain-

ing to it. Where we expect a change in the state of our knowledge of the uncertain event, the numerical statement of chances is only made to be overthrown; thus, when *one* witness deposes to an occurrence and *three* witnesses deny that it took place, it will be useless to state the probability as 3 to 1 against the occurrence, because another step may convince us that the one witness is an upright, trustworthy person, and the three on the other side notoriously false and deceitful, with a decided interest in their present story. Again, we cannot always be sure that we have arranged all the possible cases connected with the subject. D'Alembert maintained that it was *two* to one that a head would appear before the third throw, whereas it is known to be *three* to one. If such inaccuracies can occur in so simple a case, how much more difficult to enumerate the chances when human passions and mistakes enter into the cases we are to examine!

§ 96. *Syllogisms of Classification.*

Classification, which enters into all sciences,

is the basis of some of them, as Botany, Mineralogy and Zoology. In every act of classification two steps must be taken ; certain marks are to be selected, the possession of which is to be the title to admission into the class, and then all the objects that possess them are to be ascertained. Where the marks selected are really important, and connected closely with the nature and functions of the thing, the classification is said to be natural ; where they are such as do not affect the nature of the objects materially, and belong in common to things the most different in their main properties, it is artificial. The botanical system of Linnæus is tainted with the defect that it groups together plants of very different aspects and properties, merely upon the ground that they have the same numbers of stamens and styles ; that is, it is too artificial a system.

A class cannot always be defined in words, so as to describe *every* species in it. From the lowest of its subdivisions to the highest we pass through so many shades of difference, that we have a difficulty in perceiving

and expressing the likenesses between the extremes; and properties which were prominent at the bottom of the scale, are in the higher steps forgotten, as nobler ones come into view. To distinguish the polyp, the lowest species in the animal series, from a plant, it must be defined as "having a digestive cavity;" whereas the definition usually given for higher animals, and for the conception animal in general, conveys that they are "beings endowed with life and sensation." Still we group them together by our perception of likenesses; which though not so obviously applicable to the ends of the series viewed together, and apart from the intermediate links, becomes so when we pass regularly along the chain. We might not be able to prove that the polyp had sensation at all, if there were not creatures a little higher in the scale of being, resembling the polyp in other particulars, and exhibiting more plainly the sense of feeling. We presume that it exists in the lower, because we see it in the higher, and though it decreases as we descend, we cannot show that it has

ceased. I have remarked that the definition of a genus is the adequate definition of its lowest species only, since one which included any higher properties than the lowest exhibits, would of course exclude it. But in classification the definition is not so much used as the *type*, that is, some one pattern species, by likenesses or unlikenesses to which we arrange the others, and assign them a higher or lower degree.

Though the species in any great class rise by the steps of a regular arrangement, the same series must not be continued from the highest of one kingdom to the lowest of the next above it. The highest plant is often considered next below the lowest animal, whereas it is much more like, though infinitely inferior to, the highest animal. The animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms rather resemble ladders of equal height resting upon three different steps of a house, than ladders raised one upon the other. The lowest animal, the lowest plant, and the lowest mineral answer to each other; and the complex animal organism, the tall and beau-

tiful tree, and the regular group of crystals correspond in some measure at the top of the respective scales.

A fyllogism like the following is adapted to express classification.

U A A. Fig. I.

All beings endowed with life and sensation = animals,
The polyp the man have life and sensation,
Therefore they are animals.

§ 97. *Categories.*

Whilst pure Logic neglects the *real* nature of the things it deals with, and invests them with a merely formal value, logicians in almost every age have endeavoured to frame schemes of classification in which things should be arranged according to their real nature. To these the name of Categories, or as we might render it Attributions, has been given; for whilst they are classes of things and not of propositions, so that they do not properly *attribute* any quality to a subject, they are constructed with a view to the more ready discovery of attributes when required. They are intended, like the labelled drawers in a

cabinet, to be a well arranged repository of the treasures of thought and knowledge, in which they may be kept secure and ready for use. As pure Logic is not a real science, such a system of arrangement for things and the attributes of things must belong to some other system ; it is in fact essentially metaphysical, and if admitted into Logic at all, must belong to the application of it, wherein we employ the pure forms of thought to discover the nature of things.

We require of a good system of Categories that it provide a place for every simple notion, and that its heads or divisions be specific enough to furnish real help in finding the attributes of any subject ; in two words, that it be exhaustive and suggestive. Tried by this test, such divisions as that into Substance, Mode, and Relation will be rejected as comparatively useless ; if complete and exhaustive, they are too vague to offer any tangible suggestions. Even the more elaborate division of Aristotle is open to this charge ; not to dwell upon the accusations sometimes made that it is confused and in-


complete. He divides words or notions into ten classes, viz. Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, Mode of being, Doing, and Suffering. Trendelenburg finds an exact correspondence between these and the grammatical division of the parts of speech; the first four corresponding to Substantives and Adjectives, the next two to Adverbs, and the last four to the active, passive and neuter verbs; but perhaps he pushes a good suggestion, that Aristotle sought in language the ground work of his arrangement, somewhat too far. Another important suggestion would reduce the number of the principal Categories to four, Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation; of the last of which the remaining six are only subdivisions, for Place and Time are the relation of things to each other in space and time, and the remaining four imply connection with other things.* The Hindu system of Kanâda, which according to a very distinguished Orientalist, Professor H. H. Wilson,

* See Stallbaum. *Parmenides*. Prol. p. 170.

is in its origin wholly independent of the Aristotelian, though it bears a marked resemblance to it, deserves our attention, if only as a distinct testimony to the need of some such classification. He divides the Padārtha (or objects of proof) into six; Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Property and Relation;—to these some of his commentators have added that of Privation (of any of the others). This is not the place for a survey of the systems of Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, Kant and others who have drawn up lists of Categories.

If I venture to propose a scheme of Categories not to be found elsewhere, it is with the belief that many such attempts must be made before a useful, not to say perfect, system can be constructed. And when attained, its value will be proportioned to the accuracy of the specific explanation we are able to give of each category. A complete analysis of the whole scheme would be in fact a metaphysical system.

TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES.



The ultimate members in this division are ten in number—an accidental coincidence with the Aristotelian list. They are—Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation of Time, of Space, of Causation, of Composition, of Agreement, of Polar Opposition, and of Finite things to the Infinite. Most of these names will be understood by every person likely to study a system of Categories; and as it is necessary at present to state results only, they may be passed over without com-

ment. The ninth in the list however, the Relation of Polar Opposition, may not so easily be understood. We find that in different parts of the field of knowledge pairs of opposite things unite and form a new whole different from either of them. In Morals, Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean is a case in point: courage, for example, is regarded as the line of indifference between audacity and an undue sense of danger, and the notion of it is not complete without both these elements. In Chemistry, the neutral salts, and the state of equilibrium of positive and negative electricity, are examples. In Art, the necessity of a balance of conscious activity and the unconscious natural energy, of the critical and creative faculties, may, if Schelling be correct, supply another. Above sixty passages from various authors are before me, shewing how different minds occupied on different subjects, not excluding the highest of all, Religion, fall into this law without knowing it. And when we speak of "half-truths" or reprehend men for their "one-sidedness," in reality our ground of complaint

is that this law has been broken or overlooked. Rashness is often considered courage; and diligent study of art passes for artistic skill. The necessitarian, the hasty theorist, the superstitious, are victims of half-apprehended truths, which turn into deadly errors; and it would not be hard to shew that the whole task of a great thinker has often been to call attention to the opposite element, too much overlooked, and to unite what common minds have decomposed.

Alterius sic

Altera poscit opem res, et conjurat amice.

But this subject is worthy of a fuller illustration than can be afforded it here.

The Logic of Coleridge is founded upon this principle; and he has noticed that that of Giordano Bruno rests upon the same basis.

§ 98. *A Division of the Sciences.*

The table of Categories enables us to ascertain what kinds of attributes may belong to any conception, no matter from what department of knowledge it may be taken; consequently it is applicable to all sciences.

A division of the sciences, on the other hand, tends to separate different districts of knowledge, with the conceptions that belong to them, from one another. It is desirable to attempt such a division, as the conclusion of a treatise on Logic ; if for no other reason, in order that we may know to how many subjects we may have to direct our rules.

A science is a systematic arrangement of all the laws which belong to any one subject. The three great fields of human research are—the Divine Nature, the nature of the human mind, and the nature of the universe ; and corresponding to them are three principal groups of sciences—the Theological, the Psychological, and the Cosmical or Natural. Of the members of each group different enumerations may be given. In the present imperfect attempt, assistance has been derived from the work of M. Ampere on the Classification of the Sciences, from Dr. Whewell's Works, Weisse's Architectonik, and other sources, but especially from the work first named.

THEOLOGICAL SCIENCES.

THEOLOGY.	Biblical	{ Biblical Criticism. Exposition— <i>Exegesis</i> .
	Systematical	{ Dogmatic Theology. Pastoral Theology.
	Historical	{ Church History. History of Doctrines.

MENTAL SCIENCES.

MENTAL SCIENCES.	Reason	{ Logic, or the Science of the forms of Thought. Metaphysic, which ex- amines the ground of all knowledge of things.
	Choice and Affection	{ Morality, founded on the Conception of Right. Æsthetic, founded on the Conception of Beauty.

COSMICAL SCIENCES.

MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES.	Pure Mathematics	{ Arithmetic. Geometry.
	Phyfico-Mathematics	{ Mechanics. Astronomy.
PHYSICAL SCIENCES.	Physics proper	{ General Physics. Technology, or Physics ap- plied to Arts and Manu- factures.
	Geology	{ Descriptive Geology. Mining, or "Orycto- techny." (Ampere.)

NATURAL SCIENCES.	{ Phytological	{ Botany. Agriculture.
	{ Zoological	{ Zoology proper. Zootechny, knowledge of the use of animals to man.
MEDICAL SCIENCES.	{ Physico-Medical	{ Medical Physics. Hygiene.
	{ Medical Science proper	{ Pathology. Practical Medicine.
POLITICAL SCIENCES.	{ Legislation	{ Political Economy. History of Laws and Con- stitutions.
	{ Government	{ Administration of Law. Police and Defence.
PALÆTIO- LOGICAL SCIENCE*	{ of the Earth	{ Historical Geology. Distribution of Plants and Animals.
	{ of the Human Race.	{ Glossology, or science of affinity of languages. Ethnography, or science of affinity of races.

* i. e. Sciences in which the object is to ascend from the present state of things to a more ancient condition, from which the present is derived by intelligible causes.

§ 99. *Conclusion.*

These hints may be sufficient to guide a student in applying the principles of Pure Logic to the practice of analysis. If this little work is hastily examined and cast aside, the reader will not have become a logician; he will have learned the unimportant fact that upon this or that disputed doctrine the author held this or that opinion, and his knowledge will go no further. Instead of learning Logic, he will know an insignificant fact in logical history. The mistake is not uncommon;—we enquire what Aristotle and Bishop Butler said on morality, and think that we have studied Moral Philosophy; we read the *Organon*, and call ourselves logicians. History presides over these and other facts; we are in *her* domain when we use our books in this narrow spirit. Philosophy does not exist until the mind of the student begins to work for itself with the principles it receives historically; to decompose and to compose anew, to criticize the arguments

employed, to essay at least to push the confines of truth farther into the wilds of error and ignorance, and to leave her a wider territory.

Let those who wish to possess the intellect they have received from above, in the depth and clearness, the sober composure, the calm activity which a high degree of culture can alone bestow, venture to study Logic in a larger spirit than the merely historical. Let them become dialecticians; not in the sense which the sophist attached to that name, but rather in that which the scourge of sophists gave it. Let them not use so excellent a weapon as the reason in mere play, with a guarded point and bated edge, but let them keep it sheathed, sharpened and shining, till a battle has to be fought against an error. Let them watch for themselves the processes gone through in completing any science. If the rules given in books are erroneous, let them try to correct, if imperfect, to complete them: or, if experience verifies their truth and utility, let them be regarded with

a degree of trust greater than could have been awarded to them before, when they stood in books, the mere historical record of other men's philosophy. No one who has studied Logic in this conscientious spirit has ever found it trifling or useless.

THE END.

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